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The Review of Metaphysics

A PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

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ARTHUR CHILD

Doing and Knowing

PAUL WEISS

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ARTICLES

DOING AND KNOWING

ARTHUR CHILD

I

OPERATIONISM, or the theory that knowledge has an intimate connection with activity, assumes two forms. In the one, the activity is conceived as a making, as production; and I have elsewhere examined three actual versions of what I call the production theory of knowledge.¹ In the other, the activity is conceived as a doing, as action; I call it, therefore, the action theory; and, with variations at several points, I shall offer here a sketch of this theory.

Doing of some sort, undeniably, may have a connection of some kind with knowing in some sense. Take the slogan, "learning by doing." It points to the fact that one can acquire knowledge of how to do something—in the sense, at any rate, of acquiring the ability to do it—in the course of the doing. But, if undeniable, this fact seems also trifling. Nor would it mean much more to say that one can acquire such knowledge or ability only by the doing, though this is probably true if we grant that actions can be performed in the imagination.

With regard to the nature of the relationship, however, we find interesting alternatives: that action is a necessary condition of knowledge, and that knowledge is itself action. Under the first alternative, knowledge will be an insight or awareness that succeeds or supervenes on the action. But, in the statement that doing is prerequisite to knowing, there still lie several possible meanings. For one may know either in the sense of discovery or in that of learning; and, knowing in either of these senses, one may then know in the sense of retaining the knowledge. Now, it is conceivable that action should be prerequisite to discovery

¹ "Making and Knowing in Hobbes, Vico, and Dewey," *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, XVI, 271-310.

but not to learning; to learning but not to discovery; to both learning and discovery, whether also to retention or not; or to neither discovery nor learning, and yet to retention. The problem of choosing among all these combinations of senses will disappear with the second alternative, where knowing is itself a kind of doing; for, in that event, whatever can be recognized as a certain kind of knowing must be recognized as the same kind of doing. Under the second alternative, the problem will be that of exhibiting the three functions, discovery, learning, and retention, as forms of action. And, under this alternative, that action which is knowledge (simultaneously, of course, in the sense of "knowing" and the sense of "known") must be action suffused with some sort of insight or awareness—a consciousness which without the action either remains an empty form or, if filled with something other than action, becomes illusory.

Of course, the man who makes knowing a kind of doing might claim that to add an awareness is only to add another, if a mental, operation or action. But in reply his opponent should insist on the distinction in principle between the form and the matter, between act and content, between one's awareness and that of which one is aware; or, if required to speak of operations or actions on both sides, the opponent should insist that the actions or operations referred to as concepts are apprehended by actions or operations utterly distinct from concepts. And, in return, the opponent himself might suggest that the identification of knowing with an action known results from insufficient analysis. A concept its own activity of apprehension? Absurd! A reflexive act of thinking, if possible, could have for its object only the objectless act. Nevertheless, the man who refuses to distinguish between act and content will stand his ground: "Separate from the concept the activity of apprehension," he will say; "with a specious analysis distinguish an act and its intentional object, and there remains no object to be apprehended (that only being intelligible, for instance, which in some measure is intelligent) and likewise, in consequence, no apprehension." And it is clear that we have two irreducible claims as variants thus far on our theory.

But we can recognize even a third variant. Here, though it is possible to distinguish an action thought and an act of

thinking, yet in the measure in which the thinking is true to the thought, in which the act does seize the action, in that measure the act becomes the action. Thus in perfect knowledge there is perfect identity, and the act of thinking is the action thought. At the highest level acknowledged in the third variant, therefore, as always according to the second, "there is identity between knowing subject and known object—we mean this seriously,"² to use the words of Plotinus; and, centuries before, Aristotle had declared that "actual knowledge is identical with its object."³

II

For all three of the variants, I have supposed that the object of knowledge is action, mental or physical. But the supposition involves an ambiguity, since the term "action" could cover both actual and possible action. Can possible actions, then, be included among the objects of knowledge? Only, I should say, so far as they are actual, namely, so far as they are represented in the actions by which they are conceived. In other words, it is the act of conception alone which, strictly speaking, one knows, so long as the possible action has not been actualized, and, when the possible action has been actualized and is known as actual, the knowledge is of a different object. This answer, of course, holds for the second and, in part, the third variant, but not for the first. According to the first variant, it appears, possible actions, so far as merely possible, do not fall within the object of knowledge—unless, that is, they should fall within what we shall presently recognize as a transcendent object.

From the postulation of doing as a prerequisite to knowing, on the other hand, it does not follow that the object of knowledge is action. Doing may function as a necessary instrument: the retina, in the same way, is an organ of seeing though not the object of sight. Service as instrument would not, to be sure, exclude a simultaneous function as object; but the possibility and

² *Enneads*, III, viii, 6; *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, tr. Joseph Katz (New York, 1950), p. 49.

³ *De Anima*, 430a20, Smith translation.

nature of a further or a different object would lie open. And what of the antithetic position? From the identification of knowing with a kind of doing, does it follow that action is the sole object of knowledge?

For both positions, let us hypothesize that, though one knows nothing but action, yet through, and even precisely in, the knowing of action one can know something other than action, in the sense that the actions may shadow forth, or embody traces of, something which lies beyond them but which one can grasp—and grasp only—in and through them. The synthetic position, being synthetic, calls for no separate consideration here. In the interest of clarity, however, I might restate the antithetic possibilities with respect to an object transcending action: either the transcendent object of knowledge has no other connection with action than to be externally revealed by it, as the action of the stage crew, in raising the curtain, reveals the play; or else the transcendent object has some intrinsic connection with the action that reveals it, as the actions of the players reveal the characters they represent. And observe that the first of these possibilities could obtain only if doing is prerequisite to knowing, while the second could obtain whether doing is prerequisite to, or whether it is identical with, the knowing.

Under the first possibility it is perhaps a problem how the action does serve to reveal the object that lies beyond; in the same way, the mechanics of the stage curtain presents a problem. But in neither case is the problem especially hard to understand. With the second possibility, though, there seems to arise a true perplexity. If actions are the object of knowledge, how can we speak of knowledge as transcending action? For this theory, not only should one sometimes know what one does, which is a plausible enough contention, but one must also and always do what one knows. And it sounds most implausible to speak of "doing" the object of knowledge unless knowledge has for its object actions alone.

Still, I think we can make sense of the theory by some such reflections as the following. Even if actions be the sole object of knowledge, one can nevertheless transcend them by doing something that is not by nature something done, enacting something

that is not by nature an action. To give an analogy, as one knows a Chinese novel by its translation into English, though it is itself in no way English, so one can know what is not itself action by, and in, its rendition in the form of action. And for an example of the sort of way in which the object appears, we need to think only, as I suggested before, of the art of acting itself, by which passions and characters are known precisely in the actions that present them. Or as Scheler says, speaking more generally, the occurrence of experiences in the other person's sphere of absolute personal privacy "is given for us *in* expressive phenomena— . . . not by inference, but directly, as a sort of primary 'perception.' It is *in* the blush that we perceive shame, *in* the laughter joy."⁴ Now I see no reason to suppose that the relation between the transcendent object and its cognitive action should be of only one kind, any more than the action itself should. The object can be presented by dance or drama or other ceremonies or rites or by institutional activity or by the doings of the person in isolation and solitude. And these various types of action can present the transcendent object through symbolization, dramatization, the imitation of form, or whatever the means might be through which actions do present characters and passions.

But suppose it enough that, in knowing, one should know one's action; suppose that doing is only a necessary condition for the disparate act of knowing. Even on this supposition, the possibility of transcendent knowledge is not excluded. For if the action itself is a fragment of a larger whole and, as such a fragment, implies the whole, then, in knowing one's action, one cannot but know that whole which is more than one's action and yet, as implied therein, is not more. And the very measure in which one understands action will be the measure in which one transcends it. But to this paradox I must add the following observations. Though the action should indeed be a fragment implying its whole, the whole may nonetheless reveal itself also in such other ways as those we considered above. And we cannot restrict to what I have called the first variant the conception of

⁴ Max Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, tr. Peter Heath (New Haven, 1954), p. 10.

any finite action as fragmentary and thereby as implicative of the whole; it fits variants two and three equally well.

That, then, being the case, we must consider the transcendent object itself. What must it be to be thus transmissible according to any variant? Surely we can preserve the intelligibility of the several means of transmission, while excluding none of the three variants, if we suppose—as seems, in any event, hardly avoidable—that the transcendent object is, in each instance, a whole-form, some structure complete, so far as completeness goes, on its own level. And in this structure, conceivably, either the related action might be involved as a fragment, or its involvement might exist in some other way or ways. But a whole-structure of what kind? Perhaps a structure of things as they are, but by no means necessarily. For it might be a possible structure, and this in the sense either of a structure believed to be at least possible or—and this is more common—of a structure believed to be actual. Yet even if merely possible, the form is not therefore a subjective construction. It is rather an objective structure, and its objectivity is attested by its universality among those affected cognitively by the related action. Controversies may exist, indeed, as to precisely what is discovered in that structure; but they are resolvable in principle and often in fact—or interminable controversies point to a difference in what actually is seen. It is another question (though seldom realized to be distinct) whether the structure perceived is also the structure of actual events. Insight into the one leads only, in the first instance, to hypotheses as to the other; and the ignoring of this circumstance is partially due, no doubt, to the extreme difficulty of ascertaining what transactions did occur and especially in what interrelations they were involved.*

* In speaking of transcendence, as in the rest of this paper, I do not profess to expound any personal doctrine; my intention is rather to open a possibility, whose clarification and development—I presume in any of several directions—will perhaps await the insights of a believer. But this adumbration is justified by analogy with the other form of operationism. For the notion of the cognitive transcendence of doing corresponds to that transcendence of making by which the civil philosopher, according to Hobbes, in compounding definitions, knows the nature of the commonwealth; and by which, according to Vico, as men make the civil world, they likewise know the eternal ideal history of nations.

III

Any theory of knowledge will commit, from the standpoint of other theories, the folly of excluding what is obviously knowledge or of including what is obviously not—or both—and of grossly misranking the various bodies of knowledge. But let us proceed to our own inclusions and exclusions and to the appropriate evaluations.

If action is the object of knowledge, whatever has for its object something other than action is not knowledge, *a fortiori* according to those variants in which knowing, itself action, is or becomes the action known. The principle, however, is not as exclusive as it might appear; one is not always concerned as little with action as one may assume. Geometry, physics, sociology—all, so far as they offer knowledge, report on action. What action, though? Is it necessarily that of the knower? From certain discussions of experimental physics, we could make that inference. But what shall we say of observational science? When the object, other than the knower's actions, is not action—as in anatomy, say—the scientist knows only his actions; and what his actions make him aware of is not, properly speaking, known (unless, to be sure, it is done, in and through those actions). Observational science of this sort is thus, if partly assimilated to experimental science, in part distinguished therefrom. Then what of a social science in which the scientist observes, but observes actions? Here, it seems to me, the object of observation is also, in contrast to those other observational

See my "Making and Knowing in Hobbes, Vico, and Dewey," especially pp. 280 ff., 292, and 309.

The problem of the cognitive diversity between and unity within groups, I have examined in detail in "The Problem of Imputation in the Sociology of Knowledge," *Ethics*, LI (1941), 200-19; "The Problem of Imputation Resolved," *Ethics*, LIV (1944), 96-109; "On the Theory of the Categories," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, VII (1946), 316-35; "The Problem of Truth in the Sociology of Knowledge," *Ethics*, LVIII (1947), 18-34; and "The Sociology of Perception," *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 77 (1950), 293-303; and the similar problem of aesthetics in "The Social-Historical Relativity of Esthetic Value," *Philosophical Review*, LIII (1944), 1-22, reprinted in Eliseo Vivas and Murray Krieger, *The Problems of Aesthetics* (New York, 1953), pp. 445-62.

sciences, the object or part of the object of knowledge—not because the observed actions qualify simply as actions, but because, being actions, they can be repeated by the knower and, becoming thus his own, become knowable and known. In the other sciences, what we ordinarily think of as the object of observation—the stars, the flowers, and so forth—is neither known nor knowable but falls under some such other category as that of mere sensation or mere perception. Actions, too, of course, are in a way perceived but, being knowable, are not merely perceivable.

The concept of imitation is involved again in the problem whether one can have knowledge of the reported actions of others. And most so-called knowledge, be it remembered, is of this kind. Obviously, one can have a knowledge at second remove, a knowledge of one's own actions in locating and apprehending the report. But can one have, as we ordinarily suppose, a knowledge at first remove from that of the original reporter; a knowledge removed from his, as not immediately his, yet a knowledge at first remove only, as possessing, in the original actions, the same object? So far as one can imitate in imagination the actions that the original knower has performed in actuality, so far one can be said to know. The extent, however, is not great. For complete imitability depends on the presence of the materials with which the knower interacted, and the place of these materials, since they are non-active in kind, cannot be supplied in the physical sciences either at second or at first remove; this, no doubt, explains the insistence on the laboratory even for the more elementary study of the natural sciences. Bridgman is therefore justified in saying that "physical theory in its highest, dynamic, vital development exists in the minds of only a handful of people."⁶ For others—and for the handful, too, except where they have gained immediate knowledge—there can be knowledge only in an inferior sense, on a low level, of a poor grade. But with social science the situation is, at least potentially, different; for here the factors on both sides are actions, on the one side the actions of the knower, on the other the actions observed, so that the knower at first

⁶ P. W. Bridgman, *The Nature of Physical Theory* (Princeton, 1936), p. 134.

remove, by a double imitation, can imitate further the very immediacy that distinguishes knowledge at first hand from knowledge at first remove. In this way the latter becomes the former. And it follows that social science is more knowable and, as such, more scientific than natural science—for those, at least, whose knowledge is at first remove.

What, then, of the knowers at first hand? In the natural sciences even the first-hand knower can know nothing of the subject-matter he investigates. He may perceive it or its effects; he may fabricate some ontological guesses. But he knows, properly speaking, only his own actions—or those of other scientists so far as theirs become his—with respect to the subject of investigation. Do the actions of the physicist or the botanist present in any of the various possible ways, however, the transcendent object he professes to study? As fragmentary, no doubt they do, but I doubt his identification of them as fragmentary; or, if in some manner vestigial, I doubt his identification of them as traces. That is not to say that nature cannot be known, but merely that it cannot be known by the natural scientist; or, more accurately, that in fact the natural scientist does know nothing of nature. He himself may put the situation more pleasantly by defining nature as identical with his knowledge⁷ or more cavalierly by replacing nature with language. But the situation remains. In the social sciences, in contrast, as I have pointed out, the subject-matter, too, can be known, being actions. And I therefore ask now, which is more truly knowledge, for the knower to know only his own actions or, through them, the subject that his science investigates? But to ask the question is to answer it: for the knower at first hand, as well as the knower at first remove, social science is more scientific than the natural. Indeed, we might fairly pronounce it exactly twice as scientific.

If knowing consists in the actions known, and these actions are actions of the knower, history occupies a position not inferior to that of any other science, a position, in fact, rather higher

⁷ "From the operational point of view it is meaningless to attempt to separate 'nature' from 'knowledge of nature'" (Bridgman, *The Logic of Modern Physics* [New York, 1927], p. 62).

than that of social science. The historian knows either, first, what we might call his research actions; or, second, those of his actions that imitate the ones he infers, simultaneously with their imitation, from the data yielded by his research; or else he knows both. Neither the data nor the inferences, as such, are knowledge, any more than the physicist's sight of the pointers on the dials of his instruments or his inferences therefrom to the unobserved natures of things. Nor does the knowledge of the historian seize the past in itself, save in the unknowable measure in which the imitation does duplicate its original. Restricted, then, as it must be, to the actions of the historian himself, the legitimate claim of his knowledge finds its complete justification.*

And where does mathematics stand? That, I am sorry to say, we must leave obscure; for it depends on the nature of the object of mathematics. Does the mathematician know properly his own actions? In that event he would know more fully and surely than the social scientist; since there would be no need, as in social science, to imitate a primary but disparate material at the risk of erroneous apprehension or unskillful reproduction. And we might hold his knowledge superior even to that of the historian if, beyond the actions of the mathematician, there exists no further object which, though unknowable, he would ideally know. Or, on the contrary, does the mathematician, like the social scientist, know properly an object alien in fact? In that event, the object—as, presumably, nature—would likewise be alien in principle (where the object of social science is alien only in fact), and the mathematician would find himself in precisely the situation of the physicist with respect to knowledge at first hand. And whether mathematics is or is not a natural science, or in what proportion or in which respect, is not a question we can determine here. But either mathematics is the first or among the first of the sciences or else last or among the last.

This holds from the viewpoint of common materialistic metaphysics. But there is another point, the one indeed most appropriate to the present type of interpretation, from which we may

* For the development of this view of history, see my essay, "History as Imitation," *Philosophical Quarterly*, II (1952), 193-207.

reconsider the status of natural science so far as it is operational in the action sense and, therewith, of mathematics if mathematics is a science of nature. Consider, now, what alone could justify the identification of nature with knowledge of nature. It would make sense at all, of course, only on the assumption of the identity of knowing and known. Since, then, knowledge consists in action, in the coincidence of the knowing action and the action known, nature, as the known, must consist in action. But whose? The knower's, yes; the scientist's, yes; but surely the existence of nature does not depend on the scientist. And there must, therefore, exist a further "who." Under the assumption that nature consists in action, apparently but one condition can ensure its objectivity—namely, that it consist to start with in the actions of God, or at all events in a certain class of them, which the finite knower, if he begins by imitating, concludes by making his own in the knowledge identified with nature itself. Thus if the act of measuring, for instance, but imitates an act of spirit, the knowing to which it leads is such an act—and is nature. In this fashion we can offer to assure the possibility of physical science so far as actional. But whoever rejects this way must limit knowledge of nature to knowledge of one small part of nature, to knowledge merely of a part of our actions or perhaps only a part of his—which amounts to the allegation that physical science does not and cannot exist. And whoever accepts this way ranks physics, and mathematics therewith if physical, as the highest of all the human sciences, identifying it, as he does, with natural theology.

A few remarks seem advisable, lastly, on the claims of the other branch of operationism, according to which one knows either the making or the made. As to the made, the action theorist finds that this offers nothing for knowledge and only itself for perception. As to the making, the action theorist regards that as merely a set of actions, distinguished in no respect epistemically from actions of other kinds. All we can know, then, with regard to a product is either the actions by which it was made, or the actions by which one would either affect the product in some further way or obtain some perception other than the perception one has already.

IV

Perhaps it is now time to observe that, in spite of the long discussion, I have ignored what seems an obvious possibility. Why, that is, should we not concede that the intimate relationship between action and knowledge, if such a relationship exists, is causal? Quite obviously knowledge causes action, at least sometimes; and action, in its turn, might at least sometimes, and somehow, affect knowledge. Indeed, might not action cause all knowledge? But whether some or all, we need not, fortunately, consider; this line of thought would have led, in fact, to the betrayal of our theory, to its surrender into the hands of the production epistemology. For if action caused knowledge, it would bring knowledge into being, which is to say that it would produce or make knowledge—i.e., if knowledge is taken in the sense of content. What, then, if taken in the sense of act? What would it mean to say that action causes knowing? The meaning, apparently, is the same. If we disregard the dubious sense in which the action would cause the knowing by making the object, it could only, directly or indirectly, bring the act of knowing into existence—or preferably, I daresay, “into operation.” To speak of that as a production seems odd, but the oddity is rather linguistic than existential; and, for present purposes, it would be better to extend the meaning of production to the causation of acts than restrict its meaning to the causation of contents. And neither, therefore, should we say that action causes knowledge in the sense of knowing. Thus, if I have excluded from the above reflections the sense in which action would produce knowledge by being itself either the act or the content, this was done because with this sense the production theory remains only in discourse, having in reality been replaced, as the action theorist would desire, by the action theory. For to be is not, properly speaking, to cause; and God alone may be spoken of as *causa sui*.

There are matters, though, that cannot be ignored. There is belief, there is error—what should we do with them? For the action theory, knowledge is evident action. Belief, then, is the grasping of something as, presumptively, some certain action. And what of the fact that one claims one knows when one only

believes?⁹ Here is no unique problem; any theory admitting evidence must acknowledge a common confusion of certitude with evidence. And the case will never arise in which one would claim, sincerely, that one believes when one really knows; one can only presume in the lack of evidence, one can only believe in the lack of knowledge. Error, or cognitive mis-taking, occurs either particularly, in respect to knowledge or to belief, or generally, without particular reference to either. The first sort arises when certitude is taken for evidence and thus a kind of belief for knowledge; or ignorance for warranted conviction, or even certitude, and thus for belief. The second kind of error is the grasping of some action as something other than itself or the grasping of something other than action as action. With regard to transcendence, however, the mistaking that is error consists in the mere fact of taking, of taking whatever, when there can be only a giving, whether in the usual form of intimation or, on rare occasions, in that of presence.

Finally, what of wisdom in the action theory? "My view of this question is, as it happens, very simple. For since it is not in the nature of man to attain a science by the possession of which we can know positively what we should do or what we should say, in the next resort I hold that man to be wise who is able by his powers of conjecture to arrive generally at the best course, and I hold that man to be a philosopher who occupies himself with the studies from which he will most quickly gain that kind of insight."¹⁰ Now whether, as Isocrates goes on to declare, the philosopher is the student of rhetoric, of the art of discourse,¹⁰ which itself is an art of action, will depend on the conception both of true discourse and of the true art thereof. And into the nature of these we cannot here proceed. But wisdom, clearly, to follow Isocrates, is knowledge that generally has for its object (and perhaps itself consists in) not actual action, not possible action, but, whether actual or possible, the best action. Or, where there is no best, the better or the least bad. On this theory,

⁹ Isocrates, *Antidosis*, 271; *Isocrates*, tr. George Norlin (London, 1929), II, 335.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 275 ff.; see also pp. 184 ff.

therefore, wisdom reaches farther, if we grant that wisdom does concern action, than on theories in which knowledge concerns more than action. For here, if we likewise grant that action always allows of qualitative judgment, as indeed we must, wisdom can exist wherever knowledge can.

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ON BEING TOGETHER

PAUL WEISS

1. *The Problem and Some Answers.*

HE who would like to affirm that there is no more than one entity is faced with serious difficulties. To say nothing more than "One" is not yet, as Plato long ago observed, to say anything significant. Yet to say "One is" is already to have said two things, and in fact to have made a distinction between Unity and Being. An intelligible acknowledgement of a One involves an encounter with a Many.

Yet if there be a Many there must be a number of units somehow together. Were items entirely separate from one another, related in no way at all, they could not add up, make a plurality. A radical atomism offers not a Many but just a One, and then a One, and then a One, and so on, and thus has no way of ever knowing that there is more than one entity. To know that there are Many it is necessary to have them all brought together under the aegis of a common or comprehensive One.

The problem of the One and the Many is not simply a problem of knowing or saying that there is a One or a Many without somehow knowing or saying the other as well. It is also a problem of how a plurality of entities can be together without that very fact of their togetherness adding another member to the totality of things, which in turn must be brought together with the original set, and so on. This problem haunts every view, for every view acknowledges Many entities, if not in the shape of realities, then in the shape of illusions, elements, conditions, words or beliefs.

To this problem five grand answers have been offered in the past. They may be conveniently characterized as a) Synthesis, b) Concurrence, c) Self-Diremption, d) Dualism, e) Identity in Difference. Each does, I think, provide some answer to the problem. But each is also faced with embarrassments which cannot, I believe, be avoided unless we take up a new, sixth approach to the problem of the One and the Many.

a) *Synthesis*. Synthesis is a process (of being or of knowing) of forging disparate elements into a unity in such a way that each of the elements completes the others, offering them whatever additions they need in order to be as excellent as possible. It is thus a process by which a One for a Many is brought into existence, and the Many is thereby enriched. Taken at its thickest, as maximally engulfing the elements, leaving out either none or little of them so as to constitute a new being which is richer and more substantial than they are, synthesis is a source of novelty in thought or in being, the cause of the emergence of new values and new events in the universe of discourse or fact. Taken at its thinnest, as merely joining the elements without any or little affect on their being or natures, synthesis is a mode of sheer addition, of tying things together in an external way. Thick or thin, synthesis starts with entities which are unstable, incomplete and inadequate taken severally, to bring about a One of them all in which they all achieve supplementation from one another. There are of course many different theories of the nature and need for synthesis, but perhaps all can be treated as variations on Kant's brilliant attempt to explain how what is in fact diverse can be understood and exist in a single irreducible unitary whole. Hegel more resolutely and systematically exploited the idea of synthesis, but the principles and the problems involved in it do not seem to be for him really much different from what they were for Kant. I find four difficulties with the idea.

1. The doctrine of synthesis holds that the Many are brought together through some act. But then it is evident that synthesis presupposes someone or something to do the synthesizing. And since synthesizing is a real occurrence, it also presupposes, in addition to its Many, an activity affecting that Many. Whatever number of entities there be, if synthesis is the agency by which they are together, there will always be one more entity than those which are synthesized, since the synthesizer is another, and there will always be one other fact to take account of—the synthesizing, since this encompasses and is therefore not included in the original Many. Synthesis thus precludes us from saying that such and such make up the Many of the universe of thought or being, since

no matter how few or how many entities are acknowledged to begin with, the synthesizer and the synthesizing must be added to them to make a larger Many.

2. Synthesis produces a One out of a Many. That One is a function of the Many, and of the method by which they are united. Such a One is only a One *from* a Many; it is not yet a One *for* the Many. A One for a Many must have a Many over against it, which it somehow relates. But a One which is merely produced out of the Many has as yet no significance for that Many. A synthesis somehow must cut back on itself, push aside the very items which it is bringing together, in order to have a Many for the One which it produces.

3. Synthesis operates on a Many. But before it can operate, the various items in the Many must somehow constitute a single Many. If they are entirely cut off from one another, there would be no Many to be synthesized. But if synthesis is the only agency by which a Many is to be brought together, every synthesis must presuppose a prior synthesis. Only because a Many already has a One for it, enabling it to be a single Many, is it possible to have a synthesis. But then the synthesis is no longer necessary.

4. A successful synthesis finally yields a new entity. That new entity must be related to the original Many. It must be a One among a Many, make up with the original Many a larger Many consisting of that original Many and itself. It will then require a further synthesis to bring it together with that Many. Every synthesis thus requires a subsequent synthesis to relate its outcome to the material with which it began. No synthesis can ever be more than partial, incomplete, requiring ever more syntheses to deal with the problems raised by earlier ones. But unless the problem of the togetherness of the Many were solved to begin with, these subsequent syntheses could not take place.

b) *Concurrence*. Some of the difficulties that beset the theory of synthesis are avoided in the theory of concurrence. On this view too we start with a Many. But instead of invoking a synthesizer and ending with a One which must apparently be synthesized with the original Many, the Many are acknowledged to

produce a One by the mere concurrence of the Many outside themselves at some common point. To my knowledge, no one has urged this as the account of how there can be a One and a Many, though perhaps this is the idea at the root of Hobbes's theory of the origin of a state and his justification of sovereignty. In any case the One is here a derivative, which does not add an additional element to the totality of entities with which one starts and which were assumed to exhaust the furniture of the universe. It takes the Many seriously, seems to account for the One in a way that is intelligible and plausible, and does not, as synthesis seems to do, both require and make unnecessary prior and subsequent acts of bringing the Many together. I find three difficulties with the idea.

1. A concurrence happens either by chance or by necessity. If by chance, there can be no guarantee that the various items in the Many will have a common convergence. A chance production of a One is a production which could conceivably fail. A One is necessary to the Many; the presence of the One cannot therefore be the outcome of chance; it is impossible for there to be a Many without a One. Yet if the One comes about through a necessary convergence of the Many, the Many must act in concert, and in order to do this they must make up a singular totality, presuppose a One. Thus, if a convergence does not presuppose a One it may never attain it, and cannot in any case take place without miracle, for the Many has to be together from the very start. Yet if a One is presupposed, the need for the convergence disappears.

2. The One at which the Many is supposed to converge is part of that Many, or stands apart from it. It is the former if it is produced by the Many through their convergence; it is the latter if it makes the convergence possible. But if it is the former it is not yet a One for that Many; if it is the latter it is presupposed by and is not the product of the convergence.

3. A One which is produced through a convergence, and which somehow manages to stand apart from the Many, must dominate, encompass, bring the Many together. The Many out of which it issued through convergence must lose something of

their original separateness or freedom, to constitute that One which dominates them, for otherwise the One would be a new entity adding to the original Many. The Many must engage in an act of self-diremption, self-denial in order that the One be, and yet not be something added to the Many. But self-diremption is a different solution to the problem of the One and the Many—it is, in fact, the third of the solutions we have listed.

c) *Self-Diremption*. Instead of starting with a Many, out of which a One is to be generated, it might be thought desirable to start instead with a One, and generate a Many out of it by a process of self-alienation, ex-foliation, or exteriorization. This is the alternative to which monists eventually resort to account for their acknowledged plurality of appearances, errors or subordinate realities. The most persistent effort in this direction has perhaps been made by Plotinus, although it would be difficult to term him a monist, since he takes seriously the reality of the generated items, granting them a status apart from the generating One. Both his view and the view of the monists, east and west, who minimize the reality of the Many, have the great merit of recognizing the ultimacy and power of the One, and the fact that in some sense the Many is subordinate to and depends on it for its being and its intelligibility. I find six difficulties with this idea.

1. The One by itself is unintelligible. What is without division, without complexity, allowing no distinction—in short, containing no Many—cannot be thought or known. The theory of self-diremption must begin with what it cannot understand, proceed by principles it cannot grasp, and end with what it affirms is not altogether true or real.

2. To produce a Many the One must act. It and its act are distinct, and constitute a Many. The production of a Many thus already presupposes a Many, at least in the shape of the pair of the One and its act of diversification. A One which does not act remains undivided, but on the other hand it does not engage in self-diremption.

3. The One allows the Many to be over against it, or it fails to produce a Many. But then it either generates new realities or

minimizes itself, reduces itself in order to give some being or meaning to the Many. In the latter case it must presuppose not merely a prior One but a One which is more real than its self-dirempted being and the Many with which it is together.

4. The One engages in a single act or in many. If the latter, we have a radical plurality to begin with, before we have generated our Many. If the former, there will be only two things in the universe unless the product of that first act of generation generates a subordinate one, and so on, for a series of steps. This second alternative has no beings on the same level of reality or excellence, but only beings of many orders. These orders must somehow be brought together, and, so far as they are, are on a level, each offering a unit to be united with other units. A self-diremptive One must not only be a source of a Many but must continue to engulf it, and thus must have two roles, be a Many from the very start.

5. The One before it gives rise to a Many is distinct from the One as originating a Many. But then before the Many has been produced we have Many Ones. The generating of the Many would have to be of the very essence of the One and instantly produce its Many; but then there would be no act of self-diremption. A One which was always faced with a Many could be said to require that Many, but not to have generated it, and surely not by first being a mere One and then becoming a generating source of whatever else there be.

6. A generated Many is thrust away from the One or is confined within it. If the former, the Many and the One constitute a larger Many and need a more inclusive One to encompass it. If the latter, there is no real Many, a Many collected or connected by means of a One. There is only a One. This pair of alternatives touches the core of the doctrine of creation in classical theology. If God creates a universe he gives it its own existence and the universe no longer needs God in order to be; if the universe does not really stand apart, over against God, there is in fact no universe that he creates.

The problem of the One and the Many cannot hope for solution in any account which starts with one side and tries to get the

other out of it; each side has some standing, some being, some meaning apart from and over against the other.

d) *Dualism*. The dualist says flatly and finally, there is a One and a Many, and that is the end of the matter. Neither generates the other, neither grounds the other, neither owns the other. In the end most thinkers are perhaps pluralists; they end their thinking or their writing, with more than one item which they tacitly or explicitly grant to be separate, irreducible, merely over against one another. The dualist is a pluralist restricting himself to but two items, one of which may, as in the case of the problem of the One and the Many, be itself a plurality. There is strength in the doctrine, since it refuses to minimize the value or meaning of either side of such a basic issue as that of the One and the Many. Although it was one of his primary objectives to overcome dualisms of every type, perhaps Aristotle ought to be seen as a persistent dualist, particularly when account is taken of his contrasting views of God and nature, the active and the human reason, form and matter, substance and accident. Those who like Descartes deliberately set themselves to oppose the Aristotelian outlook usually do so without overcoming the basic dualism which defines the Aristotelian view. I find four difficulties with this idea.

1. A One *and* a Many is a Many. Dualism seems to side with one of the positions—that which starts and ends with a Many. And yet it confesses that a One is needed, for the One is the necessary correlate of the Many, never to be reduced to it or placed alongside it.

2. A One and a Many form a pair. They must be together in some way, and thus be under the aegis of a One. That One is and must be distinct from the One which is paired with the Many. A dualism thus proliferates endlessly, pairing opposites only by turning the result into a single item to be paired with a One in terms of which the original pairing occurred.

3. To form a pair the One and the Many must be related. That relation is neither the One nor the Many with which one begins. It is a third item which somehow must be paired with the

supposedly original and exhausting pair. Once again a dualism proliferates without end, since it must pair ever new items which were produced in the course of a previous pairing.

4. A dualism has two final items on a level. If it is to avoid an infinite production of new items to pair, it must refuse to acknowledge anything more than the items with which it begins. These must be thought of as irreducible, final, unrelated. But then to know or grasp or become acquainted with one of them is to be cut off from the other. How then, knowing or having one half of the duality can it be possible to know the other? And if we do not know or have the other, what warrant is there for supposing there is anything more than the original side with which one begins? A dualist, to know his two items, must somehow be over and above or in both, and in any case force the acknowledgement of something other than the items with which he originally tried to remain content.

e) *Identity in Difference.* Identity in difference is the doctrine that the final items are in a sense the same: the One is the Many, the Many is the One. Each of the two components is seen to need the other, before it can have the status of a full reality. That other is in fact itself from another side, the two sides as together, as one despite their being two, alone constituting a reality. Starting with the Many it acknowledges a One, but not as another item to be added to the Many; starting with the One it acknowledges a Many, but not as a further reality somehow generated out of and standing over against the One. The doctrine is subtle, perhaps too subtle for a non-initiate to grasp, perpetually seeming to disappear as it does into self-contradiction. This is true even in the case of the master of this view, that resolute dialectician and rationalist, Hegel.

No one of the Hegelian school seems to have taken the One and the Many with equal seriousness. All tend to favor the One over the Many. They remark that the One exteriorizes itself as and yet continues to possess the Many, differentiating itself from while identifying itself with that Many. There are similar statements to be found faintly urging somewhat similar feats on the part of the Many, but on the whole the Many is

thought of as a product of the One, subordinate to it in reality and in meaning. But only a view which takes the Many as seriously as it does the One does justice to the thesis of identity in difference, though such justice will perhaps preclude the desire of the school to move from a world of heterogeneous items to a single absolute within which whatever Many there be is found reconciled and somehow absorbed. Taken this boldly the thesis of the identity in difference of the One and the Many seems to accommodate the contentions of the dualists without falling into the characteristic embarrassments of that view. It grants the One and the Many equal status, but does not cut them off from one another. The other is held on to while it stands apart. To be with either the One or the Many, it holds, is not to be cut off but instead is to have the Many or the One as well. I find three difficulties with this idea.

1. It is not clear whether the Identity is supposed to be identical with or different from the Difference. If it is identical with it, we have nothing more than sheer Identity; if it is different from it we have a radical dualism right inside the initial Identity in Difference.

2. Each basic reality is supposed to have its other with which it is identifiable. But then Identity in Difference should have an other. The basic reality will, as a consequence, not be expressed as an Identity in Difference but rather as an Identity in Difference connecting an Identity in Difference with an other. This last in turn will need an other of its own, and so on, infinitely.

3. If the One is in any sense an other of the Many it must have features which the Many does not have, or lack features which the Many has. If this were not the case we would have nothing more than just a One, or just a Many. Yet if the One and the Many are genuinely distinct, the acknowledgement of a Many inevitably leads to the acknowledgement of one more entity, the One, which with the original Many will need a still further One, and so on.

2. *On Being Together.*

Each of these five answers has considerable power, and no solution to the problem of the One and the Many which neglects their insights will eventually do. A satisfactory account must, like the theory of synthesis, recognise that if we start with a Many, a One must be an emergent of some sort and yet not add to the total number of entities in the universe. It must recognize, with the theory of concurrence, that the various members of the Many must have a common One, but must avoid thereby compromising the status of that One as a One for that Many. With the theory of self-diremption it must acknowledge that One is presupposed by the Many as that which allows the Many to be together and thus be a Many, at the same time that it recognizes this Many to be an inevitable referent of that One, without compromise to the fact that the Many is as basic and as real as the One. With the dualist it must affirm that the One and the Many are on a par, each irreducible and final, but related in such a way as to make possible a knowledge of them both. And finally it must, with the defenders of the doctrine of Identity in Difference recognize the fact that despite their diversity the One and the Many are not alien to one another in meaning or in being; but this recognition must not lead to the abrogation of the law of contradiction, nor prompt the forging of irresponsible paradoxes. This is a formidable array of demands; yet one cannot avoid trying to meet them except by giving up a claim to be self-critical and systematic beyond any pre-assignable limit.

For simplicity's sake let us begin with a consideration of only two entities, x and y , making up a Many. Let these exhaust the universe; let them be viewed as irreducible, final realities, one of two independent basic dimensions or modes of being. As simply over against one another, as apart from a One, let us symbolize them as " x,y ". They cannot be in this state unless there is a One for them. Let us symbolize that One as ".". There will be an " x,y " only so far they together constitute the ".". The "." is x and y as merged, as terminating in each other; the merging of x and y is what constitutes the togetherness of them both. Like a point which is the outcome of the intersection of two lines,

a border which is the limit of two figures, a standing erect which is the outcome of opposite stresses, the "." exists only as something constituted by the very items it serves to sustain. The togetherness of x and y is x and y as no longer distinct; it can have a nature of its own only so far as they continue to stand over against it as distinct, as " x,y ".

Each of the elements, x and y , acts on and is blocked by the equal, counter-thrust of the other. The "." is not an entity additional to the x and y , since it is their togetherness, the being and meaning of them so far as they are intermingled, in no way distinct. But for each of the elements, x and y , the "." which it constitutes with the help of the other is something over and against it. The "." as partly constituted by x belongs to that x , and the x , in order that the part of its being which it contributes to make the "." should not be in the control of y , is driven to try to possess the entire ".". It tries to make the entire togetherness part of itself. Could it succeed it would then possess the y by virtue of its possession of that part of the "." which is continuous with the y . It never wholly possesses the "."; it can never manage to do more than to deal with it from its own angle. It does not possess it as a neutral fact—or what is the same thing, it gets the fact of togetherness only in the abstract and never in the concrete. As a consequence it never gets to the y entirely, but ends only with an abstract of it, what y is when approached by x through the agency or a biased mastery of the ".".

No matter how much of x is comprehended by y , or how much of y is comprehended by x , the x and the y will continue to be as they were. The mastery of the other by each occurs within the area defined by " x,y " and ".", the one expressing the fact that there are two entities, the other the fact they are together, each saying what the other does, but in a different way. The "." has the x and y together but at the price of their distinctness; " x,y " has the two so far apart that there is no relation to be found between them. We can say, if we like, that " x,y " is one mode of togetherness of which "." is the other, the one having a minimum of the being of a togetherness, the other a maximum. Or we can say with equal justification that "." is x and y in one guise, of which " x,y " offers a complementary other, the first

distinguishing them to a minimum degree, the second to a maximum. In either way of speaking the x and y are recognized to constitute their own togetherness, and the togetherness is recognized to be distinct from the x and the y just so far as they are distinct from one another.

There is always a difference between the "." and " x,y ". That difference we can describe in a "." way or in a " x,y " way, the one stressing the togetherness of the "." and the " x,y ", the other their distinctness. And these two descriptions can themselves be described in two ways and so on without end. This is a harmless progression, for it is a progression in analysis and not one towards presuppositions which have to be settled before there can be the situation with which we in fact began. We always possess both a "." and an " x,y ". And when we try to say how they are one we must continue to keep them distinct as a many. From the standpoint of "." the "," in " x,y " is a whole set of "." which never make a single whole; from the standpoint of " x,y ", the "." is the unreachable limit of more and more intimate relations between x and y . Each standpoint expresses what the other is. If we wish to avoid either standpoint, we but take the standpoint of a neutral but abstract mind. We then assume something like the position of the "." and see that which is before us as a manifold in which the various parts are conjoined, but never enough to make the kind of unity which we have in mind.

The One and the Many then are related by a kind of identity in difference, for the "." and the " x,y " articulate one another, re-state one another in different terms. The one presents in a united way what the other has as separate. But the relation of the two parts is not a paradoxical self-sameness which is different; each is the continuation of the other, the extreme limit of what the other exhibits. They can be said to form a duality, but not as a pair of items characterizable in the same terms. The x,y are distinct and determinate, the "." is indeterminate, with the x and the y hopelessly merged. The being of the "." requires the distinguishing of its items; the being of " x,y " requires their merging. Both the distinguishing and the merging must occur, but the occurrence of the one is not a fact over against the occurrence of the other. The existence of x and y does not involve

the production of another entity ".", which together with them make a new Many. The x and y exist as "." and as " x,y ". These are one and the same, and if we start with either, we express ourselves through the use of the other. They can be had as distinct, but only by our standing over against them in a neutral position. But then it is evident that their status as distinct is but a way of articulating the fact that we have them together in an abstract rather than in a concrete way. Starting with " x,y ", the "." is the product of a convergence; starting with ".", the " x,y " is the product of a self-diremption. But in neither case do we get a being separated from its origin, a genuine other adding another fact to the universe, additional to that with which we began. And finally the "." can be viewed as a product of a synthesis of the x and the y , but a synthesis which never had to be performed. The synthesis of " x,y " is completed in the ".", and this "." exists when and as " x,y " does.

We started with x and y , a Many. That Many makes a unity by virtue of a togetherness which is distinct from the items that are together. But that togetherness is not a third substance; it is the very items which are together. The togetherness of beings is the being of them together.

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KIERKEGAARD AND THE PROBLEM OF EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY, I

LOUIS MACKEY

I. *Thought and Being.*

ON the philosophical side the starting point of Kierkegaard's thinking is a reply to Hegel. If it is the characteristic right of mind to know the truth, Hegel reasons, then "everything we know both of outward and inward nature, in one word, the objective world, is in its own self the same as it is in thought. . . ." To think or reflect is to bring out the truth of the object. But this act of thought is my act, so that "the real nature is a *product* of my mind, in its character of thinking subject—generated by me in my simple universality, self-collected and removed from extraneous influences. . . ." ¹ Followed to its end, this inference leads Hegel to the conclusion that the necessary self-development of the concept (*Begriff*) is identical with the objective structure of reality. What is (ultimately) real is also (ultimately) rational.

Kierkegaard never doubted that the object of thought is real. The idea that thinking could be about nothing is unintelligible. "That the content of my thought *is* in the conceptual sense needs no proof, or needs no argument to prove it, since it is proved by my thinking it" (*Postscript* 282; SV VII 306). ² There is a problem, however, concerning the relationship of being "in the conceptual sense" to being in whatever other senses it may have. Being is not of a piece, but is inwardly differentiated by its own modalities (cf. *Postscript* 268n; *Fragments* 32-33, 60). The problem of the relation of thought and being cannot be understood unless we are aware of the various meanings of "being," and similarly, of the meaning of "thought."

Suppose, for example, the assertion is made that "truth is the

¹ *The Logic of Hegel*, tr. W. Wallace, p. 44.

² References to the English translations of Kierkegaard's works are given in parentheses in the text. In the case of direct quotations, where I have sometimes altered the translation, reference is also given to volume and page numbers of the second edition of the *Samlede Værker*.

conformity of being and thought." Let "being" be taken to mean the abstracted or prototypical *form* of being, being as the most universal genus. Then the assertion of the conformity of being and thought is tautologous. Being generically understood is, as Hegel was aware, the emptiest of concepts. As the being of all things it characterizes everything and distinguishes nothing. Since it also characterizes thought, it is analytically true to say that thought conforms to being. For all that is said thereby is that thought *is*; the sense in which it "is" is not specified. Thus the being of truth in this instance is no more than the abstract form of truth itself. Thought conforms to (generic) being, therefore the truth is; i.e., it conforms to (generic) being. The being here affirmed is the bare bones of reality, the distillation of pure is-ness. But such is-ness is only the presupposition of inquiry, and if it is made the result of an inquiry into the nature of truth, then it is certain that the investigation never actually got under way (cf. *Postscript* 170).

It is therefore necessary to ask what legitimate meaning can be given to Hegel's assertion of the identity of being and thought. Kierkegaard's answer is that the assertion is correct if it is understood as a tautology. Thought and being are identical if both are taken in an ideal sense. Thought in the ideal sense is the Objective Idea, the system of all possible concepts standing in formally necessary interrelationships. Being in the ideal sense is the modality of Essence, the system of all possible essential kinds standing in formally necessary interrelationships. Regarded in this way, thought and being are indeed identical, different names for the same thing. Formal logic coincides with formal ontology.

Being and thought are identical in the case of Ideas and Essences, because being in the case of Essences *means* thought objectified, and thought in the case of Ideas *means* the structures of being. This identity is abstract and formal; the Ideas and the Essences *are*, and are one and the same, but they do not *exist*. The essence of man, man in general, is not an individual existing man. The formal structures of being are modally different from their concretion in time and space. Similarly, the system of objective ideas with their necessary relationships is not an actual

process of inference carried out by an existing thinker. The logos of being, "objective reason," differs modally from the subjective activity of reasoning (cf. *Postscript* 112).

To affirm the identity of thought and being in the only legitimate sense is to abstract from existence—as Kierkegaard says, to desert existence for another continent (ideality). The affirmation of this identity says nothing about the being of the individual—and certainly philosophical wisdom ought to throw some light on the concrete—nor about the nature of his thinking—and certainly, whatever objective thought may be, it is a concrete individual who philosophizes with the aid of his concrete processes of thinking (cf. *Postscript* 293-95).

Of course Hegel does not mean the identity of thought and being in a purely abstract and formal sense. He is concerned to offer an explanation of actuality as well as ideality. What he means to say is that thought and being in their full concrete self-development include the moment of actuality—the existence of the thinker and his thought. For the idea by its own nature passes over into its other and returns to itself, incorporating both itself and the other in a higher synthesis. The principle of contradiction applies only at the level of finite reflection, where the idea has not yet come into its own. At the higher level of the absolute idea all finite contradictions are mediated.

At this higher level, Kierkegaard agrees, contradictions are indeed mediated, so that "it is objectively in order to annul the difference between good and evil, together with the principle of contradiction, and therewith also the infinite difference between the true and the false" (*Postscript* 181).

But contradictory relationships, formally considered, are not the same as concrete relationships of negation and mutual exclusion. The relationship by which truth excludes falsehood is not the same as the act by which a man disciplines his thinking to avoid error. The formal opposition of good and evil is not the same as the act of will by which a man affirms the good and renounces the evil.

As a matter of fact, formal contradiction or opposition is not radical negation or exclusion at all. In logic, for example, a self-contradictory proposition, whatever its peculiarities, stands

on the same level of being with other propositions. Like other propositions, it can be a premiss from which conclusions (all conclusions) are validly deduced, and it can itself be the conclusion of a valid argument. Or in "value theory," good and evil, true and false, as "values," are of equal and correlative status. They are both equally real in the sense in which ideas can be real, as essences. They do not, in their being as essences, exclude each other from being as essences.

Far from excluding each other, essential contradictories and opposites require each other. In so far as they *necessarily* contradict or oppose each other, they require each other to oppose or contradict. He who thinks the good and the true must also necessarily think their opposites. There is therefore at this level of being (idea or essence) not only no contradiction, there is the necessary reconciliation of all oppositions into a formal unity. Mediation expresses the necessity with which opposites are thought together.

But is this the case in actual existence? A man must think both good and evil in the same thought, but can he become both good and evil at once? He must think truth and falsehood together, but can he pursue and achieve both at once? And can the real exclusions operative in existence be reconciled with the synthesis of ideas in a still higher synthesis (cf. *Postscript* 357 ff.)? These are the questions which Kierkegaard puts to the Hegelian concept of mediation. Recognizing that mediation is a necessity at the level of essence, he denies that it operates so as to reconcile essence with existence and thereby even generate existence out of essence.

In order to understand his position we must say something more about existence and thinking as opposed to being and thought.

Existence or actuality (*Tilvaerelse*, *Virkelighed*) differs radically from essence or possibility (*Vaesen*, *Mulighed*). The being of essence is to be eternally and necessarily self-identical. Essence is what it is immutably (cf. *Fragments* 61). Necessarily identical with itself and related by a strict formal necessity to other essences, an essence is nevertheless only a possibility in relation to existence. No essence need be "instanced" or

"illustrated" (whatever these terms may mean) by particulars, but every essence may be (cf. *Postscript* 282 ff.).

Actuality, on the other hand, is that being which is the result of a process of becoming (*Tilblivelse, Vorden*). It is not changeless, since it is the product of a change. Actuality is that being which has come to be.

Since it has come to be, actuality is by its very being spatial and temporal. As spatial and temporal, actuality is differentiated into a plurality of particularities, as opposed to the universality of every essence.

The change of becoming, by which actualities come to be, is contingent. Kierkegaard supports his position by a consideration of the nature of necessity.³ Whatever exists necessarily cannot come into being. If it is necessary, it "already" is, there is no "time" at which it is not. Necessary being cannot suffer change. For this reason everything that comes into being proves by doing so that it is not necessary.

Necessity cannot be comprehended in terms of possibility and actuality.⁴ What is necessarily simply is; it is neither possible (for then it might not be) nor is it actual (for then it came to be and is not necessary). Nothing exists or comes to be with necessity. If an actuality were necessary before it came to be, then it would have *been* and could not have come to be. If it were necessary after it came to be, then it has always *been* and could not have come to be. Necessary being is always and completely self-identical. Necessity is in fact the formula for the eternal self-sameness of essence as such.

Since all becoming takes place contingently, the impetus of every process of actualization is not a logical (essential) ground, but a contingently operating cause. The original *terminus a quo* of all contingent causes (the Prime Mover) must also be a contingently working cause. Otherwise the whole process of becoming is no longer contingent, but necessary; that is, nothing comes to be. If, for example, God is understood as a being from whom the world proceeds as a necessary emanation, then the

³ The following is an abstract of *Fragments* 60-62.

⁴ Cf. Wallace, *op. cit.*, p. 267.

world exists necessarily, the contingency implied in becoming is illusory, as is becoming itself, and nothing really happens in the world. The fact that things happen implies that they happen contingently.

All thinking that is done by human beings is infected by the particularity, the mutability, and the contingency of spatio-temporal existence. It will therefore differ from objective thought as existence differs from essential being.

All thought is necessarily abstract; to think is to conceptualize, and a conception is the subjective correlate of an essence or objective idea. But when thought is regarded objectively, as a system of conceptual interrelationships, and not as the activity of an existing thinker, abstract thinking becomes "pure thought." Pure thought is therefore predicated of a fictitious objective subject, consciousness *überhaupt*, the pure cognitive subject-in-general. Pure thought is "thought without a thinker." It "ignores everything except the thought, and only the thought is, and is in its own medium" (*Postscript* 296). Pure thought is the identity of the essence of mind with the essence of being.

When a concrete thinker thinks abstractly, therefore, thought is in a medium foreign to itself. In time and space, related concretely to a particular individual as his activity, thinking becomes something other than pure thought. Any man who thinks must be transparent in his thinking to this existential transformation of thought. "He who exists is constantly in becoming; the actual subjective thinker constantly reproduces his existence in his thinking and places all his thought in becoming" (*Postscript* 79; SV VII 74).

Thinking is affected in two interrelated ways by existing. All actual thinking, as opposed to pure thought, is intermittent and uncertain.

Thinking is intermittent. Pure thought is absolutely continuous in the eternity and unity of the idea. It never starts or stops, but simply is. "Since it is in the mode of essence, it is not something that "goes on" at all, but a *status* of concepts and relations. The existing thinker, however, thinks "before and after" (*Postscript* 293). His thinking begins and ends, begins and ends again, indefinitely throughout his life. Time sunders the unity of

pure thought, spreading it out discursively and successively. At no point does thinking achieve identity with thought itself. If, says Kierkegaard, a dancer announced that he could leap higher than any dancer before him, we should all admire him. But if he said he could fly continuously, he would be laughed at. Leaping after all is the accomplishment of a man, an earthly being who in his intermittent leaping is still bound by the law of gravity. But flying is the privilege of winged creatures and if kept up continuously would imply an emancipation from earthly limitations (cf. *Postscript* 112-13). So also a thinker may be capable of spectacular flights of abstraction, and he deserves our admiration, provided he comes back down to earth again. But for an existing thinker to think pure thought presumes a freedom from the conditions of existence that is impossible as long as he exists.

As it breaks up the continuity of pure thought, so existence transforms the formal necessity of logical relationships into the contingent connections of actual inference. Formal logic itself is not thinking, but an object of thought, something that can be thought about. As the necessary structure of essential relationships, it is something all thinking looks to and tries to reproduce in itself. But when a logical argument is reproduced in the thinking of an existing being, and thereby translated into a temporal process, it loses its certainty and its finality. For all process is by nature contingent.

It is obvious enough that thinking gains in certainty as it moves farther and farther away from the concrete, deals with more and more abstract features of actuality. The act of abstraction possible intermittently to a thinker is a movement within existence away from existence toward essence. Mathematical and logical inferences possess a high degree of certainty, whereas the reasoning of an historian about history must be hemmed in on all sides by doubts and conditions.

Inferences like p , therefore p ; or $p \supset q$, p , therefore q , are less likely to be vitiated by contingency than any concrete inference I may make. They deal with barren abstractions. Yet in two ways they are contingent. First, since even such reasoning is process, q does not follow in inference from $p \supset q$ and p as it

does in formal argument. There is no guarantee that in time the p of the second premiss and the q of the conclusion have not become something different from the p and q of the implicative premiss, or that the relation of implication between p and q has not itself changed. Formally of course they cannot change, yet (secondly) such inferences are never made for their own sake— p and q are only “dummy letters”—but are always form for some concrete content, where the contingency of the inference increases with the concrete complexity of the content.

Objectively viewed, logic as a system of formal relations holds dominion over all thinking. It is the ideal prototype of certainty at which all thinking aims. But it cannot incorporate movement, and by its very perfection is separated from both the actual object of thought and the actual process of thinking. Thus subjectively viewed, formal logic is all hypothesis; the thinker is never certain if logical relations apply or can be applied to this particular problem. The objectivity and the uncertainty of logic taken together constitute “the unity and the contradiction in which it is negatively related to existence” (*Postscript* 100; SV VII 98).

The existence of the thinker is a synthesis of being and thinking in the mode of temporal actuality. The thinking of the existing being is a synthesis of the certainty of thought and the uncertainty of becoming. The uncertainty in existence is about the possibility of valid thought. The uncertainty in thought is about its own adequacy to comprehend actuality. Hence the “negative relationship” of thought and existence; actual thinking, though it has a structure analogous to that of formal argument, is not itself logic and lacks the necessity of logic, and formal logic does not exist, is not actual thinking.

Time therefore establishes a complex set of distinctions between thought and being, and within thought and being themselves. Thought as the objective idea is different modally from the actual process of thinking. The existence of the thinker is different modally from the realm of essence in which the pure ego has its being. Formal logic differs modally from the existence of the thinking subject. The subject’s thinking differs modally from essential being. And the individual’s activity of thinking

differs from his existence, if only because it is one of many activities of the same subject.

Suppose that now the proposal is made to reconcile the disparity of thought and being by an act of mediation. But mediation itself is not an activity, but the necessary coherence of opposites and contradictories in the mode of essence. Mediation synthesizes conceptual oppositions. But the manifold opposition of thought and being just defined is not an opposition within ideality, but between ideality and actuality. Mediation is an "activity," that is, a *status*, of pure thought (or pure being, which is the same thing). To employ mediation to reconcile pure thought (= pure being) with existence and actual thinking would be to allow mediation to be judge and litigant in its own case (cf. *Postscript* 336 ff.).

"I can abstract from myself; but the fact that I abstract from myself means that I also exist" (*Postscript* 296; SV VII 321). The act of abstraction is an activity which requires time. No activity is possible in the eternity of abstraction itself. I am other and more than thought *when* I am thinking and precisely *because* I can think. If I were in my own thinking to attempt a mediation of thought and existence, I would by that very fact testify to their continued difference.

To summarize: the relation of thought and being, in the sense of the objective idea and the realm of essence, is a simple identity. But the relation of actual thinking and actual existence to essential being and the objective idea is a problem. It is a problem which cannot be solved in terms of objective ideas and essences, since as Kierkegaard perceives, it does not even arise at this level (cf. *Postscript* 267-70, 273-74). The problem of the relationship between two distinct modes of being cannot even be formulated, much less settled, by a thinking which operates solely in terms of one of the modes involved. Kierkegaard's metaphysical opposition to Hegel is just this, that he "explained" existence in terms of pure thought—the dialectic of mediation and reconciliation—when the real problem lay elsewhere. The Hegelian explanation of existence is in reality a suppression of existence, and his answer to the problem of the relation of thought and being is a pseudo-answer to a pseudo-problem. The real question for the philosopher is not,

How is the eternal truth to be understood by eternal beings? but, How is the eternal truth to be apprehended temporally by one who exists in time? (cf. *Postscript* 172).

A paradox now arises. Pure thought and essential being differ radically from actual thinking and actual existence, and yet I who exist also think, and my thinking has a considerable claim to objective validity. This paradox involves Kierkegaard in both a conclusion and a problem. The conclusion, that a systematic "philosophy of existence" is impossible, leads in its turn to the problem.

If existence is conceived systematically, if it is viewed as a member in full standing of a definitive system of ontological categories, then it is conceived, says Kierkegaard, "as abrogated" (*som ophævet*). Existence is movement in time. There is no finality in existence, at least not until the world comes to an end. To be sure, if relations among actualities were necessary relations (in a determinist world), then existence would be in every important respect finished from the moment of its inception. But all becoming is contingent, and change follows change with never more than momentary rest.

To have a definitive ontology means exactly that everything is finished, that being has once and for all been reckoned with and impounded in a network of concepts. A system is the concludedness of all essential kinds in a unity of formally necessary relationships. To have a system is to be a determinist with a vengeance. To think that being is reducible to a systematic ontology is to deny outright the reality of time, happening, and contingency (*Postscript* 107-13; *Fragments* 62-64).

If then existence, which is the very opposite of system, is nevertheless "thought" systematically, it can only mean that it is not thought as *existing* but as "revoked into the eternal," translated into the "essence of existence." Existence cannot be the subject matter of an ontological system. It cannot be, as Kierkegaard would say, taken care of in paragraph 14. The presence of such a discussion in a systematic philosophy demonstrates either a) that the philosophy is self-refuting, if existence is rightly understood, or b) that it is not existence which is discussed, but the "essence of existence," which is a roughshod way to override

existence, inasmuch as existence in its concreteness is not an essence but a mode of being (cf. *Postscript* 111; *Fragments* 60).

But now comes the problem mentioned above: is not this conclusion also self-destructive? After all one *does* think about existence. Kierkegaard wrote a good many volumes about it, and presumably did not think he was talking nonsense. He was of course aware of the problem and dealt with it in his own way.

The problem can be formulated in this way: if existence is really unthinkable, what happens when an existing individual thinks? Can his thinking have objective validity and still sustain a significant relationship to existence? Or do the existential and the intellectual cancel each other, so that his existence becomes an everlasting succession of chaos upon chaos, and his thinking a combination in the void?

With respect to the possibility of an existential philosophy, we may ask: can a man philosophize so as to give expression to the fact that it is an existing individual who thinks and that his existence is the object of his thought—without allowing his philosophy to become confession? If this is not possible, there can be no existential philosophy, for confessional self-knowledge is only the raw material from which philosophical wisdom has yet to be extracted. And if what is thus extracted is only a *tour de force* of pure thought, then philosophy had better abandon its ancient claim to practise the love of wisdom. A wisdom that throws no light on man's existence is a sorry wisdom indeed, a vanity of vanities, and the *caput mortuum* of the whole philosophical enterprise.

The possibility of an existential philosophy will be our concern in what follows.

II. *The Subjective Thinker.*

Kierkegaard distinguished between pure thought—the objective idea, thought without a thinker—and abstract thought, which for all its abstractness is the activity of a finite thinker and so bears a definite relationship to his existence (cf. *Postscript* 278). This relationship Kierkegaard specifies in three equivalent ways:

abstract thought is an act of conceptualization, an act of abstraction, and a translation *ab esse ad posse*.

All thinking operates in terms of universal concepts. As Hegel demonstrated, even the "This," the "Here," and the "Now," the evocations of particularity, become universals as soon as they are thought.⁸ The most elementary articulation of experience—and it is doubtful if a human being ever has any wholly inarticulated experience—is a conceptual reconstruction of that experience.

Now as the activity of an existing human being, the activity of conceptualizing is as concrete as any act he can perform. Subjectively considered there is nothing on the face of it that would distinguish conceptualization from any other activity as regards its concreteness. But there is no doubt that objectively something happens to an item of experience when it is thought. To think something is precisely to abstract from, to draw away from (*abstrahere*), its concreteness. Actuality is spatio-temporal, particular, fluctuating, and contingent. But when an actuality is thought, it is fixed in a relatively static concept, universal in intent, and necessarily implicated with other concepts in logical relations. Since the activity of thinking is itself the act of a man, this fixation is of course momentary and uncertain and wavering, but it is a decided movement in the direction of objectivity and the objective idea. All thinking is a movement within existence away from existence, toward the outer borders of existence (*Postscript* 103-05).

But to abstract is not only to abstract *from* existence, but also to abstract *something* from existence. What is thus drawn away and conceptualized by thinking is some universal aspect or aspects of actuality. These universal aspects, comprehended in a concept, stand related to existence as *possibility* to actuality. Greenness, dogness, manhood, circularity, etc., are all characteristics that may (or may not) be illustrated in various actual contexts. To call them abstract possibilities is not to deny their reality, but their reality is to *be* concepts, to *be* possibilities (cf. *Postscript* 292). Thinking therefore "consists in translating the real into the possible" (*Postscript* 280).

⁸ *The Phenomenology of Mind*, tr. J. B. Baillie, pp. 149-60.

There is obviously a mystery here, the mystery of the double participation of thinking in essence (the realm of possibility) and existence. How is it that abstract thinking stands related both to that ideal object at which it aims and to the existence of which it as an activity is itself a part? What is the meaning of an act of abstraction that takes place in existence? This is not, so Kierkegaard believes, a mystery soluble by thought. As in the former case of the relation between the ideal and the actual, to "solve" this mystery by thinking is *ipso facto* to produce a false solution. "Actuality [*Virkelighed*] is an *inter-esse* between the moments of that hypothetical unity of thought and being which abstract thought presupposes. . . . Actuality or existence [*Tilvaerelse*] is the dialectical moment in a trilogy, whose beginning and whose end cannot be for the existing individual, since *qua* existing individual he is himself in the dialectical moment" (*Postscript* 279; SV VII 302).

Existence in time combines thinking and being in a way that does not really synthesize the two but presents the individual with an unresolved tension. Insofar as by thinking the existing individual apprehends the *essence* of things, he is in his existence apparently related to essential being. But insofar as by existing in time he is constantly expressing his disparity from essential being, that apparent relationship is, equally apparently, always being negated. Likewise, insofar as his thinking is not wholly objectified as pure thought, the individual appears in his thinking to sustain a constant relation to actuality. And yet his thinking itself is an act of abstracting *from* actuality. Existence separates thought and being at the same time that it relates them.

Abstract thinking cannot overcome this disunity in existence. It cannot "close the trilogy." For one thing the abstract thought by which the problem is supposed to be solved is the act of an existing individual, and its own inner unity is in question. It is in fact itself the problem. And on the other side, although it is a concrete act, abstract thinking is a tension away from concreteness in the direction of abstract essentiality. "Abstract thought considers both possibility [*Mulighed*] and actuality, but its concept of actuality is a false rendering [*Gjengivelse*], since the medium within which the concept is thought is not actuality, but possibility.

Abstract thought can get hold of actuality only by nullifying [*ophaeve*] it, and this nullification of actuality consists in transforming it into possibility" (*Postscript* 279; SV VII 302).

Abstract thought works in concepts which comprehend essences. Now it would appear that essence is present indifferently in the mode of possibility and in the mode of actuality. There is apparently no difference *in essence* between an actual X and a possible X. Suppose then that abstract thought can be said to comprehend the essence of actualities. But the mode of being in which essence is when it is in actuality is not itself thinkable as an essence. Thus abstract thought in its inevitable preoccupation with essence cannot comprehend actuality in the mode of its actuality. To think a thing is to apprehend it as in the mode of possibility.

In a word, abstract thought itself can never define the relationship in which it stands to existence. Its relation to actuality can never be clarified by its own conceptual formulations, since every such formulation expresses a possibility without reference to its relation to actuality. "All that is said about actuality in the language of abstraction and within the sphere of abstract thought, is really said within the sphere of the possible. In the language of actuality: all abstraction is related to actuality as a possibility; but not to an actuality included within abstraction and possibility" (*Postscript* 279; SV VII 302).

So we still have not a result but a problem, not the solution of a difficulty, but the confession of its insolubility at the level of thought. Kierkegaard therefore turns from his discussion of thought to a consideration of the nature of *action*.

If the content of thought, he says, were actuality instead of possibility, there could be no possible contrast between thought and action. Thought and action would be the same, and the most perfect conception of an action would be or contain or immediately entail that action. But thought is always a translation *ab esse ad posse*, whereas all action (even in the most general sense of becoming) is a transition *a posse ad esse*. In the case of the voluntary action of human beings, action occurs when the individual, having thought the action as a possibility, puts an end to the possibility *as such* and actualizes it. Action in this case

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is a decision to identify oneself with the content of his thought, to "exist in it," to bring the essential content into existence. Between the possible action (the conceived action) and the actual action (the decision) there is no difference in essential content, but there is a crucial difference in mode of being. There is a profoundly significant difference, certainly, between conceiving the good and doing the good, between thinking about honesty and actually being honest. In opposition to the disinterestedness of abstract thought, action involves an *interest* not in ideas or essences for their own sake but in actualizing them. That very disinterestedness which is the mark of the objectivity of thought must be sacrificed in action to the subjectivity of the individual's concern to realize possibilities in his concrete existence (cf. *Postscript* 302 ff.). Action becomes personal and ethical while thought remains impersonal and morally neutral.

Several interesting consequences follow from this analysis. The eternal, which it is the goal of thought to think, is related to action as futurity (cf. *Postscript* 271-72). That which is eternally possible in itself is for becoming that which is or may be coming to be. For the acting individual, the eternal is not an object for contemplation, but a demand for a decision. Possibilities which are given to thought to view in their ceaseless contemporaneity are presented to the individual concerned with existence to be resolutely actualized or (in the case of possibilities of evil) rejected. A possibility which is continuously present and available to thought may be lost forever by a failure of active resolution. Opportunity lingers always about the doorway of thought; what is not thought today can always be thought tomorrow or next year; there is no hurry and no loss by default. But for action opportunity may knock only once, and a possibility (for good, for example) not seized when it presents itself may be irrevocably missed.

The demand for decision and resolution in action also explains why, although the principle of contradiction may well be a vanishing factor for thought as thought approaches objectivity, there is still an either/or in existence. Contradictory possibilities which can and must be contemplated together cannot be actualized together. To endow one possibility with existence in the moment

of decision is to reject with equal decisiveness its opposite. To "synthesize" or "mediate" genuine oppositions in action is at best to compromise and at worst, by wavering, to lose the moment of opportunity altogether (cf. *Postscript* 270-72).

The consideration of action by itself serves only to accentuate the disparity between thought and existence. What is true for thought is not true for action: for thought the correlativity of opposites, for action the mutual exclusiveness of opposites; for thought the abiding presence of the eternal essence, for action the fleeting present of the moment of decision; for thought the retreat to possibility, for action the advance toward future actuality.

Yet it is in action and its relation to thought that the possibility of an existential philosophy first comes to light. It is in the *tension* between the drive of action toward existence and the drift of thought toward essence that philosophy has its being.

(To be concluded)

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CHANCE AND COUNTERFACTS IN WRIGHT AND PEIRCE

EDWARD H. MADDEN

I

THE doctrine of tychism which Charles S. Peirce and William James eventually formulated supposedly came to light in the discussions of the Metaphysical Club; and several commentators have suggested¹ but not developed the idea that Chauncey Wright's concepts of "cosmical weather," "accident," and the attendant notion of irregularity—developed in his articles, "The Genesis of Species," "Evolution by Natural Selection," and "A Physical Theory of the Universe"—anticipated and perhaps influenced the tychistic views of the younger men. Wright, the oldest of the group, was indeed the whetstone on which the younger men sharpened their philosophical wit and Peirce, James, and Holmes acknowledged him to be their intellectual "boxing master" during this period;² but I believe, nevertheless, that if one analyses Wright's concepts completely he will find it difficult to make a good case for his prefigurement of tychism in any way. Wright's concepts of cosmic weather, accident, and irregularity are an important part of his interesting philosophy of science and, as we shall see, plunge one into the midst of several problems which are receiving much attention in contemporary philosophy.

Irregularity is fundamental to both Wright's and Peirce's positions but they interpret it in radically different ways. The occurrence of things by absolute chance, Peirce's tychism, is his explanation of irregularity; chance, for him, is ontologically irre-

¹ Morris R. Cohen, Introduction to C. S. Peirce's *Chance, Love, and Logic* (New York, 1923), p. xix; Paul Anderson in Anderson and Fisch, *Philosophy in America* (New York, 1939), p. 419; Gail Kennedy, "The Pragmatic Naturalism of Chauncey Wright," *Studies in the History of Ideas*, III (New York, 1935), 498.

² Cf. William James, *Principles of Psychology* (New York, 1896), p. vii; *The Collected Papers of C. S. Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, 1931-35).

ducible—"an objective reality, operative in the cosmos."² Wright, on the other hand, interpreted irregularity as a function of causal complexity; it does not constitute an abridgement of causality but only an abridgement of our knowledge of it.

Causal complexity and irregularity, Wright said,⁴ are exhibited in the palaeiological sciences, that is, in sciences like geology which deal with concrete series of events rather than with isolated controlled systems. In "The Genesis of Species," a defense of Darwin against the Jesuit naturalist St. George Mivart, Wright said that natural selection, while it imitates mechanics in isolating and separating causes under controlled conditions—e.g., in experimentation with domesticated plants and animals—nevertheless should not be compared as an explanation of the origin of species with this science but rather with geology, meteorology, and political science, all of which exhibit causal complexity and irregularity.⁵ The only genuine explanation in these sciences, Wright urged, is the deduction as far as possible of the concrete series from combinations of elementary laws discovered in control situations. "As far as possible" is an important consideration. In a concrete series of events causal chains are intermingled most intimately; and this complexity, unfathomed in precise detail, generally gives the appearance, but the appearance only, of irregularity in concrete events.

An "uncontrolled" event, Wright believed,⁶ is explained when it is derived from fixed principles or laws from the occasions which concrete causes present. Causes in concrete series of events are called "accidents" only when their occurrence, in turn, cannot be derived or predicted—which is frequently the case, again, as a result of the causal complexity in any concrete series. This unpredictability is Darwin's meaning of "accident," which notion, unfortunately, Wright said, is oftentimes erroneously interpreted

² *Collected Papers*, 6.35-65.

⁴ The sources of Wright's ideas which follow in the text are, primarily, "The Genesis of Species," "Evolution by Natural Selection," and "A Physical Theory of the Universe," in Chauncey Wright, *Philosophical Discussions* (New York, 1877). Note particularly pp. 4 ff., 9 ff., 17 ff., 130 ff., 137-38, 141, 143-44, 173 ff., 177-79, 190 ff., 199-205, 244 ff.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, pp. 137-38; 179.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 173-74.

as uncaused. "In referring any effect to 'accident,' he only means that its causes are like particular phases of the weather, or like innumerable phenomena in the concrete course of nature generally, which are quite beyond the power of finite minds to anticipate or account for in general, though none the less really determinate or due to regular causes."⁷ "Accident," then, is not a characteristic of events but of our knowledge of them; it does not mean that events are uncaused but that we do not know the cause. Wright believed what Peirce later denied, that the universality of causality is a postulate of scientific inquiry;⁸ so, unlike Peirce, he did not have to give a practical justification or, in the terminology of the current controversy, a vindication of inductive inference.⁹ Wright, in short, in Peirce's terms, was a hide-bound necessitarian—not, it is true, in a state of case-hardened ignorance, however, because he did not have the advantage of Peirce's examination of necessitarianism!

Peirce wrote, "When I ask the necessitarian how he would explain the . . . irregularity of the universe, he replies to me out of the treasury of his wisdom that irregularity is something which from the nature of things we must not seek to explain."¹⁰ On the contrary, for Wright, since irregularity is a function of causal complexity, it is a remnant that always challenges further explanation; and even in the cases where an explanation is impossible one can sometimes give what appears to be a reasonable explanatory sketch.

The polarity of Wright's thought and Peirce's tychism can be brought out most forcefully by inquiring into the function this concept had in Peirce's "architecture of theories" and then understanding Wright's fundamental antagonism to this whole architectonic structure.

Evolutionary development is central in Peirce's thought;

⁷ Ibid., p. 131.

⁸ Ibid.; Peirce, loc. cit.

⁹ Cf. Herbert Feigl, "De Principiis Non Disputandum . . . ?" in *Philosophical Analysis*, ed. Max Black (Ithaca, 1950), particularly pp. 130-39; Max Black, "The Justification of Induction," *Language and Philosophy* (Ithaca, 1949); Max Black, "Pragmatic Justification of Induction," *Problems of Analysis* (Ithaca, 1954), p. 157.

¹⁰ Peirce, op. cit., 6.60.

indeed, his tychism is only a vehicle for the journey to synechism. Peirce wrote, "Everywhere the main fact is growth and increasing complexity. Death and corruption are mere accidents or secondary phenomena."¹¹ "I make use of chance chiefly to make room for a principle of generalization, or tendency to form habits, which I hold has produced all regularities."¹² Peirce's view, equivalent to the notion that systematic process laws themselves are a function of time, is incompatible entirely with Wright's ateleology; for him, any evolution with ultimate progress or even directionality is a perversion of biological evolution—which he preferred to call simply descent with modification—into evolutionism, and so inconsistent with the principle of counter-movements, the lack of discernible tendencies on the whole, which he thought was the drift of the logic of science, and, consequently, also inconsistent with his cosmogonic views, to which he applied the apt metaphor "cosmical weather."¹³

Cosmogonic speculation about the production of systems of worlds, Wright thought,¹⁴ belongs to the palaetiological category of science. The cosmogonist uses the laws of physics, particularly the principles of gravity and thermodynamics, discovered in controlled situations, to explain the physical history of the system of worlds where there has been an uncontrolled, complex interpenetration of the principles at work. The result of this causal complexity again is apparent irregularity. "The constitution of the solar system is not archetypal, as the ancients supposed, but the same corrupt mixture of law and apparent accident that the phenomena of the earth's surface exhibit. . . ." ¹⁵ This irregularity, rather than regularity, Wright urged against Laplace, is the proper evidence that the solar system is a product of physical or natural causes and not the result of a creative fiat. Ordinary weather phenomena exhibit the same logical features of causal complexity and apparent irregularity, and the effort to predict them runs into

¹¹ Ibid., 6.58.

¹² Ibid., 6.63.

¹³ Almost all of Wright's articles exhibit his ateleological view. See specifically *op cit.*, pp. 9 ff., 17 ff.

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 5 ff., 9.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 9.

the same difficulties as the cosmogonist's effort to explain the production of systems of worlds—all of which provided Wright with his metaphor "cosmical weather." But the metaphor meant more than this for Wright; for he believed that the production of systems of worlds, like ordinary weather, shows on the whole no development or any discernible tendency whatever but is a doing and undoing without end—a kind of weather, cosmical weather. Wright based his ateleological view on what he called the principle of counter-movements, "a principle in accordance with which there is no action in nature to which there is not some counter-action," which he contended is a likely generalization from the laws and facts of science.¹⁶ Concrete courses of events in nature and inter-stellar space do not exhibit the dramatic unities, do not have a beginning, middle, and end; and the exhibition of these unities, and the consequent ignoring of counter-movements, in the nebular hypothesis, Wright felt, renders this cosmological view nugatory.¹⁷

Wright worked out a technical and elaborate hypothesis about the nature of cosmic weather,¹⁸ a system that exhibited the principle of counter-movements and avoided what Wright believed were the teleological elements of the nebular hypothesis. Quite briefly, Wright, impressed with the conservation of energy principle, accounted for the origin of the sun's heat and the positions and movements of planets by the first law of thermodynamics and the conservation of angular momentum. The spiral fall of meteors into the sun, he thought, is the cause of its heat. The sun does not rapidly increase in size, he suggested, because the heat of the sun is reconverted into mechanical energy. Part of the heat is consumed in vaporizing the meteors and parts of the mass of the sun, while the rest is expended in further heating, expanding, and thus lifting the gaseous material to the heights from whence it spiraled into the sun. There it cools and condenses and the cycle begins again.

Wright apparently thought that mechanical energy and heat energy are not only convertible but reversible. However, he

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ This view permeates his "A Physical Theory of the Universe."

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, pp. 17-34.

was not unaware of the second law of thermodynamics; at least not when he wrote "The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer" a year later.¹⁹ In a section of this article devoted to the nebular hypothesis Wright says that the most obvious objection to his hypothesis is Thomson's theory that there is a universal tendency in nature to the dissipation of mechanical energy, "a theory well founded, nay, demonstrated, if we only follow this energy as far as the present limits of science extend. But to a true Aristotelian this theory, so far from suggesting a dramatic *dénouement*, such as the ultimate death of nature, only propounds new problems. What becomes of the sun's dynamic energy, and whence do the bodies come which support this wasting power?"²⁰

"Tychism" is sometimes used not to refer to absolute chance, but to the hypothesis that evolution occurs through fortuitous variations; and one commentator apparently has this meaning in mind in saying that Wright's thought is tychistic.²¹ Wright's notions of cosmical weather and accidents, it is true, are ateleological in this sense; but this viewpoint is common enough and does not begin to do justice to Wright's ideas. He rejected teleology in science in the obvious sense of planned adjustments but he also rejected as teleological the ascription to the natural world of categories which correctly characterize only conscious behavior, even when there is no accompanying assumption about a world-mind whose existence and directive nature these categories reflect. Wright felt that teleology was a subtle poison, and all his criticisms of Spencer's philosophy and the nebular hypothesis center around the less obvious forms.

James's tychism and his criticism of determinism²² are as antithetical to Wright's principles as Peirce's. According to James, "chance" and "indeterminism" are synonymous, but "happening by chance" does not render a thing irrational or preposterous. Chance is only the negation of determinism; if

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 43-96.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 87.

²¹ Paul Anderson, op. cit. But in this case it is unclear why he thinks Wright anticipated Peirce's tychism.

²² James, "The Dilemma of Determinism," *Essays on Faith and Morals* (New York, 1943).

something happens by chance it simply is not necessitated by other things in advance of its own occurrence. James, of course, was interested in establishing chance or indeterminism as a prerequisite for freedom of the will and so for moral responsibility; but his indeterminism, if established, would simply deny responsibility in a fashion polar to that of the traditional determinist.²³ This dilemma of responsibility is more fundamental certainly than James's dilemma of determinism. Wright, at any rate, did not think that James's indeterminism was any solution to the problem it addressed; he doubted, in fact, that the psychological experience of moral freedom has anything to do with the question of philosophical liberty.

While everybody recognizes as real those feelings which we describe as a sense of moral freedom and the feeling of responsibility, few attend to the metaphorical character of the names which are given to them. "The virtuous man is free," said the Platonic philosopher. "He is, like a Roman citizen, uncontrolled by a master." "A vicious man is a slave." Such is the metaphor: now what is the real character so described? This freedom is internal control in place of external control; centric or self control, which, so far from making a man free, in the scientific sense of the word, makes his life regular and his conduct calculable. He has a freedom like that of the solar system or like that of a normal growth. Again, moral responsibility was so named from legal responsibility in Roman law; and the sense of it is only the sense, of dignity and trustworthiness which is characteristic of moral feeling, a sense of being intrusted with interests not our own . . . Minus the metaphor, it has nothing to do with the question of philosophical liberty.²⁴

II

The concept of novelty is an important link in Peirce's defense of tychism and his criticism of necessitarianism, or universal determinism.²⁵ He believed that novelty and complication are always increasing in the universe, and to account for this continuous increase he asserted that events must occur by absolute

²³ Cf. G. A. Paul, "H. D. Lewis on the Problem of Guilt," in W. Sellars and J. Hospers *Readings in Ethical Theory* (New York, 1952), particularly p. 626; George Herbert Palmer, "The Improbability of Freedom," *The Problem of Freedom* (Boston, 1911).

²⁴ Wright, *Letters* (Cambridge, 1878), pp. 74-75.

²⁵ Cf. "The Doctrine of Necessity Examined."

chance. He objected ²⁶ to the doctrine of necessitarianism because, he said, it requires that the novelty and complication of the universe be now no greater than at any previous time; everything to come is built in, so to speak, from the beginning. In Wright's cosmology, however, there was no beginning; he believed, with Aristotle, he said, ²⁷ that the universe is uncreated and eternal—which, again, reflects his non-developmental viewpoint. However, the problem still remains of whether at any given time the universe contains more variety and novelty than at any previous time. Wright did not think that there is novelty in Peirce's sense of the word, for this sense requires that a "novel" event have no antecedent at all, and Wright never admitted an abridgement of causality. He specified, however, several other senses in which it is perfectly correct for a determinist to talk about novelty. ²⁸ His distinctions are, variously, ontological, epistemological, and scientific in nature. Ontologically an event is novel or genuinely new simply when it first occurs providing that it is discontinuous with previous events (i.e., no continuity in kind) and is involved only potentially in antecedent events. Further, he saw that, epistemologically and psychologically, novelty or newness, or its absence, is not an absolute property of an event but relative to a theory or composition rule.

The word "evolution" conveys a false impression to the imagination, not really intended in the scientific use of it. It misleads by suggesting a continuity in the *kinds* of powers and functions in living beings, that is, by suggesting transition by insensible steps from one *kind* to another, as well as in the *degrees* of their importance and exercise at different stages of development. The truth is, on the contrary, that according to the theory of evolution, new uses of old powers arise discontinuously both in the bodily and mental natures of the animal, and in its individual developments, as well as in the development of its race, although, at their rise, these uses are small and of the smallest importance to life . . . Their services or functions in life, though realized only incidentally at first, and in the feeblest degree, are just as distinct as they afterwards come to appear in their fullest development. The new uses are related to

²⁶ Op. cit., 6.57 ff.

²⁷ *Philosophical Discussions*, p. 4.

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 199-205.

older powers only as *accidents*, so far as the special services of the older powers are concerned, . . . ²⁹

The appearance of a really new power in *nature* (using this word in the wide meaning attached to it in science), the power of flight in the first birds, for example, is only involved potentially in previous phenomena. In the same way, no act of self-consciousness, however elementary, may have been realized before man's first self-conscious act in the animal world; yet the act may have been involved potentially in pre-existing powers or causes. The derivation of this power, supposing it to have been observed by a finite angelic (not animal) intelligence, could not have been foreseen to be involved in the mental causes, on the conjunction of which it might, nevertheless, have been seen to depend. The angelic observation would have been a purely empirical one. ³⁰

Experimental science, as in chemistry, is full of examples of the discovery of new properties or new powers, which, so far as the conditions of their appearance were previously known, did not follow from antecedent conditions, except in an incidental manner—that is, in a manner *not then foreseen* to be involved in them; and these effects became afterwards predictable from what had become known to be their antecedent conditions only by the empirical laws or rules which inductive experimentation had established. Nevertheless, the phenomena of the physical or chemical laboratory, however new or unprecedented, are very far from having the character of miracles, in the sense of supernatural events . . . Scientific research implies the *potential* existence of the natures, classes, or kinds of effects which experiment brings to light through instances, and for which it also determines, in accordance with inductive methods, the previously unknown conditions of their appearance. This research implies the *latent* kinds or natures which mystical research contemplates (erroneously, in some, at least, of its meditations) under the name of “the supernatural.” ³¹

Wright, it will be noted, in talking about novelty used the notion of potentiality twice—“really new powers” are involved only potentially in previous phenomena; and scientific research implies the potential existence of classes which experiment brings to light through instances. Statements about potentiality and counterfactuals are isomorphic, so it is not surprising to find Wright explicating the concept “natural or caused event” in terms of counterfactual inference.

Nature means more than the continuance or actual repetition of the

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 199-200.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 200-01.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 201-02.

properties and productions involved in the course of ordinary events, or more than the *inheritance* and reappearance of that which appears in consequence of powers which have made it appear before. It means, in general, those kinds of effects which, though they may have appeared but once in the whole history of the world, yet appear dependent on conjunctions of causes which *would always* be followed by them . . . Certain "physical constants," so called, were so determined, and are applied in scientific inference with the same unhesitating confidence as that inspired by the familiarly exemplified and more elementary "laws of nature," or even by axioms.³²

Peirce, as Arthur Burks has pointed out,³³ relied on potentiality and counterfactual inference in explicating the concept of lawfulness. In his early period, true, Peirce advanced a view of concepts and laws which disallowed potentiality and was based only on actual events. In his famous essay on "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," e.g., he claimed that there is absolutely no difference between a hard and a soft thing as long as they are not brought to a test. In his later period, however, Burks writes, he thought that a law is not simply a summary of actual events—"what happens to be"—but involves reference to potentiality as well—"the would-be's of our universe." In short, Burks avers, Peirce is essentially saying that accidental correlations do not give rise to counterfactual inference whereas lawlike statements do. Burks, however, neglects to qualify his interpretation in an important way; for there is a sense in which an accidental statement does sustain a counterfactual inference, namely when the antecedent of the counterfactual is interpreted as asserting identity rather than "has the property of";³⁴ and this possibility must be explicitly eliminated if Burks's interpretation of Peirce is to hold.

Burks contends,³⁵ unwarrantedly it seems to me, that Peirce's counterfactual interpretation of lawfulness is inconsistent with his pragmatic meaning criterion. Peirce's pragmatism, Burks says, requires that two theories, if they are genuinely and not simply verbally different, must give rise to different "practical," or

³² Ibid., p. 202.

³³ In his introduction to the chapter on Peirce in *Classic American Philosophers*, ed. Max Fisch, (New York, 1951), pp. 41-53.

³⁴ Roderick Chisholm has made this important point in his "Law Statements and Counterfactual Inference," *Analysis* (1955).

³⁵ Op cit., pp. 50 ff.

experimental, consequences. The summary view of lawfulness (nominalistic) and the counterfactual view (realistic), however, give rise to exactly the same set of experiential consequences; indeed the only difference between them is not what happens but rather what does not but would or would have happened, and so is not a matter of experience; consequently there is no real difference between the two theories and the dispute is eliminated by the pragmatic criterion. Peirce's pragmatism, in short, eliminates his own realistic conception of causal law. Burks writes, "One naturally wonders how such a contradiction arose in Peirce's thought and why he did not at least suspect its being there."³⁶ Burks concludes that Peirce never saw the conflict because he never sufficiently carried through his analysis of "law" in terms of potentiality; his writings on this subject remained few and fragmentary in spite of the central role he said it played in his later "system."

One might make exactly the same kind of criticism of Wright's views that Burks makes of Peirce's—namely, that his concepts of potentiality and counterfactuals are incompatible with his Humean, positivistic views on meaning—but the justice in doing so in either case, I suspect, is extremely doubtful. The whole procedure smacks of projecting contemporary issues and frameworks back into a historical context which was not made to accommodate them. I will try to show that Burks makes just this mistake.

The contemporary problem of counterfactual inference stems from the alleged impossibility for a contemporary Humean of explicating the concept "causal law," which supports counterfactual inference, within the conceptual framework of *Principia Mathematica*; counterfactual inference, the objection goes, is rendered either self-contradictory or 'vacuous.' The Humeans have replied, however, that the difficulty only occurs when one tries to translate "law" by the notion of material implication alone;

³⁶ Ibid., p. 52.

³⁷ Cf. R. B. Braithwaite's discussion of counterfactuals and lawfulness in *Scientific Explanation* (Cambridge, 1953), particularly pp. 295-304.

which, they say, they do not do.³⁸ Again, others have tried to distinguish between causal laws and accidental correlations, within a Humean framework, with such concepts as infinite scope, purely qualitative predicate, entrenched predicate, projectibility index, theoretic concepts, etc.³⁹ The connection between counterfactual inference and lawlikeness is peculiarly intimate certainly, but their precise relationship is not agreed upon; some writers believe that the criterion of lawfulness would suffice as an account of counterfactual inference; others, that it is only a part of the latter notion—a step in its analysis but not a complete analysis.⁴⁰ All of these positions must be evaluated and the relationship between lawfulness and counterfactuals clarified before one can justly conclude that counterfactual inference and potentiality are incompatible with a positivistic, pragmatic, or Humean position in philosophy. Consequently, since the issue is still a going concern in contemporary philosophy and perhaps mooted temporarily, it seems impetuous to conclude that Peirce's and Wright's meaning criteria and views of lawfulness are incompatible; and it seems particularly pointless when they, or no one else at the time, thought it was a problem. One might say that, in spite of Peirce's logical genius, the problem did not occur to them, not because they did not sufficiently analyse the notion of counterfactual inference, but because they were not philosophizing with *Principia Mathematica* as an epistemological model. And, if I may indulge in counterfactual inference instead of talking about it, I suspect that Wright, if he were philosophizing now, would see clearly that the Humean's inability to analyse the notion of lawfulness—granting, as he might or might not, that a Humean is unable to do so—does not by indirect proof establish the existence of

³⁸ Gustav Bergmann, *The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism* (New York, 1954), pp. 262 ff.

³⁹ C. G. Hempel and Paul Oppenheim, "Studies in the Logic of Explanation," *Philosophy of Science*, XV (1948), 135-75; Nelson Goodman, *Fact, Fiction, and Forecast* (Cambridge, 1955), pp. 87 ff.; Braithwaite, op. cit.

⁴⁰ Braithwaite, op. cit.; Goodman, op. cit.

ontological ties and potencies, as some writers imagine it does. The difficulties with the view of ontological connections still remain and must be resolved in their own right. If they are not, then, on this issue, Sextus Empiricus is the only refuge for an honest man.⁴¹

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⁴¹ This paper concludes my study of the philosophy of Chauncey Wright. The study includes the following papers: "Chauncey Wright: Forgotten American Philosopher," *American Quarterly*, IV (1952); "Chauncey Wright and the Logic of Psychology" (with Marian C. Madden), *Philosophy of Science*, XIX (1952); "Pragmatism, Positivism and Chauncey Wright," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, XIV (1953); "Chauncey Wright's Life and Work: Some New Material," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XV (1954); "Wright, James, and Radical Empiricism," *The Journal of Philosophy*, LI (1954); and "The Cambridge Septem," *Harvard Alumni Bulletin* (January, 1955). I am indebted to Professors Ralph Barton Perry, Max Fisch, Herbert Schneider, Philip Wiener, and Gail Kennedy, all of whom aided me in this study with suggestions and encouragement.

CRITICAL STUDIES

IDEALISM AND VOLUNTARISM IN ROYCE

SAMUEL M. THOMPSON

MR. Cotton's book is a full-scale study of Royce's philosophy, and the title is justified by the central place of the theory of the self in Royce's thought.¹ In the first five chapters Mr. Cotton shows that Royce's Absolute is the final stage of the attempt to make intelligible the given of the present moment of experience, and that the self is the mediating link from the given in experience to the ultimate in reality. Both knowledge and existence are grounded in the activity of the self; for only the immediate present is given in experience, and if this is to be meaningful it needs to be supplemented by past and future. But since past and future are not contained within the given they must be constructed, and only a self can do this.

The private self, however, cannot stand alone. "We cannot think of the self except in contrast to that which is other than the self" (46). Royce finds the source of physical nature in this need of the self for a not-self. The whole difference between inner and outer is social in origin, for only social confirmation can sustain our belief that a fact is an outer fact rather than an inner fact which no one else can observe.

Royce begins with the experience of the present moment as the only given. The bridge between the present moment and the self in time, as well as that which links the self in its inner aspect to other selves and to nature, is built on purpose. "If thinking is active, it is purposive. If it is purposive the truth of its ideas must be measured by the idea's own intention" (91). The ultimate fulfillment of this intention, of the internal meaning of ideas, requires the Absolute.

Voluntarism is the central theme of Royce's logic as well as

¹ James Harry Cotton, *Royce on the Human Self* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954).

his metaphysics. Although he works out his logical doctrine as "the science of order," yet he contends that "the mind finds order in the world because the mind had demanded just that order" (174). Even his formulation of the law of non-contradiction as the ultimate test of truth is in terms of the possibility of thought as a purposive activity (175).

A discussion of Royce's relations with James and Peirce provides the transition to the last of the three periods which Mr. Cotton distinguishes in Royce's development (vii-viii). In the earlier two periods, culminating in the publication of *The Religious Aspect of Philosophy* (1885) and *The World and the Individual* (1901) respectively, he worked out his system of idealism. In the third period he was preoccupied mainly with the moral and religious applications of this system. The result was a reinterpretation of the Absolute in social terms and its virtual replacement by the idea of the Community. Royce never repudiated the Absolute, but the change of terminology is the result of a considerable shift of emphasis. The study closes with a critical examination of Royce's interpretation of Christianity.

Mr. Cotton's exposition and interpretation of Royce's philosophy is a masterly performance. He brings into clear view the mutual relevance of the varied strains of thought and exposes the structure of the argument. The artistry of the presentation, resting as it does on a complete command of the subject, lets the reader see Royce's philosophy from the inside. The critical sections which interrupt the exposition and help keep each part in perspective are cogent and illuminating on many particular points. But when we look at the deeper levels of his criticism it seems incomplete and, in part, aimed at the wrong target. In this study I wish to examine the two main lines of Mr. Cotton's criticism of Royce.

Mr. Cotton tells us that "the most important point in this study and in the work of Royce lies in the union between idealism and pragmatism in his thought" (11). He feels, however, that Royce did not do justice to the "internal meaning" of ideas, where the pragmatic or voluntaristic aspect of his thought appears. "The partial and highly conditioned perspective of each individual knower has been clarified since Royce wrote. This means that

the paradox between 'voluntarism' and 'absolutism' is sharper than Royce ever thought it to be" (x). Specifically, Mr. Cotton criticizes Royce for his tendency to restrict the "internal meaning" to the rational interests which knowledge seeks to satisfy. This, he thinks, blinded Royce to "a whole new range of insight" that is "implicit just beneath the surface," namely, the irrational private and group interests that pervert thought. "It took Kierkegaard and Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud to teach this needed lesson to the Western world. Royce . . . should have seen this clearly. . . . But he wrote as though Karl Marx had never lived" (101).

Royce also lost his opportunity to bring out the cultural relativity and inevitable failure of objectivity in history and the social sciences, where our thinking is in the service of our interests. Royce found our finitude in "our limited range of knowledge" and in "the separation of our purposes from their final fulfillment" (104). But this does not go far enough for Mr. Cotton. "We are finite also because we embody a limited perspective. Our internal meaning reflects all the limitations of that perspective" (104). The consequence for every knower is relativism.

One response to relativism "is a supine skepticism with its facile inference: all men are victims of their prejudices, therefore objectivity is impossible and all judgments are colored by the bias of the group to which a person belongs" (104). Mr. Cotton admits that Royce has a reply to such a skepticism, in terms of his principle of intelligibility. "*There are certain modes of activity, certain laws of the rational will, which we reinstate and verify, through the very act of attempting to presuppose that these modes of activity do not exist, or that these laws are not valid*" (*Principles of Logic*, p. 121; quoted by Cotton, p. 175). We should note that Royce refers here not to mere logical self-contradiction but to what we may call an existential contradiction, a contradiction between the meaning of what we assert and the act of asserting it. For Royce an absolute truth is one which is reaffirmed by the act of trying to deny it. Thinking is a unique activity, for it has certain aspects "which sustain themselves even in and through the very effort to inhibit them" (*William James and Other Essays*, p. 243; quoted by Cotton, p. 203).

Mr. Cotton is not satisfied, however, with this reply to skepticism. The response to cultural and historical relativism which he prefers is "to undertake a critical analysis of one's own presuppositions" (104). But immediately he suggests that perhaps no man can know his presuppositions completely, that they can be discovered only by a later generation. In the meantime, what is left for us to do? It is to "attempt" to understand them. But what will come of such an attempt? The answer is that we shall have supplied something which is "essential to any kind of moral harmony" (104). But this is only a by-product; the attempt to understand one's presuppositions will not succeed in its primary purpose and it will not free us from the limitations of our special perspective. Appeal to social corroboration is not the answer. "The question is distinctly moral and, at its deepest, religious in nature" (105). Mr. Cotton objects that "Royce never dealt adequately with these difficulties. After recognizing all interests as playing their part in human life, he soon confined his 'internal meaning' to purely rational purposes" (105).

Now I think it can be shown that on this issue Royce was right, and that the only way to deal with such difficulties as conflicting interests and partial perspectives is to make the "purely rational purposes" primary. This will not, as Mr. Cotton seems to think, lead us to overlook or minimize such difficulties; on the contrary it will subject them to their proper master and keep them in their place in so far as this is possible. Indeed it is hard to see how we can do anything but intensify the difficulty if we abandon the intellectual problem and appeal to moral and religious considerations. It is true that moral fervor and religious faith are not themselves intellectual activities; but unless we insist that they be grounded on knowledge and that when we follow faith beyond reason's control there shall be a rational justification for doing so, we open the door to every aberration of fanaticism. No matter with what sober and gentle winsomeness our own faith may make its claims upon us, the claims of the most fantastic extravagances of prejudice and emotional frenzy will have as good a warrant.

It is just not the case that we are faced with the dilemma either to repudiate the effort to know truth as objective and

without distortion or else to deny the existence and influence of those special interests which can so easily distort our thinking. Royce saw that the remedy lies in the way in which we organize our special interests. It is his contention that all of these private and group interests must be subordinated to one fundamental interest, to a passion for truth itself. The strength of that interest is the measure of the control we can exert upon the influence of our partial perspectives. Royce's error, as we shall see later, was not in his lack of emphasis on the volitional aspect of knowing; it was in going as far as he did in trying to substitute the volitional for the logical.

To recognize that knowing is motivated does not require us to confuse the motivation with the process of knowing. When we really desire the truth we carefully protect the methods and tests of inquiry from bias and preconception. Even when we cannot do this with complete success we still may carry it further than if we had not made the attempt at all. What is most important of all is to recognize that our errors are *in principle* corrigible. The desire for truth takes us out of our personal perspective just to the extent that we succeed in satisfying that desire, and to say that we cannot succeed at all in satisfying it intellectually is to make a statement which, if true, could not be made.

Royce's ill-starred attempt to unify will and thought rests on his confusion of the proper role of each in action and knowledge. He is forced to make volition take over the work of cognition, and the result is to subvert the very truth-claim which differentiates knowledge from psychological adjustment. For the source of this difficulty we have to go to the very foundation of Royce's idealism, and this brings us to the second of Mr. Cotton's two main criticisms of Royce. It is this second criticism which needs to be pushed further than Mr. Cotton has followed it, and its connection with the first criticism clearly shown.

Royce's thought, says Mr. Cotton, rests on two assumptions: "(1) that only the presented is the real; and (2) that the purpose of thought is even now fulfilled" (138). The first leads to subjectivism and the second to the denial of temporal reality in favor of a timeless Absolute Self. We may add that it was to meet the predicament in which the first of these assumptions placed

him that Royce needed the voluntarism that is so important in his philosophy.

Only the first of these assumptions is basic, for the second can be derived from it. On the first assumption the finite self can be rescued from solipsism only within a wider self, so that eventually all inter-subjectivity is contained within a single all-inclusive Self. But to be all-inclusive it must already have excluded the temporal; for if temporal there would be no actual moment at which it would exist in its entirety and thus satisfy the first assumption.

The immediate present is the only datum, but if its internal meaning is to be fulfilled it requires a past and a future; and this the self constructs to satisfy the purpose of the present. Thus Royce is led, as Mr. Cotton says, "to affirm both past and future as ideal in nature, the kind of reality that fulfills the purpose of our momentary judgments" (34). Royce himself says, "*That by future as by past we mean only certain notions we have, that are now and here formed by a present thought-activity dealing with present data of feeling*" (*Fugitive Essays*, p. 254; quoted by Cotton, pp. 34-35). As with past and future so with the physical world. We recognize it because "*the purpose of any instant of rational consciousness is fulfilled better by recognizing it as thus and thus existent than by viewing it otherwise*" (*The World and the Individual*, II, p. 31; quoted by Cotton, p. 37). "The ought of theoretical judgment," Mr. Cotton comments, "is like the ought of ethics, definable in terms of our own purpose" (37).

It seems clear from this that the self constructs past and future in time, and the physical world as well, in order to fulfill the internal meaning of the idea of the present moment. But what about the existence of the self? Royce denies that the self is a datum (14-19), and yet its existence can hardly be a postulate, for "by Royce's own terms the self is that which does the inferring and the postulating" (40). So the self, it would seem, has to be a datum and yet not a datum. It is not to be found among the objects of its own experience and yet it is, in a sense, given in every act of knowing.

It is from this point that Mr. Cotton's criticism needs to be

pushed further. We need to recognize that the way the self is known in Royce's philosophy is another way of knowing, one which differs from the way in which past and future and the physical world are known. Here the voluntaristic bridge from internal to external meaning is useless. What we have is rather a plain old-fashioned realistic cognition of a reality which exists in independence of its being known. The self is known as a being which has its own existence; it is not a construct. This is not idealism but personal realism.

If this is Royce's position, implicit in his argument without recognition or acknowledgment, what has become of the principle that our awareness transcends the present moment only as the fulfillment of purpose? The fact is that Royce's argument for idealism is frustrated from the very start. Once caught in the given of the present moment, escape on his own terms is impossible. To appeal to volition and purpose is to try to make the non-cognitive do the work of knowing. This it cannot do. Purpose cannot know, it can only purpose. It may be our purpose to know, but to purpose to know is not to purpose to purpose.

I suggest that the explanation for this confusion is to be found in an equivocation that permeates much of modern philosophy and which hid from Royce the seriousness of his difficulty. The equivocation is between *cognitive* and *volitional intention*, between *intention* as descriptive of the act of *awareness* and *intention* as *purpose* or *aim*. Cognitive intention is logical meaning; in this sense an idea intends its object. To have an idea is not to be aware of the idea but to be aware of that which the idea intends, of that which its use as a logical instrument enables us to know. Volitional intention, on the other hand, is a purpose which we engage to carry out, an aim which we set out to fulfil. It is not cognitive; and even when our intention is to know, the intention to know is entirely other than the logical intentionality of the act of cognition. One is the motive or purpose to be served by the knowing, the other is the very structure of the knowing act itself.

If we ask why Royce did not recognize logical intention and was forced to try to make volitional intention do the work of the other, the answer is found in his basic assumption that only the presented is the real. For logical intention can survive only with the recognition that it is the very essence of the act of awareness to transcend itself.

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APPEARANCE AND MORALITY

DONALD WALHOUT

THE *Phenomenology of Moral Experience*¹ evinces by its subject matter a predominating interest in the types of ethical issues dealt with by the main stream of British moralists in the last two and a half centuries, including the modern concern with ethical disagreements. The author can be classified as belonging to the "intuitionist" school; but the classification should not be stressed at this point, since he approaches his subject from a fresh point of view. His approach is, as the title indicates, phenomenological, and claims to be strictly objective and descriptive. "In making these analyses I have consciously sought to avoid prejudging any of the issues of ethical theory by the introduction of epistemological, psychological, or sociological hypotheses. What I have sought to render is a faithful description of the most significant features of various types of moral experience, and of that which all possess in common" (7). Such a "faithful description" of actual moral experience will, he believes, have great relevance for the problems of traditional normative ethics. "The results of these analyses are not, in my opinion, devoid of import for ethical theory. Not only can they serve as a basis for testing the adequacy of alternative theories, but they also directly suggest certain significant conclusions" (ibid.). One of these conclusions is that the analyses "lend very powerful support to the basic contention of those recent moralists who have attacked the utilitarian tradition" (ibid.). Another is that the author is "unwilling to hold that the data of moral experience suggest that rightness is a 'non-natural' property of actions, or that judgments of rightness and wrongness are a priori in character" (ibid.). Rather he states his position as follows: "In the language of current technical distinctions, I believe that the ethical theory which is most consonant with the facts of moral experience would be classifiable

¹ Maurice Mandelbaum, *The Phenomenology of Moral Experience* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955).

as a naturalistic and (in Sidgwick's sense) a perceptual form of deontological theory" (7-8). But these conclusions are implications. Let us turn to the analyses themselves and their results.

The largest part of the book (Chapters II, III, and IV) consists of analyses of the fundamental types of moral judgment. This section is preceded by a chapter on methodology in ethics, and the last two chapters discuss the nature and resolution of moral controversies. It will be convenient to divide the subsequent exposition according to this threefold division.

There are two ways in which one may conduct a critical study of this kind: one may, like a duelist, meet the author on his own ground, in the arena he has chosen, and act either as an opponent or as a second; or else one may witness the duel as a spectator (although hardly an ideal one) and evaluate the analysis from the outside. The present book calls, I think, for the first kind of review. Consequently, remarks derivating from the second standpoint will have only a minor place.

1. *Methodology in Ethics.*

Mr. Mandelbaum begins his work with a consideration of a neglected problem in modern ethics, namely, the selection of a method capable of solving its questions. British and American moralists since Sidgwick have been emphatic in demarcating a special subject matter for ethics, but have failed to deal with the correlative problem of methodology. The demarcation of subject matter consists in the separation of normative from descriptive disciplines. Normative issues are said to be the subject matter of ethics, as distinguished from other kinds of inquiry which are merely descriptive. The causes of this (artificial) division are two: one is the revolt against "scientism," and the other is the growth of analytic philosophy, which, in seeking more fields to analyze, took up the analysis of normative meanings as differentiated from scientific meanings. The result has been the minimizing of descriptive techniques in ethics, and indeed the exclusion from most inquiries of "any consideration of the conditions under which moral judgments were made, or of the characteristics of man which were responsible for such judgments"

(14-15). But having dislodged ethics from its earlier attachment to fact, modern theory has offered no method by which the problems of ethics in this isolated state can be adequately resolved. Mr. Mandelbaum proposes at once to return to descriptive facts as relevant to the solutions of ethical issues, and to adopt a method calculated to exhibit their relevance.

The method adopted is the phenomenological method. It is defended (a) by showing the difficulties in other methods, (b) by showing that other methods presuppose it, and (c) by employing the method throughout the book in verification of the claim made for it. The other methods with which it is compared are the metaphysical, the psychological, and the sociological methods. These three, along with two versions of the phenomenological method, are said to be the five methods used by moralists in the past. A possible omission might be called the biological method, popularized by Huxley in one way and by Nietzsche in another, but it is safe to say that the appraisal of this method would have been similar to that of the first three. These methods are not mutually exclusive, and none is completely rejected by the author. The criticism of the alternative methods is not made without recognition of their positive value.

The metaphysical method, used, for example, by Plato, Christian theologians, Spinoza, and Bradley, attempts to discover the *summum bonum* of the moral standard through a specification of the ultimate nature of reality. The difficulty in this procedure is not the one usually cited, namely, that it fails to distinguish between *ought* and *is*, but rather that it shifts attention away from the proper study of ethics, namely, moral experience, to something else, namely, reality. It thereby loses contact with the only validating experience there can be for ethical theories—the actual moral experience of mankind.

The psychological method seeks to draw ethical conclusions from a determination of why men act as they do and why they make the moral judgments they do. The difficulties here are again not the customary ones alleged—that the nature of man cannot be learned empirically, or that descriptive explanations cannot settle normative issues. They are that no generalized conclusion is possible, since human desires differ so widely, and that

the psychologist must, in order to study psychological factors in morality, already have a knowledge of the meaning of ethical concepts, and this knowledge can only come from an acquaintance with actual moral experience.

The sociological method attempts to derive ethical conclusions from a study of diverse cultural standards and of social factors influencing morality. But the user of this method also presupposes a prior phenomenological acquaintance with the meaning of ethical concepts and judgments. Thus each of these methods can be seen to have a genetic reliance upon phenomenological knowledge of moral experience.

The phenomenological method does not mean, for Mandelbaum, the method of the phenomenological school; it is broader. He writes, "I use 'phenomenology' to connote any examination of experience or of experienced objects which aims at describing their nature rather than seeking to give an 'explanation' of them. . . . What is included is every descriptive investigation of 'the phenomenal world,' that is, of whatever is directly experienced by me or by others" (313 [footnote to p. 30]). In the present connection, this means that the "essential methodological conviction is that a solution to any of the problems of ethics must be educed from, and verified by, a careful and direct examination of individual moral judgments" (31).

But two forms of the phenomenological method are distinguished, called the *contentual* and the *generic*. In the past, moralists have, for the most part, used the former; but they have done so inconsistently, and it has failed. The reason for this failure is that the method was associated with a conception of ethics which regarded its main task as that of establishing a universally valid moral standard. The *contentual* phenomenological method was employed to discover the common content in the moral judgments of mankind and thereby display the universal standard. But finding the content of man's moral judgments grossly diverse, attention was generally shifted to only a part of mankind, i.e., to those with an "enlightened moral conscience." This enlightened conscience was usually that of the moralist himself, or that of the group to which he belonged. Such an outcome should lead us to eliminate the prejudgment that there is a universally valid moral

standard (a question which can be settled only after analysis), and with it the contentual approach to moral judgments. Mr. Mandelbaum proposes instead to search for the generic, formal properties of moral judgments as such, irrespective of content, and including *all* moral judgments, whether they be enlightened or queer. Thus we are invited to a general theory of moral judgments, analogous to Perry's general theory of value. Moreover, we cannot assume that these generic properties are simply the normative ones—good, right, ought, etc.; we must examine descriptive factors as well. "What characterizes this approach is the fact that it treats moral experience as a complete judgmental act. Not only are the attitudes which are present and the content which is affirmed to be considered, but it is crucial for such an approach to examine each of these in relation to the situation in which the judgment is made" (40). To sum up, the phenomenological method adopted (called a structural generic approach) must examine the situation, the attitude, and the content involved in all moral judgments.

Doubtless the adequacy of a method cannot be fully measured apart from its results. Nevertheless, we may mention a single caveat at the outset. The author seems to be assuming, as a thoroughgoing phenomenologist must, that all of the evidence sufficient to settle any question under investigation is already contained within current human experience. This assumption is not vindicated. Stated otherwise, the assumption is that any question raised by human experience can also be solved within human experience, that is, by a "faithful description" of the nature of human experience. Now this is obviously true if our purpose is simply to offer such a description of experience and nothing more. It is quite another thing, however, when the claim is made that such description can solve other than descriptive questions. But however that may be, Mr. Mandelbaum makes an even more specific, and more dubious, claim: not only must the solutions to ethical problems be contained within the nature of current moral experience, but they must be contained within all moral experiences, as if the difference between enlightened and barbaric morality, or, if one may say it, between true and false moral judgments, counted for nothing. Finally, it may be remarked that Mr. Mandelbaum does not make it perfectly clear whether the

phenomenological method is intended only as a preliminary, or whether it is intended as a final court of appeal. If the former, then we can and must go beyond it into speculative philosophy—and we all know how Kant found it necessary to do so. If the latter, we cannot. With the former provision, I should heartily support the adoption of the method. But there seems to be a wavering on this issue which is not conclusively settled in the book.

2. *The Concept of Fittingness.*

The first application of the method is to the various types of moral judgment. The purpose of this inquiry is to discover, in the generic properties of these judgments, the real signification of the normative terms, "good," "right," "ought," etc. The solution to this most fundamental of ethical questions will contain by implication the solutions to many other questions, such as the long debate between the utilitarian and deontological theories of the moral standard, the controversy between naturalistic and non-naturalistic views of moral qualities, and the role of emotion and attitude in moral judgments.

Moral judgments are classified into three types. The first type, called direct moral judgments, are judgments made by a person who is himself confronted by a situation in which he must make a moral choice. The second type, called removed moral judgments, are judgments made upon the actions of other people or upon one's own past actions. The third type, called judgments of moral worth, are judgments concerning character traits or a person's character as a whole. The conclusion of the analysis of these types of judgment is that the central generic feature of all of them is the presence of a certain fittingness in the total judgmental act. A brief review must necessarily do some injustice to the author's own treatment, by leaving out the sequence of distinctions, definitions, illustrations, and evidence which usher in and substantiate his conclusion, and also his excellent criticism of other theories. Nevertheless, the conclusion stands out unmistakably and emphatically:

... if the preceding analyses have been correct, we have not only

found reason to believe that all moral judgments do constitute a single *genus*, but we have also found the characteristic which defines that *genus*. This characteristic is that all moral judgments are grounded in our apprehension of relations of fittingness or unfittingness between the responses of a human being and the demands which inhere in the situation by which he is faced. (181)

It will suffice for the present introduction to concentrate on this concept of fittingness—to characterize it generally and to see it in perspective.

One essential component in moral situations is the existence of a demand. Moreover, the demands which call forth moral judgments always have, according to Mandelbaum, the character of pointing toward us from the outside, and are therefore objective demands. This fact, which is among the soundest of his phenomenological observations, points up the one-sidedness of those views which hold that moral judgments are rooted in, and are mere expressions of, private emotions and desires. Moral judgments are responses to objective demands.

But unlike most deontological and teleological theories which accept this principle, Mr. Mandelbaum does not believe that the moral demand is an unanalyzable *ought*, a non-natural property of the situation. Rather the demand springs from an apprehended disproportion or disharmony in a situation, and can be analyzed in terms of such incompleteness or unfittingness. Just as the perception of a partial circle demands a completion of a certain definite kind, so the unfittingness in a moral situation sends out a demand for responses which will introduce the requisite harmony. This makes the theory "naturalistic" in Moore's sense. The fittingness which answers to the demand is not an extra quality added to the situation, but simply the natural factors of the situation organized harmoniously. In direct moral judgments, the fittingness is a relation between action and environment, past, present and future. In removed moral judgments, the fittingness is an apprehended relation between the agent's initial circumstances and his provisioned goal. In judgments of moral worth, the fittingness is a relation between types of responses, called character traits, and types of demand made upon mankind generally.

Fittingness itself is undefinable. It can be understood best by introspection, and next by examples, such as that of a blocked desire being fulfilled by a fitting satisfaction, or of gratitude being the appropriate response to a past kindness. The analogous use of the idea of fittingness in the theory of perception and in aesthetics is also illuminating. The author is especially influenced by the latter field when he speaks of fittingness as "an apprehended internality of relationship among the parts" (64). The undefinability of "fittingness" does not mean that "good," "right," "ought," "virtue," "moral emotion," and the like, are undefinable; these are all definable in turn by the concept of fittingness. Thus fittingness emerges as the all-embracing category of explanation for moral phenomena.

We must now ask whether fittingness does really have so wide a scope in morality as this theory maintains. Let us look at moral experience in prospect, instead of in retrospect as the phenomenologist usually does. If rightness (or *ought*) is analyzable into fittingness, it would follow that in every case where an action is motivated by the idea of rightness, that is, by a sense of duty, that action is *ipso facto* motivated by anticipation of fittingness in the total moral scene. I do not see how this can possibly be maintained. Some actions, such as those of the dogmatic intuitionist (in Sidgwick's sense), seem to be grounded solely in an appeal to a rule, without further considerations. Other actions, such as many of Bentham's, appear to be motivated only by envisagement of consequences. It may be argued that these examples concern mere subjective rightness, whereas objective rightness will, phenomenologically considered, reduce to fittingness. But I do not believe such an objection to be sound. Some claims to objective rightness, such as Kant's second categorical imperative, seem to be based solely on appeal to principle; and others, such as the speedy distribution of a new vaccine, upon the appeal to consequences. Doubtless the multiplicity of duties do come ultimately under a single principle; but such a principle hardly seems to be the largely aesthetic concept of fittingness. Now when moral phenomena are viewed in retrospect, we must admit that they embody fittingness rather than unfittingness (if these be the captions to which we are confined). But it is putting

the cart before the horse to suppose that fittingness is motivationally or morally prior to rightness. I should say that fittingness is an ingredient or accompaniment of rightness, much as pleasure was thought by Aristotle to be an accompaniment of virtue. And it may be a useful means to the apprehension of duty. But this is something less than claiming it to be the all-defining moral characteristic.

Again, the concept of fittingness seems to enter ethical theory in another way, viz., in the notion of an ultimate good, a *summum bonum*. Our dim envisagements of a final ideal do appear to be dominated by the idea of a total harmony of wills and interests. But it is a mistake to suppose that such envisagements are apprehended sufficiently clearly to warrant the assertion that every particular case of duty is motivated by, and consists in the apprehension of, fittingness.

Finally, we should emphasize the practical value of the concept of fittingness; for there is sound phenomenological support for the view that fittingness, if not universal, is at least one important incentive to obligation. And much more could doubtless be done to explore this notion, and other aesthetic factors, in the discovery of duty. Mr. Mandelbaum has promised something of this sort in a future work. Whether such a treatise would receive much attention from contemporary moralists, still preoccupied with a predominantly contemplative conception of ethics, in which "ethics is the attempt to gain a systematic and complete understanding of moral experience," is conjectural. But it would be welcomed by some, including myself, as a significant contribution.

3. *A Universal Moral Standard?*

The question of whether or not there is a universally valid moral standard—perhaps the central question of ethics—is reserved to the end of the book. The discussion is begun by noticing that both the absolutist and the relativist beg the question on this issue. The absolutist does, since we cannot assume before investigation that there is a common content in all moral judgments. But the relativist does so too, since we do regard some

judgments as better than others and do seek agreement with one another. Consequently, Mr. Mandelbaum's phenomenological approach to the question is somewhat indirect. He begins by examining the nature of moral controversies, the factors which give rise to them, and the possibility of their resolution. This examination does not immediately reveal to him a moral standard, but certain criteria of validity which we all use in determining whether or not a moral judgment is valid. These criteria can be applied to any moral judgment; and then it can be asked whether all valid moral judgments have a common content. If so, this would afford a universally valid moral standard; if not, not. The author concludes that there is no such standard. But we must first summarize the steps leading to this negative result.

Moral controversies are divided into three types. Differences about the moral properties of a judgment, when each party to the dispute understands the viewpoint of the other, are called *disagreements*. Controversies over the non-moral, i.e., factual, aspects of the situation are called *disparities*. Finally, disputes resulting from a seeming difference in moral sensitivity between the two parties are called *divergences*. These latter, however, when pressed, resolve into one of the first two types.

The author then proceeds to analyze the sources of moral controversy. These sources are classified as follows: (1) beliefs about facts; (2) emotions; (3) sentiments (love and hate—more permanent tendencies than emotions); and (4) personality structures. He discusses, in some detail, and with illustrations, how these factors give rise to disagreements and disparities, and the possibility of their being resolved. Whatever be thought of the completeness of this list of sources, or of the theoretical conclusion to which it finally leads, this section is one of the most illuminating parts of the book from the standpoint of practical ethics and psychology. Anyone concerned with self-reflection and with the estimating of others, with a view toward assuaging unhelpful controversies, will find here a rich mine of tunnels to explore. But the immediate purpose is more theoretical.

In considering the possibility and processes of resolving moral controversies, that is, of establishing some moral judgments as valid and rejecting others as invalid, Mr. Mandelbaum finds that

there are three criteria of validity which are generally accepted. These are named the principle of the *primacy of facts*, the principle of *universality*, and the principle of *ultimacy*. I give them in his own words:

To be valid, the predication of a moral quality must arise as a direct response to the apprehension of the non-moral properties which the object which is praised or blamed actually possesses. (245)

To be valid, a moral judgment must make an assertion which is not restricted by a reference to the conditions under which the judgment was made. (263)

Any moral judgment which is believed to be valid is incorrigible, and any incorrigible moral judgment must be acknowledged to be binding upon thought and upon action. (277)

The first principle means that a moral judgment based on an incorrect or emotionally distorted grasp of the facts in the situation cannot be valid. In the second principle, the kind of universality meant is that of a universal consistency: not necessarily a consistency in our judgments themselves, for we do change our minds; but a consistency in the method or viewpoint by which moral judgments are made. That is, the judgment must be such as would be rendered by an impartial spectator; it must include a "willingness to be consistent in the point of view from which we have made that moral judgment which we now take to be true" (271). The third principle is a consequence of the other two and depends upon them; it states the general recognition that everyone ought to think and act according to the judgments which he considers valid. The first two of these principles can be used in resolving moral controversies; the third must be appealed to in case of failure. But to what extent can moral controversies be resolved?

All controversies which are simple disparities can be resolved by either of the first two principles, depending upon whether they involve erroneous apprehension of facts, or whether they arise from distortion by subjective factors. It should be noted that the solubility of a controversy does not require the actual recognition of that solubility by the disputants.

In the case of disagreements, however, the author is less hopeful. In fact, he maintains that there is abundant empirical

evidence to show that, due to differences in personal makeup, some disagreements cannot be resolved, and ultimate differences must result. This means, for him, that there is no common content in all moral judgments, and consequently that there is no universally valid moral standard:

... if anyone wishes to establish that there is a universally valid contentual standard for conduct, applicable to all persons and in all cultures, he must empirically show that this standard is implicit in every moral judgment which any person is willing to be consistent in affirming. The evidence that such is the case is not, I believe, available. And even were it to be established we should still have to admit that it would be theoretically possible that such should not always be the case. Therefore the belief that there is a standard for conduct the validity of which may be affirmed regardless of what now is, or even may be, the nature of man is not a belief which can in my opinion be defended. (307)

In all this there is no distinction made between an absolute standard and a universal standard. An absolute standard may be defined as the ultimate determinant of truth and falsity in moral judgments, binding even if not recognized by men in their actual moral judgments. A universal standard may be defined as a standard formed by abstraction from a common content present in all moral judgments. Mr. Mandelbaum seems to be maintaining—and in my opinion wrongly—that the denial of the actuality of a universal standard eliminates also the possibility of an absolute standard. The difficulty comes in interpreting the author's assertion that a moral standard must be implicit in our moral judgments. He insists that, "We cannot claim that ethical inquiry will be able to furnish man with any norms which are not already implicit in his moral judgments" (42). There is a sense, of course, in which this must be true. But "implicit" may be taken in two senses: there is (1) the root meaning of "already contained in," e.g., a word being contained in a papyrus, waiting only to be unrolled; and there is (2) the sense of "pointing towards or presupposing, without necessarily being already contained in." These senses point up the difference between a universal and an absolute standard. I would accept Mr. Mandelbaum's requirement that a valid moral standard must be implicit in all our moral judgments, provided we adopt the second con-

struction of "implicit," but not if it entails the first. I see no reason, in other words, for assuming, as does the strict phenomenologist, that a "valid moral standard" can only mean that faint grain of common content which might be winnowed out from every single moral judgment, good or bad, that anyone has ever been "willing to be consistent in affirming."

On the positive side, one might argue that the designated requirement—that a valid moral standard must be implicit in all valid moral judgments—is in fact fulfilled when taken in the second sense of "implicit." This could be done by urging that since moral judgments, like scientific judgments, claim truth or falsity (a phenomenological fact which Mr. Mandelbaum himself admits), there is *ipso facto* presupposed an absolute standard of truth and falsity for moral, as for scientific, judgments.

But since the author has given his own conditions of refutation, I shall record these before concluding.

Now, there are moralists who doubtless would hold that such a conclusion demands that the previous argument be rejected. However, if it is to be rejected, the rejection must rest upon either, or both, of two grounds: first, that the phenomenological analysis of moral experience which has been given is either false in what it has asserted or inadequate because of what it has failed to take into account; or, second, that any such phenomenological analysis, even if it be granted to be on the whole adequate, must be supplemented by another method which is capable of establishing a more ultimate range of moral truths. If moralists should base their objections on the first count, I should consider myself to have been refuted. However, if they were to base their objections on the second, I should demand that they demonstrate by what method they can reach any more ultimate conclusion than has here been obtained, and that they then show how this conclusion relates to the moral experience with which, throughout this book, we have been concerned. (308)

I have already suggested a sense in which the analysis may be regarded as "inadequate because of what it fails to take into account." The nature of this suggestion itself entails the need for appealing to a supplementary method. But here we confront a difficulty: Mr. Mandelbaum demands that an opponent "demonstrate" his supplementary method. But a method cannot be "demonstrated" at all—at least apart from its use and apart

from the results to which it leads. Thus, if we were to propose the adoption of what the author calls the metaphysical method, its demonstration would occur with the attainment of metaphysical truth itself. Any prior demonstration is impossible, and a demand for it unreasonable. But since Mr. Mandelbaum has not indicated the criteria of meaning and truth which would be acceptable to him in the area of metaphysics, we cannot go further within his conditions. This does not mean, of course, that we can evade the issue: it means only that the problem of the moral standard, along with the method for its delineation, is part of the wider and continuing metaphysical pursuit for which there is no easy, and perhaps no final, solution. It is to the author's credit that he has ably presented what must probably be the inevitable result of any analysis within the limits of phenomenology alone.

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THE CASE FOR ETHICAL DETERMINACY

WILLIAM A. BANNER

In ethics, the devotion to the empirical has given to the discussions of psychologists, sociologists and linguistic analysts a stamp of rigour which in many instances is scarcely deserved. For it would seem that one may be quite prepared to accept the data, however selected, of social scientists without accepting therewith the quasi-philosophical dogmas which are tacitly, if not explicitly, imposed. Discourse to be philosophical must give an adequate or full account of experience. What has been stressed by relativists is that the variety and uniqueness of data in the realm of morals is irreducible and irreconcilable. It is the adequacy of the relativist's belief in unavoidable indeterminacy which is examined by Professor Edel,¹ in the effort to explore, in the light of empirical investigation, possible grounds for moral agreement.

The problem of determinacy versus indeterminacy in morals is the problem of the foundation of ethical judgment. The most relative of relativisms, the emotive theory of ethics, has in its most flagrant and simplified form held moral judgments to rest basically upon attitudes and therefore to be neither true nor false. As ethical disagreements involve oppositions of attitudes, they cannot be resolved through any appeal, however attractive to the cognitivist, to beliefs. That ethical disagreement is ultimate simply because individuals differ in their attitudes, is challenged by Professor Edel as a semi-apriorism which may be broken through an appeal, in particular cases, to the steadily increasing knowledge of human life. The removal of arbitrary barriers raised by the emotivist and others opens the way to the recovery of the cognitive element as a basis of moral judgment and the restoration of ethics as a practical science.

In rejecting extreme relativism, Professor Edel rejects also that ethical absolutism which, in appearing to remove inde-

¹ Abraham Edel, *Ethical Judgment: The Uses of Science in Ethics* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955).

terminacy, simply covers it over. What must be sought, through scientific investigation, are general principles in an applied or interpreted system. Methodologically, it is urged, the use of induction in ethics is not basically different in its "non-vicious broad circular character" from procedure in physics, whatever the significant differences between ethical and physical models. Moreover, Professor Edel contends that, through inquiry which ranges over the whole field of psychological and historical data, one may bridge the "unbridgeable chasm" between fact and value. Here it is significantly pointed out that the assertion in contemporary ethical theory of the independence of fact and value cannot be established on logical grounds alone. The question really involves the definition of good and the knowledge of human life which supports or justifies such a definition. This definition as "ultimate" would reflect "a 'complete' picture of the nature of man, his cognitive faculties and social relations" (78). There is no logical reason why a definition of good, whether ultimate or not, may not reflect the *normative* or *lawful* as indicated in the *facts* of human striving.

In appraising the old absolutisms, resting upon conscience, moral law and reason, Professor Edel is concerned with how far such moral norms are relevant to any considerations of value which purport to be empirical. Any pretensions to knowledge of antecedently given moral axioms would seem to be ruled out, together with any "special mustness" pertaining to such moral rules. Once this is done, appeals to conscience, moral rules and reason may be restated in the light of the phenomenology of moral experience and the systematic theory of man. Professor Edel seeks not so much to reject the traditional cognitive authorities upon which ethical absolutism rests as to adjust the meaning of older concepts to contemporary discussion. It should be said, however, that there is much in the author's criticism of traditional ethical absolutism which would seem to be gratuitous. This is particularly true of his criticism of ancient (e.g., Platonic) and "traditional" views of reason and his own restatement of the appeal to reason as the appeal "to the results of experience as best systematized by theoretical reflection" (60). One is reminded that for Plato

knowledge rests in the *process of reasoning upon experience*.⁹ The point to be raised with the modern empiricist in whether theoretical reflection" elicits the forms or natures of things through which recurring sense materials themselves are accounted for. Professor Edel's recognition that ethical judgment must rest upon "some theory of the world and its possibilities," would seem to imply that reason has the genuine apprehensive character which he is tempted to reject as "some uncanny faculty of penetrating the mist by which mankind is enveloped" (50).

In turning to the problem of the degree of determinateness in ethical judgment or decision, Professor Edel focuses upon what has been designated by John Dewey as the problem-situation or problem-field. The problem-field in general is constituted by relations of persons, aims, circumstances and environment. The direction of the author's assault upon the problem at hand is indicated in his recognition, as primary sources of indeterminacy, of the "objective" factors of field instability and field complexity as over against the "subjective" factors arising from limitations in the knowing process. Lack of clarity in concepts and insufficient knowledge are recognized as "subjective" factors in indeterminacy which may quite possibly be reflections of the "objective" factors of change and complexity. To this extent, the problem of cognition in moral situations becomes that of the analysis of "the primary richness and complexity of existence" (99). This, it seems, places the epistemological problem in ethics in proper perspective and permits a positive or realistic attention to the analysis of the data of moral experience. Such a quest for lawfulness in moral behavior carries with it the possibility of the reduction of indeterminacy in accordance with the growing command of knowledge over the richness and complexity of data. With the command of analysis over complexity, ethical inquiry elicits a moral pattern in which there is variety and uniformity and in which "residual indeterminacy is hemmed in by well-grounded values."

Of the factors recognized in the problem-field, aims and conflicts of aims constitute the *distinctly moral* elements. Ultimately the problem of ethical inquiry is the analysis of the phenomena of

⁹ *Theaetetus*, 186D.

human striving. In the second and third parts of his work, Professor Edel takes up the examination of moral aims in the light of the accumulated knowledge of the human sciences and in the interest of discovering a definite pattern and content of striving or aspiration. What is sought is a scheme of natural morality, rooted in the actual life of man and therefore common even to individuals of apparently diverse value orientations. At the center of this analysis is what is designated as the *functional* view of moral phenomena, in which values are simply the refinements of the "striving to live and to grow" at a given stage in the evolutionary process. Distinguishing between what is essential for life as over against the peripheral and inimical, Professor Edel proposes the ethical scheme of a *valuational base* consisting of both universal and local (historical) elements (297-305). The universal elements are the fundamental human needs, the perennial aspirations, and the values which are grounded in these needs and aspirations. These values are discoverable in the direct study of life in its socio-cultural setting, in which attention is given to common structures and common processes, to divergent activity, and to the conditions for the existence of both. The local elements are the necessary and contingent conditions under which the satisfactions of needs and aspirations must be sought in a given period.

Professor Edel maintains that a common ethic must be a "definite functioning value structure rather than a hypothetical construct of the theoretician resting on analogy" (218). There must be faced, however, the question of how *empirical* a theory of invariant or perennial value can be. Is there empirical evidence for the universal elements in the valuational base? Clearly there is abundant evidence in history, past and present, of the pursuit of the peripheral as well as the essential, of the inimical as well as the beneficial. Human aspiration patterns embrace many items which are plainly not compatible with what may be regarded as a general tendency to the satisfaction of fundamental need. This is the sort of difficulty which confronts any empirical theory of common values, if on the one hand diversity is not to be ignored and if, on the other hand, diversity is not to be taken as ultimate or irreducible. If diversity, once acknowledged, is not taken to be irreducible, there must be a sense in which value is real even when it is

not realized or actively pursued, and there must be evidence to indicate this.

Professor Edel, in meeting this difficulty, offers as evidence for ethical universality the available knowledge of values and valuational contexts.

... if there is anything which men have always sought, sought through thick and thin, sought in forms that were now open and now disguised, sought more eagerly the more it became known, it cannot be without some claim to rank as a good. And if its claims are not set aside, if it is not shown to be *merely* an instrument to something else, or a disguise for something else, or an inevitable compromise or sour grapes refuge, then it may even come to serve as a basic standard in ethical judgment. (248)

What is relevant here is the detailed knowledge, not at present far advanced, of the intimate relations of the movement of events and the modes of striving. Through this knowledge the complex structure of indeterminacy may be penetrated by indicating how the same basic values were achieved under different cultural conditions, and what factors were responsible for the degree of achievement or failure in particular situations and for the emergence of new forms.

The use of evidence in this way permits and supports a trans-cultural evaluation of life as a whole, in which the recognition of "universal tendencies or strivings" obviates cultural relativity as a value thesis without ignoring the facts of cultural variation. In rejecting cultural relativism, Professor Edel calls attention to the distinction between a value orientation as described by the anthropologist and the orientation of a valuational base. In a great measure, it would seem that cultural relativists have either ignored this distinction in treating diversity in moral practice as irreducible or have introduced universal or "higher" values in contradiction to their thesis (213-14).

In Professor Edel's scheme of the valuational base, both universal and local elements are included, as we have noted. The universal elements are the invariant needs and perennial goals which are to be satisfied and realized under the necessary and contingent conditions of a given time and place. While there is no single list given of universal values, there is indicated through-

out the book a general pattern of *physical* (food, sex), *psychological* (warmth, affection, affiliation), *social*, (interpersonal relations, association), and *intellectual* (cognition, reflection) needs. On the relation of needs to values, fundamental needs "provide raw material for many values, often serve as structural components of values, and enter into numerous value-configurations" (170). Values, in the sense of precise aspirations and life-goals, are "obviously more specialized human phenomena built on . . . [needs] . . . in a cultural milieu" (122). The valuational base for a given society may well include *major* although not invariant values, where these values are rooted in fundamental need satisfaction.

The valuational base, as the constellation of human goods or ends in relation to needs, provides specifically for the evaluation of moral attitudes, obligations and virtues, rights and duties, social policy and social control. As the ground for a consistent program of moral reorientation, the valuational base would reflect itself ultimately in the reorganization of patterns of culture through the recognition and promotion of common good. Raising the global productive level and expanding democracy globally are the examples given of possible goals in the reorganization of contemporary culture. In this, Professor Edel brings the results of systematic ethical inquiry to bear upon problems of vital importance to the contemporary world.

With some attention now to problems of theory, it is not clear just how Professor Edel regards the status of ethical inquiry. It is clear that the main thrust of the discussion in this book is in opposition to ethical relativity. There is, further, a clear rejection of the view that knowledge or truth is itself culturally and historically relative. "Where cultural and historical elements come closest to the truth problem is when they enter into the content of the scientific assertions. But here they refer to and help clarify the meaning of the assertions whose truth is to be determined. They do not determine whether what is asserted, once it is asserted and its meaning fully clarified, is true or false" (285). At the same time, however, it is asserted that ethical theory, viewed in terms of functioning as part of the whole cultural process, "is only one step removed from morality . . . ; the intellectual tools

for moral construction and reconstruction are part and parcel of the same cultural milieu" (331). And there is the further statement that fundamental theoretical concepts as well as their application have deep historical roots (331).

There would appear to be confusion here, in some respects at least, between the historical or contingent *content* and the historical or contingent *condition* of ethical theory. To recognize that the valuational base embraces a variable content which reflects the pressing needs and particular goals of a given period is not in itself to acknowledge that the *theory* of the valuational base or the intellectual tools employed to arrive at this theory are part and parcel of this milieu. It is difficult to see in what way any theory *qua* theory may be held to be pervaded by cultural elements, unless all theory is so pervaded and there is simply no objectivity of truth. It may very well be that our difficulty here stems from a failure to appreciate the "evolutionary perspective" which, it is claimed, will not permit a theorist "to step completely outside of the evolutionary process" (331). And yet it seems that the evolutionary perspective itself would be gained only in stepping completely outside of the milieu in which cognition takes place.

There is throughout this book a rather clear disavowal of metaphysical commitment (286, 335-36). Without ignoring the obvious advantages of avoiding the ways of metaphysics in the course of a volume on ethics, it is difficult to see the merit of maintaining that a definite metaphysical commitment is not entailed in the case against ethical indeterminacy. To hold, as Professor Edel does, that the stability of physical knowledge expresses "a pervasive order in the natural world" (286) involves, it would seem, a metaphysical stand. The same would be true of numerous references in this book to the nature of man and to the nature of the world and its possibilities.

Howard University.

THE IDEA OF CREATION

NEWTON P. STALLKNECHT

1. Creation is the active relation of non-durational being, or possibility, to real becoming.

2. Being and becoming are of equal status, mutually dependent upon one another for their reality. Being is the possibility of some sort of becoming; becoming the embodiment of some sort of being.

3. Creative activity reconciles the stability of being with the restlessness of becoming. The world in all its finite detail is an interplay of creative activities.

4. There is no fully concrete future, but only a skeletal project always in many ways indeterminate.

5. Creation is the presence of past and future to one another.

6. Past and future *exist* only as indispensable features of the creative present, which would be empty without them.

7. Creative activity may be enjoyed but cannot be anticipated or foreseen. To anticipate it in the fullness of its concrescence would be to perform the very act of creation we set out to anticipate.

8. The creative *now* mediates between a single concrete past and a set of alternative futures, each incompletely determinate.

9. Creativity is the ontological character of the present moment, the only aspect of the present that cannot be identified with either past or future.

10. The human self is a creature directed towards achieving the status of a creative creature. So far as it does not create, it lacks individual autonomy.

11. The creative individual is free, subject to no laws,

maxims or rules of thumb which he does not choose to embody in his work. In so far as he creates he is *causa sui*.

12. God or the sacred is the unity of the creative activity that contributes towards the emergence of creative individuals.

13. God does not create the freedom of his creatures.

14. God makes available the possibility of freedom to certain creatures; their acceptance of that freedom is a creative act.

Indiana University.

COMMENTS ON STALLKNECHT'S THESES

I

CHARLES HARTSHORNE

1. Pure possibility is wholly non-durational; real possibility is a particularization of pure possibility, so that real possibilities emerge from moment to moment (Thesis 1).

2. The equal status mentioned in Thesis 2 need not mean, "equally concrete" or "inclusive," but only, "equally real," where "real" means having a character of its own with reference to which opinions can be true or false. But becoming or process is alone fully concrete or inclusive, since if A is without becoming, and B becomes, then the togetherness of AB also becomes. A new constituent means a new totality. In this sense, becoming is the ultimate principle. (The foregoing is not intended to exhibit disagreement, and I feel in hearty agreement with nearly all, if not all, the theses.)

3. I should want to interpret "the self is a creature" (Thesis 10) in accordance with the theory of Actual Entities, in terms of which there is *not* an ever-identical self possessing experiences, but rather the ever-new experiences each possessing the self in common (so far as there is a common self—not very far if one starts the reckoning with birth, and ends it with utter senility). That language seems to say the self possesses, or has, experiences is only apparently in conflict with the doctrine. When I say, "I think," the "I" not only does not refer to what it refers to if you say, "I think," it may not even refer to what the phrase did when I used it on a previous occasion. There is always a subject which has the experience, but only more or less abstract aspects of such subjects are common to different moments. The fully concrete subject emerges with the experience.

The question is not, is there something identical throughout a person's stream of experiences, but only how concrete this is. If the final subject to be described in true statements is the con-

crete, to which more or less abstract predicates and relations are to be ascribed, then *the* logical subject, so far as we can reach it, is the momentary self, and it is this self alone which actually has the momentary experiences. Not that, the next moment, this self will be gone; for, owing to the immanence of past in present (Theses 5, 6, 8), it will not be gone. But it will no longer be *the* self, *the* concrete relative to subsequent moments. (Again, I am not expressing disagreement with Professor Stallknecht, but rather trying to elucidate what it is I hope I am agreeing with.)

Emory University.

II

ERNEST HOCKING

1. I am one with Mr. Stallknecht in his effort to avoid disposing of major problems through a coup of terminology. A "principle of creativity," like the concept of "emergence," encapsules rather than resolves an enigma.

2. On Thesis 3. We get light on creativity by contrasting it with activity which is not creative. Nature, as closed physical system, "conservative," builds on the nothing-can-be-added- (nor-lost) postulate. Lutoslawski pointed out, to James's delight, that such a system contains no individuals; the birth of an individual means an arrival of something not contained in the closed group. For this arrival he had no theory; he seemed to assume that it just twinkles into existence as by some inherent "power to exist," such as Spinoza attributed to "perfection" (a sort of ontological argument) or Hegel to "the idea." But these are not explanations. The most significant creation is the creation of an idea, not its embodiment. And there must be *room* for the new idea, an unoccupied region in which a vague wish takes form. No wish, no creation; no room, no wish; ergo, no room, no creation. I want an analysis of the room to exist.

Madison, N. H.

III

AMÉLIE OKSEBERG RORTY

1. If creation is the active relation of possibility to becoming, then possibility must be both active and non-durational. But what is the activity of the non-durational?

2. Theses 1 and 2, taken together, assert that the only difference between actuality and possibility is that the former is temporal and concrete, while the latter is non-durational and logical; these differences, however, are said not to affect their ontological status. What then does determine ontological status?

3. Thesis 4 seems correct, but the problem is to discover how the future can be "in many ways indeterminate" and also "incompletely determinate." Presumably the past and the present give the future what structure it has. But what is it that further determines the future?

4. Are Theses 5, 6, and 9 consistent? All assert that creation takes place in the present; but in Theses 5 and 6, creation is simply the presence of the past and future to one another, while in Thesis 9, creativity is said to be that aspect of the present which is *not* identified with the presence of the past and future.

Theses 5, 8, and 9 suggest that it is the present, as the meeting of the past and future, which creates; yet Theses 10-14 argue, much more properly, I think, that only the individual can be creative. But Thesis 10 does not grant a creature individuality until it has already created, and I do see that this difficulty is solved by saying that creative individual is *causa sui*.

5. Theses 1 and 2 make possibility as determinate as actuality; Theses 5, 6, 7, and 8 make the future and perhaps the present indeterminate. Is the distinction between determinateness and indeterminateness a temporal or an ontological one?

6. Thesis 7 suggests that we cannot know, but only enjoy, the present and the future. If prediction is to be genuinely pos-

sible, we must know something of the structure of the future, on the basis of our knowledge of the past. But this suggests the necessity for a distinction between the more and the less formal aspects of knowledge, the former of which permits us to predict something of the limits of the future though not its entire content. Is this an absolute distinction? Can we tell, from an examination of the past, what parts of it can, and what parts cannot, structure the future?

7. It is necessary to distinguish between possibility as a logical relation in the system of temporal sequence and potentiality as a quality of individuals. Individuals have potentialities which may or may not be developed in the course of time; but there are possible futures, more or less structured by the past and present. Only one of these will become actual and determinate. Thus the process of creation is two-fold: it fulfills the potentialities of individuals and it eliminates all but one of many possible futures.

New Haven, Conn.

IV

V. C. CHAPPELL

1. Mr. Stallknecht is right, I think, in emphasizing the presentness of creation. Creation is an activity or process, and neither what is future (non-durational being) nor what is past (durational being?) can be said to be active—i.e., to become. But it should also be stressed that creation is the activity of some creator. It is not "the present" which creates or is creative, as Theses 6, 8 and 9 would seem to suggest, but only individuals acting in the present.

2. A creative individual is a present *being*; it engages in activities or becomes but is not itself an activity or becoming. But then it cannot be the case that the "creative present" is exhausted by creative activity (becoming) on the one hand and being which is either past or future on the other (Theses 6, 7, 9).

Creation, in other words, presupposes a distinctively present mode of being, different from those of determinate fact (past being) and possibility (future being).

3. Mr. Stallknecht apparently wants to say both a) that creativity is the distinctive feature of the present, distinguishing each and every present moment from any past or future moment (Thesis 9), and that, therefore, being present alone is a condition of creating; and also b) that not every present individual is in fact creative (Theses 10, 14), so that being present is a necessary but not sufficient condition of creating. The conflict of a) and b), however, can be resolved by distinguishing two sorts of creative activity, one of general or "cosmic" scope, the other peculiarly "human."

4. In a world in which time is ingredient in things, the properties of time are the properties of things. Since each moment of time is in some sense new, whatever is at the present moment is new with respect to what was before; it must, furthermore, produce what yet will be, which is new with respect to it. The production of what is (temporally) new is a kind of creation, a kind manifested by things merely in virtue of their temporality, or membership in a temporal cosmos.

5. All men are at least cosmically creative. But some men may also create in such a way as to achieve individual autonomy (Thesis 10). This peculiarly human sort of creation is opposed to the cosmic sort, in that the non-creative routine with which human creativity is contrasted itself consists of activities which are cosmically creative. To create merely as a cosmic being is, for the human individual, to be non-creative.

6. There are two ways of regarding the relation between the two sorts of creation just described. Human creation, it may be said, is continuous with the creative activity of the cosmos in general, such that an autonomous individual is *more* creative than a stone but acts in no way essentially different from that in which stones act. Or it can be maintained that man is genuinely creative only when he succeeds in acting in some radically un-stone-like way, a way *sui generis* or perhaps in a measure divine. It is

not clear which of these two alternatives Mr. Stallknecht would accept.

7. Every creative act occurs within certain limits (despite Thesis 11). Thesis 6, e.g., states that past and future are "indispensable features of the creative present" (see also Theses 2, 5). This means that no individual creates in a vacuum; creation takes place only on the basis of past achievement and within the bounds set by future possibility, and both past and future thus limit the degree to which one can create. To be absolutely free in the present would require the total separation of the present from the past and the future, in which case creation itself would become meaningless. But though unlimited creation is impossible, it is important to recognize that the limits of creation must themselves be subject, in some cases, to creative transformation, such that no one limit or set of limits is ever fully fixed or eternal. To act creatively means to act within limits, some at least of which transcend whatever limits may have held in the past.

Yale University.

V

ROBERT WHITEMORE

1. Thesis 1 is to me an unresolved puzzle. What is "active relation"? If it is no more than a species of relation how does it differ from its terms? For creativity has ontological status (Thesis 9) as do being and becoming. Or if the relation does differ from its terms, in what sense does it have ontological status? Moreover, granting ontological status to "active relation" appears to open the possibility of an infinite regress. For how can we avoid positing a second "active relation" to relate "active relation," being and becoming—and so on? Or is the problem solved by admitting the infinite regress and holding that it (the regress) constitutes the genetic division (to use Whitehead's phrase) of creation (creative activity)? On the other hand, if "active relation" is not

simply a species of relation, what is it? Emphasis on the "active" seems to yield only a synonym for becoming or creativity. But if "active relation" is synonymous even in part with creativity, then to that degree the definition of creation as "active relation" etc. is tautologous. And "active relation" can be synonymous with becoming only at the cost of inconsistency with Theses 2 and 3. One other alternative remains. "Active relation" may be intended as a synonym for "synthesis," or for "mediation" (Thesis 8) or "reconciliation" (Thesis 3).

2. Since Theses 2 and 3 presuppose the definition of creation offered in Thesis 1, the objection that applies there applies here also. Here, however, it takes the form of the question: If being and becoming are relative to and mutually dependent upon each other, what is the nature and character of this relation or dependence considered in abstraction from being and becoming? Stallknecht's answer is apparently Thesis 3, but this seems to me to lead us straight back to the infinite regress problem encountered in connection with Thesis 1.

3. I accept Theses 4, 7, and 10.

4. Thesis 5 seems to involve the same type of ambiguity as Thesis 1; in this case with respect to the definition of "presence." Thesis 6 speaks of a "creative present," but if this means the same thing as "presence" then Thesis 5 should read, "Creation is the creative present, etc.," and this still leaves "present" undefined. The same objection would appear to apply to the "creative *now*" of Thesis 8.

5. If the "creative individual" of Thesis 11 is the same person as the "creative creature" of Thesis 10, then it would seem that Thesis 11 requires amendment, for the "creative individual" qua creative is free, but qua creature he is subject to selection by God (Theses 12, 14).

6. Thesis 12 leaves open the question as to whether the "creative individual" of Thesis 11, who is himself presumably a unity, is internal or external to the unity of God. In other words, is God pantheistic, theistic, or panentheistic?

7. If Thesis 13 is intended to be taken as implying that freedom is either ontologically prior to or independent of God, then freedom is the ultimate character of reality, the ultimate presupposition.

8. If freedom is ontologically prior to God, then Thesis 14 seems to be incompatible with Thesis 13. For if God is the donor of freedom to "certain creatures," then regardless of whether He creates freedom or not, the *creature* is not free in the fullest sense of the word.

Tulane University.

VI

GLENN A. OLDS

1. What is an "active" relation in Thesis 1? It is obviously more than a logical relation, but what more? The notion of non-durational being may mean mere possibility, or possessing all possible form, or qualified by the form of what is actual. The notion of "real" becoming may mean the process in actuality (Thesis 3), or the product of the process in actuality (Thesis 2). The meaning of relation here turns on the meanings of possibility and real becoming. It may mean merely *informing* becoming with the form of some possibility, or *producing* what comes to be. These two quite different senses turn on radically different understandings of time, being, freedom, and history; they may be said to represent, respectively, the Greek and the Biblical views of creation. The former treats creation as a fact, described through rational abstraction in terms of content and relation, form and function. The latter treats creation as an act, a distinctive mark of Ultimate Reality, "known" primarily *in act*, in personal decision and encounter. The difficulty arising from the effort to think these two views together appears in virtually all of Stallknecht's Theses (cf. No. 7 below).

2. What is the relation of creation to being and becoming?

If being and becoming are equal, mutually dependent (Thesis 2), how is the process of creation initiated or to be understood? Is it the passage of possibility into actuality and back? Or, is it a one-directional process productively unique?

3. Reconciliation (Thesis 3) connotes tension, opposition as a prior condition. What is in opposition? Possibility and actuality? But, if non-durational being is possibility, in what sense is it stable? And, if becoming is embodiment (Thesis 2) in what sense is it restless? Though creation is always in a context, in which possibilities and actualities are factors, is there not a distinction between the activity of reconciliation between possibility and actuality, and the prior productive act in terms of which both possibility and actuality are abstractions?

4. Thesis 4 seems clear and obvious.

5. What is meant by "presence"? Does this mean logical presentation, cognitive content through memory (past) and anticipation (future), or something given itself *in act*? Is an act of creation time-conscious in this sense in act, or only in reflection or anticipation of act?

6. What is the meaning of "empty" in Thesis 6? Clearly the past does give the present content in terms of memory and the future in terms of envisaged possibilities, but the *creative* aspect of now in its fullness is not exhausted by such content; it is given *in act* as well.

7. In Thesis 7 the contrast of the two underlying perspectives (see No. 1 above) comes into sharp focus. If to anticipate in fullness is equated with actualization, cognitive representation is given ontological and productive power. But this is not what Mr. Stallknecht wants to say (Thesis 9). The Biblical view argues against this form of rationalism that what is missing in anticipation (as one movement, to be sure) is precisely the creative act whereby what is anticipated is *done*.

8. Every creative act, as creative in act, is now (Thesis 8). Does the now mediate ("reconcile"—Thesis 3) or produce?

9. As creature, is the self in some sense created (Thesis 10)?

If so, what is the relation of the self's created nature to its creativity?

10. If God is not the source of man's freedom (Thesis 13), how is it to be explained or understood? Is it a possibility become actual (Thesis 14)?

Cornell University.

VII

SAMUEL M. THOMPSON

1. I agree that creation is the active relation of possibility to real becoming (Thesis 1), but creation is more than this and more than the presence of past and future to one another (Thesis 5). To create absolutely is to give real existence to what, without the act of creation, would be a mere possible. Since every agent acts in accordance with its own nature, only a being whose very essence is to exist can give existence. A finite creator uses the already existent to make actual a possibility. The creative aspects of his activity are in the freedom with which he explores alternative possibilities, and in his free choice of which possible shall become actual.

2. Theses 1, 3, and 9 oppose change and identity. But these are in opposition only as we understand change as change of identity. There is also change within an identity, as in the development of an individual.

3. In disagreement with Theses 4 and 8, I think there is a sense in which the future is determinate although not as yet determined. An event now among the possibilities for the future will take place, if and when it does, in its full concrete detail. It will not take place as a partially indeterminate skeletal project. On the other hand, my present knowledge of the future is both incomplete and necessarily indeterminate.

4. I agree with Thesis 7 that creative activity may be enjoyed but not anticipated or foreseen. I do not agree that to anticipate

it in the fullness of its concrescence would be to perform the very act of creation we set out to anticipate. This supposes that the difference between possible and actual is the addition of something to an essence, as the particularization of a universal, and thus confuses an ontological with a cognitive relation. The identity between a mere possible and that possible actualized is a real and complete identity of essence; it is not the partial identity of essence characteristic of the logical relation of a concept to what it intends. The difference between possible and actual is a difference in the mode of being of the essence. What makes the difference is a real existent acting as a cause either to give existence or to change other existents so that certain of their potentialities are realized.

5. Mr. Stallknecht's Theses seem to contain two conflicting concepts of the place of creative activity within the actual. In Thesis 9, the actual is nothing but creative activity. Theses 3, 5, and 8 may also be read with this interpretation. But a quite different position is taken in Theses 10, 11, and 12. Here creativity is something for the actual to achieve; some existence is created activity which lacks individual autonomy, while other created existence is also creative (Thesis 10). Creativity is a special level or condition of the creative individual's activity, for it is "in so far as he creates" that he is "*causa sui*" (Thesis 11). The emergence of creative individuals is something to which God contributes (Thesis 12), and so there must be something in the existence of the creative individual that is not his own creative activity

6. Where Mr. Stallknecht confines the actual present to creative activity (Thesis 9, etc.), he is forced to separate possibility, as a mere *can exist*, from potency, as the actually existing tendential character of a finite individual. Without real tendency development is patternless change, and the possible has no ontological link with the actual.

Monmouth College.

VIII

W. NORRIS CLARKE, S. J.

1. I take it that the term "creation" here does not refer exclusively or even primarily to the special divine mode of production of things out of nothing, but has the wider modern meaning of "creativity," or any free productive activity, particularly as found in man. If the equation, being = possibility, is to be taken literally, then the first Thesis, whether applied to human or divine creativity, implies an underlying theory of being which I find both arbitrary and unacceptable. It identifies being with the purely static and non-actual, in opposition to the fully real or actual, which is identified, apparently exclusively, with the process of becoming. For me, to be (and a being is that which is exercising a "to be") signifies primarily and properly the basic actuality or active presence of anything in the universe, to be in act and ready to flow over into the diffusion of its own actuality. Becoming is only the deficiency of a finite being which does not yet possess all its possible perfection in full actuality but is in the process of advancing towards it with the help of other beings already in act. It could be said, however, that creation involves a transition from possibility to an actuality inserted in an order of becoming, since the being of all finite things can never be entirely self-identical but is always stretched out in a process of self-realization through becoming.

2. I am prevented from accepting Thesis 2 in its full literal tenor, because of its solidarity with the theory of being as identified with possibility and of becoming as the only actuality. I could accept it, however, if rephrased this way: "Possibility and becoming are intelligibly correlative, or mutually dependent on each other for their intelligibility" (not for their reality, since possibility can precede becoming and possibility itself is never properly real).

3. Thesis 3 is acceptable, if being is taken as signifying either possibility or the permanent substantial human self, which

is at the same time the source of ever new outpourings of accidental becoming.

4. Theses 4, 7 and 8 are acceptable in a human context as a penetrating phenomenological description of what seems to be a necessary concomitant of at least all human creative action. We have no right, however, to extend it higher than man.

5. Thesis 5 is acceptable as a description of the state of consciousness of a finite agent in the act of creation within a process of becoming, in the sense that my presently acting self is simultaneously and indivisibly the totalization of my past in the present stretching out towards a here and now anticipated future. I would prefer, however, to change "is" to "involves" or "brings about."

6. Thesis 6 is acceptable also, within the same context. I think it necessary to qualify "exist" as follows: "Past and future possess each its own proper mode of *intentional* existence . . . ; the past as point of origin or source of the present, the future as point of anticipated and sought-after achievement."

7. Thesis 9 is acceptable, with slightly different wording for clarification: "Creativity is the *sui generis* ontological character of the present moment, the only aspect of the latter which cannot be found identically present in either past or future."

8. I agree with Thesis 10, with the qualification, for accuracy, in the second sentence: "So far as it does not create, it fails to rise to the full exercise of its individual autonomy."

9. Thesis 11 is acceptable, if "subject to" is understood only of natural or physical necessity, imposing ineluctably on the subject the following of normative laws of a moral or aesthetic nature. Such laws do, however, impose a rational or moral imperative on a subject, demanding that they *ought* to be followed, a demand, of course, which the subject remains free to reject.

10. Thesis 12 is to me a seriously misleading and inadequate statement. It suggests, or at least by its vagueness leaves the door open to, a conception of the divine being according to which God would not be a single, completely individual and personal being,

distinct from all His creatures and the sole ultimate cause of the "emergence" of all of them either directly out of nothing (in the case of spiritual substance) or through the mediation of multiple secondary causes (in the case of material substance and all accidental becoming), but rather only some kind of immanent bond of unity linking the activities of an all-pervasive but multi-centered and hence non-individual cosmic force. The latter conception is fraught with internal inconsistencies of all kinds.

11. Thesis 13 is acceptable, if it is meant that God does not create man's free acts as complete ready-made "objects" with no free intrinsic contribution on the part of the human agent himself.

12. I agreed with Thesis 14.

13. As should be evident, the main objections (aside from No. 10) I have to the above theses stem from what appears to be the general theory of being enunciated in the first two Theses and whatever necessary dependence the other Theses have on this general theory. As for the theory itself, I cannot help but wonder whether it is not a daring attempt to fuse into a synthesis some kind of Platonic essentialism or "idealism" (being as pure immutable intelligibility or possibility) and a Bergson-inspired evolutionary dynamism (actuality as durational becoming). Is such a synthesis viable?

Fordham University.

IX

ELISEO VIVAS

1. Mr. Stallknecht fails to distinguish between God's creativity and that of his creatures in Thesis 1. And he seems to equate God with possibility. But God is not possibility. He is the source of possibility.

2. God is put on the level with his creatures in Thesis 2. God is non-durational, but He is much more: He is Being, Pure Actuality, the Uttermost Reality *and* more—not mere being—and

he allows what possibilities He chooses to allow. He does not choose according to reason; the mode or form of His choice is reason. From our standpoint, actuality and possibility are not independent of God, but modes of His Being. It is being as creature and not Being as God that has equal status with becoming. The mutual dependability of being and becoming is not primary but derivative, for both are dependent on God.

3. Thesis 3 is correct for being but not for Being. But the world does not create its creativity—that is pantheism. The world is the result of God's creativity, and in it, the interplay of the creative activity of the creatures, such as it is, takes place, and in it, what creativity the creatures are capable of, manifests itself as novelty. For God there is no novelty.

4. I agree with Thesis 4, if we are speaking of the creature but not of God.

5. Creation *in the abstract* is what Stallknecht says it is in Thesis 5. But creation entails *the* Creator—the denial of this entailment is either atheism or pantheistic naturalism, either Democritus or Spinoza.

6. I agree with Thesis 6, since by underlining "exist" Stallknecht indicates that he believes there are other modes of being than existence. The conviction that being and existence are congruous concepts gives us a picture of a very clear, very orderly, Occam-shaved universe, in which a logician can live *qua* logician, but not *qua* man.

7. Thesis 7 holds for the creature. From man's standpoint God may be said to enjoy creativity. But from the standpoint of eternity God does not do anything, He does not *exist*, for He is out of space and time. He does not love forever, He loves out of time or eternally.

8. I agree with Theses 8 and 9, but I qualify them along the lines I qualified 7.

9. I agree with Thesis 10, if I am allowed to add that what the creative human being creates is 1), society and 2), culture. Society is the complex of institutions under a given sovereign.

Culture is the espoused values man discovers. Society is required to give values the anchorage, the stability, the continuity, that gives historical dimension to man's activities. This creativity is both man's vocation and his redemption.

10. Thesis 11 requires qualification. The creature from man's standpoint is free, subject to no law or determination, and *causa sui*. But in respect to God the creature is and is not free—and Saint Augustine seems to me, on the rare occasions when I understand him, to have resolved the seeming paradox. If man could create out of nothing he would be God. But while man is free he is also in bondage, for he can transcend neither the realm of possibility nor that of logic, and even the most creative of men can not transcend his age or culture altogether.

11. I agree with Thesis 12 but God is infinitely more than Stallknecht says He is.

12. I agree with Thesis 13 if Stallknecht means that when God gives freedom to his creatures He suspends His determining or creative power.

13. From man's standpoint, God does not create the freedom he gives His creatures (Thesis 14). But from the standpoint of eternity, He does in the sense that He alone truly is, and nothing else is but for Him, by Him, from Him and through Him.

Northwestern University.

X

E. S. SALMON

1. I understand creation in the Creator as an act that wills another to be, and so be related in the totality of its being to the Creator. This relation is from the created to the Creator, not vice versa as an activity flowing from the Creator begetting the created. But this relation is understood only on the supposition that, starting with an existent and realizing that it does not—

without contradiction—posit itself to be, there is a cause which is Existence Itself. Creation is thus seen in Thesis 1 as an act of non-durational being; it is not seen as an activity in the sense of a becoming—not the possibility of a real becoming in the Creator.

2. If creation is so seen, then being, (i.e., that of the Creator) and becoming (i.e., existents that are developing and becoming) are not of equal status (Thesis 3). All created things become, each according to its mode; on this plane, being and becoming are correlative. Yet there is a primacy of being because the existence and character of the becoming is the becoming of this mode of being. For though all things may be viewed as being, and all created being as interrelated, there is yet plurality as in an interplay of "creative" or developing activities. Yet no matter how connected are the factors in the interplay, there is still difference in being, in order to have an interplay (Theses 5, 6). Thus according to the types of "interplay" among different modes of being the future development is in broad lines outlined in the character of the being developing in the interplay.

Past and future (Theses 7, 8, 9) are in the duration of the existent. But the concrete future cannot be seen as concrete or actual in a definite form until it is. In the interplay I do not see the future as absolute creation, nor becoming as absolutely unintelligible, nor radically new.

3. In the free choice of man one comes upon the closest analogy to the absolute sense of creation. The choice as one's own act is certainly autonomous, but it is still an act flowing from me as an intelligent existent, and it is choice of, or directive of, an order of existents which I do not beget, much less create. Choice is within the realm of being. Man is not creative in attempting to posit an act denying what he is, and what other things and his relations to them are (Thesis 10).

4. As is evident from the above, I would not agree with Theses 12 and 13. God as Existence Itself is the principle that posits being to be at all. So he creates intellectual beings that are free. If the being as intellectual is conceived as the emergence of the interplay of activities that are not free, it could not be seen to be created as a being which is itself a free cause.

5. I am not sure I understand Thesis 14. Perhaps, in relation to 13, it means that God does not create the choice (freedom) of his creatures but gives (creates or makes available) the power to be free to certain creatures. This acceptance does not seem to be understandable as the acceptance of our manner of existence, for have we not that in spite of ourselves? But as we do make decisions we accept the responsibility of being intelligent and so free.

Fordham University.

RESPONSE TO COMMENTS

NEWTON P. STALLKNECHT

1. The expression "active relation" has disturbed more than one reader. Let me try to clarify by an appeal to intuition. When we are writing or "trying" to write, there is sometimes only an "aching void," but, on the other hand, sometimes a luminous and fruitful relevance arises between what we have already written, moments of our past experience including our acquaintance with our mother tongue and its uses, the idea to which our composition is committed, and the plans or schemes of composition that are constantly being formulated and reformulated. The synthesis or "precipitation" of a turn of phrase that in context furthers our intention may be called the *active relation* of all these things. The new expression reflects them all and grants them a new togetherness. Whatever regress of relations is involved, as Mr. Whittemore suspects, would seem to be resolved in a creative *solvitur ambulando*.

2. Without creation, becoming would be either a repetitive routine or a random movement, and no possibility would appear

as an objective. But *creative becoming* embraces a determinable future containing unrealized objectives in the form of possibilities. It also maintains itself as a consistent continuation of the past. Thus I can accept Mr. Hartshorne's comment on Thesis 2. As I see it, the idea of creation involves a theory of endless becoming, a world without end. Creation is an adjustment of pattern and context, a determinate embodiment of pattern in a context consistent with a relevant past and contributing toward a relevant future. Hence no first act of creation and no last act are called for, nor can creation be reconciled with a world history present as a *totum simul*.

3. I agree with Mr. Hocking that the creation of an idea is an important matter. But creation always involves context or medium, even if the latter is only the structure and vocabulary of a language. Creation is always embodiment that works toward the concrete where it completes itself. There is always "room" for such activity in a world whose future is indeterminate and in the making.

4. Turning to Mrs. Rorty's problems, especially her No. 3: as such, possibility is determinate but the open future in which possibility and the concrete are oriented toward one another contains indetermination. We might say that reality is the projection and resolution of such indetermination. Of course, the future remains predictable (and hence knowable) in certain of its "shapes" or patterns, just as the metrical scheme of a half-finished poem is predictable, although not its full text.

5. With reference to Mr. Hartshorne's No. 3, I can agree in that the "I" is not a ready-made substance but a feature common to certain events, a feature that is often transformed as it endures. It is obvious from what Mr. Chappell and Mr. Thompson have said that my notion of the creative creature as a human ideal is incomplete. I am interested in Mr. Chappell's suggestion for clarifying the situation. As regards his No. 6 and its alternative: I stand close to Leibniz. From one point of view all creatures differ only in degree, with the lowest approaching the status of *mens momentanea*. On the other hand, certain higher creatures are capable of self-awareness. These creatures can be creative.

Indeed, consciousness with its sense of alternatives may be described as a matrix of self-direction and creation. Creatures below this level are completely oriented in their world by creative energies lying beyond their own comprehension or initiative. In so far as this limitation is overcome, creatures become creative. Let me say here to Mr. Whittemore that creaturely freedom remains finite and subject in many ways to circumstance, which the free agent must choose to meet if he is to maintain his creative freedom.

6. Mr. Olds has set me a fascinating problem when he argues that I vacillate between a classical and a Biblical interpretation of creation. I suspect that I have borrowed from both traditions. I do not understand creation out of nothing, i.e., an absolute or wholly unconditioned creation. There is always something to be informed. On the other hand, I recognize that creation culminates in the emergence of a unique *haecceity* that "comes to be." Perhaps, like many moderns, I am a mugwump—a Hebrew-classical hybrid. As a mugwump, I find Fr. Clarke's No. 13 very astute. I am trying to reconcile Plato and Bergson. Let me suggest that the Plato of *Philebus* and the Bergson of, say, the essay on *Intellectual Effort* deserve to be considered together.

7. With reference to Fr. Clarke's major criticism and those of Messrs. Thompson and Vivas and of Miss Salmon, I must confess that my thinking, as reflected in these Theses, is pre-theological. I have tried only to indicate what area I have in mind when I speak of the holy or the sacred. I do not know just what sort of theology will result if this line of reflection is carried on persistently. But I doubt that I shall ever be able to discover any God except one that contributes toward the evocation of creative creatures. Such a God is more than a possibility. It seems to me that he must preside over vast reaches of becoming. Furthermore, it seems to me that a God for whom there is no novelty is a God quite out of this world. Such a God would belong to a universe wholly foreign to ours. I am suspicious of any double aspect theory that undertakes to present the world in two very different lights, eternal and temporal, divine and human, so that we end with two worlds.

8. As Miss Salmon's very concise argument makes clear,

there is rather less common ground between my idea of creation and an orthodox theology than Mr. Vivas, perhaps out of generosity, has tried to find. Fundamentally speaking, I stand poles apart from the theologians; yet it is interesting to notice how many points of peripheral agreement are evident between my thinking and that of Mr. Vivas and Fr. Clarke.

Indiana University.

EXPLORATIONS

CONTEMPORARY VEDANTA PHILOSOPHY, I

GEORGE BURCH

VEDANTA is the philosophical tradition based on the Upanishads, the philosophical portion of the Veda, and its unifying concept is that of the absolute being, called Brahman.¹ It is one of many philosophical schools in India, and within it many philosophical theories, monist and pluralist, idealist and realist, have been developed. Vedanta is not, therefore, a philosophical theory but a philosophical school, analogous to Christian philosophy in Europe, united by a historical tradition, respect for scripture, and certain categories of thought, but varied in content and capable of indefinite evolution. Its classical works are the ancient Sanskrit texts (Upanishads, Sutras, and Gita), in which its basis ideas are set forth, and the medieval Sanskrit commentaries in which the various philosophical theories are worked out. At the present time there is a vigorous revival of Vedanta philosophy in which the old tradition is being developed in many original ways. This is the work of academic philosophers writing in English, the language of education in modern India. Their works show, in forms of expression and sometimes even in content, the influence of Western thought, especially German and British idealism, but substantially they are an authentic continuation of the Vedanta school.

1. *K. C. Bhattacharya.*

The Vedantists with whom I studied in India represented radically different philosophical points of view, but I found one

¹ I am indebted to the Trustees of Tufts College for the sabbatical leave of absence, to the Rockefeller Foundation for the financial grant, and to Srimant Pratap Seth of Amalner for the hospitality which made possible the study on which this article is based.

consensus among them, namely that the late Professor K. C. Bhattacharya was the greatest philosopher of modern India.² The obscurity of his life and difficulty of his writings have kept Professor Bhattacharya from being well known, except to philosophers, but those who studied under him were impressed by the subtlety of his thought and the profundity of his insight. It would seem that his philosophy should be easy to study, since he has many published works and several immediate disciples eager to spread his doctrine. But the disciples competent to understand his subtle dialectic are themselves subtle thinkers in whose writings and oral teaching it is often difficult to distinguish between his system and their own developments of it, while his own written style, precise, literal, lacking any rhetorical adornments of illustration or analogy, and using ordinary words in extraordinary ways, is extremely difficult.

Krishna Chandra Bhattacharya, a Bengali Brahmin, was born in 1875 at Serampore near Calcutta, one of eight children of an impoverished clerk. Educated at Presidency College in Calcutta,³ he studied under B. N. Seal, who had revived the study of Indian philosophy. He was a brilliant student clearly destined for an academic career, but his unwillingness to appease British administrators prevented his obtaining an appointment commensurate with his ability, and he held a variety of teaching and administrative positions in government colleges. When he reached the retirement age of 55, he was principal of small Hoogly College. After retirement, however, he became professor in the Calcutta post-graduate department, spent two years at the Indian Institute of Philosophy at Amalner (where he was given the title of director), and finally became George V Professor of Philosophy at the University of Calcutta. After final retirement in 1938 he lived at Serampore, reading little because of failing sight, but

² The account of K. C. Bhattacharya's philosophy is based principally on conversations with his disciples, while that of the philosophy of the other persons discussed in this article is based principally on conversations with them, although their published and in some cases unpublished works have also been consulted.

³ He received his M. A. in 1896, and was awarded a Premchand Roychand Scholarship based on a thesis indicating outstanding scholarship.

writing a great deal and discussing philosophy with his sons and his many visitors until his death in 1949.

Bhattacharya led an austere life, and had few personal belongings. He was a devout Hindu, but not fanatic, and ate meat, if sacrificed to Kali. The progressives claimed him because he taught at the progressive Bethune College for women, and the conservatives claimed him because he observed the orthodox rites. He loved to travel, but never went outside India. He was a simple and retiring man, but proud within himself, never bowing to anyone or trying to advance himself. His oral teaching, unlike his writing, was a model of clarity, and his dialectic irresistible. There was a brilliant group of philosophers at Amalner when he was there, but none could stand up against him.

His published works in English include two books and many articles. His earlier book, *Studies in Vedantism* (P. R. Scholarship thesis, 1901), was perhaps the first competent attempt to interpret Vedanta philosophy in modern language. The later one, *The Subject as Freedom* (lectures at Amalner in 1929), was the first systematic formulation of his own doctrine. I will quote its concluding sentence as an example of his literary style:

I am not introspectively aware of my actual introspective individuality but I am aware in my introspection into feeling that the self from which the feeling is distinguished may not actually introspect and may not even possibly introspect, that individual as it is as introspecting—individual or distinct freedom without being, it may be free even from this distinctness, may be freedom itself that is de-individualised but not therefore indefinite—absolute freedom that is to be evident.

Unpublished works include two books, *Philosophy of Kant* and *Philosophy of Sankhya and Yoga*, various articles, and a pile of miscellaneous and largely unfinished manuscripts now partly destroyed by children and termites.

K. C. Bhattacharya's philosophy developed in three phases. The first phase was subjectivist, and strictly within the Vedanta tradition, although developed in an original way. Vedanta was in his blood: his grandfather was a pandit, reading of Vedanta classics was common in his family, and he was brought up to believe in them. But he maintained that faith in any authority

implies the necessity of raising ourselves to the authority's own standpoint and feeling the truth as he has felt it. He found the first clue to this understanding of faith in the Kantian theory of knowledge which he studied in college. Rejecting Kant's doctrine of the impossibility of metaphysics, he maintained on the contrary that Kant's epistemology leads inevitably to the metaphysics of Advaita⁴ Vedanta. Instead of following the Sanskrit classics, with their interminable references to scripture and refutations of ancient theories, we should take a phenomenological approach to philosophy.⁵ We should seek truth by a critical analysis of normal experience.⁶ This point of view is developed in a series of articles, of which the most important are "Sankara's Doctrine of Maya," "The Correction of Error," and "The False and the Subjective," and in the book *The Subject as Freedom*.

The first pillar of this first-phase philosophy is the subjective thought based on an analysis of *knownness*. The given object possesses knownness just as it possesses redness, but the knownness, unlike the redness (but like spatiality, which is studied independently by geometry), can be studied independently of any object and so reveals knowing as distinct from object known. This epistemological approach to the subject proceeds through a consideration of the fact of *error*. Correction of error has three stages: the snake⁷ is first presented, then corrected, then contemplated as corrected. First, the snake is perceived as real, though not judged to be real, since no judgment is made about it at all. Second, the rope is perceived as real, and by contrast with the snake is also judged to be real, although the rejected snake is not judged to be unreal, since now there is no snake, but its disappearance brings out the meaning of reality: "The quality of

⁴ *Advaita* (literally, "non-dualism") is the sub-school of Vedanta which teaches absolute monism. Its principles are: Brahman is the only reality; the world is illusion; the self is Brahman.

⁵ Professor Marvin Farber stated in a letter to K. C. Bhattacharya that *The Subject as Freedom* is a work on phenomenology.

⁶ This is the usual Vedanta approach to philosophy. The possibility of mystical experience is not denied, but it is not stressed or used to demonstrate any philosophical truth.

⁷ He employs the stock Vedanta example of a rope mistaken for a snake.

reality is explicitly felt only when it is experienced as dissipated in an illusion." Third, the snake is not even disbelieved in or considered non-existent: "Correction is not disbelieving in a previously believed *content* but only disbelieving that the previous belief had a content at all." The snake is gone, rather there never was a snake, yet the rope's *reality*, as distinguished from the merely perceived rope, is significant only with reference to the belief in the snake. The false is what is corrected or disbelieved, that is, subjectively negated, not merely objectively perceived, and conversely, reflective consciousness of a belief implies disbelief in its content, since we examine a belief reflectively only in order to question the reality of its content by dissociating this content from our belief in it. Hence the doctrine that "the consciousness of the false and the consciousness of the subjective imply each other," with its corollaries that the object exists as such through the self-alienation of the subject, and that the subject is known only by denial of the object.

The second pillar of the first-phase philosophy is the assertion of *faith*, not faith in revealed scripture but faith in the fulfillment of the demands presented by experience. It is by faith that we go beyond Kant to Vedanta. According to Kant the self is not real, though it demands to be real, since this demand is impotent. But Bhattacharya maintains that there is no evidence that this demand will not be actualized, and we have faith that it will be, not merely as an ideal of pure reason or postulate of practical reason but as known. To know the phenomenon is neither to know the reality nor not to know it, but to know it as unknown and demanding to be known. The absolute, although unknown, is believed not to be unknowable but as demanding to be known. The Vedanta doctrine of Brahman and illusion is the conceptual formulation of this demand, which is based on our feeling of the vanity of life and consequent unreality of the world. Unreality has meaning only in contrast with reality. The illusory object demands the real subject.

The superstructure erected on these pillars is the dialectical system which Bhattacharya called "transcendental psychology" and summarized in *The Subject as Freedom* as a sequence of grades of subjectivity. *Object* includes whatever is meant. The *subject* is

neither meant nor thought nor intuited, yet it is speakable and known as what the speaker intends by *I*. The modes of subjectivity are the modes of freeing oneself from the modes of objectivity. Constructing a series of steps from object to subject is standard Vedanta practice, and in doing this Bhattacharya is following the Vedanta tradition, but with a new elaboration of stages, a new subtlety of discrimination, and a new language drawn largely from Western thought. He distinguishes the following stages of subjectivity:^{*} (1) the perceived environment, purely objective; (2) the body as perceived, similar to other perceived objects, yet unique in being the center of spatial reference for all objects and in not having its unperceived parts completed by imaginary perception from another position, and subjective in relation to the environment; (3) the body as felt internally, which gives the first feeling of detachment or freedom; (4) knowledge, by conscious non-perception, of absence as a present fact, this distinguishing of what the present is not being the beginning of psychic fact; (5) image, that is, the image of what is absent, essentially incomplete, since completion would make it a percept; (6) idea, finished form that interprets the image's forming form; (7) thought, unobjective yet referring to object, definable only as what the object is not; (8) feeling, a psychical state unreflectively conscious, complete dissociation from objectivity or meaning, and, coordinate with it, willing, free identification with objectivity—cancellation of the objective attitude bringing freedom either for withdrawal from the object in feeling or conquest over it in willing; (9) introspection, believing which is not itself meant, which is the *I* itself; (10) the non-individual self beyond actual introspection, when distinction is negated as illusory; (11) the subject as freedom itself. At each step the demand for consciousness of a deeper reality is fulfilled as the previous experience is rejected as illusory.

Bhattacharya's interest in this scheme is not merely theoretical. As a Vedantist he is interested in philosophy primarily as a practical discipline. *The Subject as Freedom* is a Vedantic discipline

^{*} These are sub-stages of four principal stages: objectivity (1), bodily subjectivity (2-4), psychical subjectivity (5-7), spiritual subjectivity (8-11.)

analogous to the psychosomatic discipline of Yoga. Spiritual progress means the realization of the subject as free, or rather as freedom, and it is by the resolute cultivation of the subjective attitude, denying every meant object and believing in the reality which this denial demands, that this freedom is attained.

The second phase of K. C. Bhattacharya's philosophy, developed after his retirement from "service" in government colleges and especially during his residence at Amalner, is represented by a number of articles. The influence of Vedanta (and also of Kant) is still strong, but the second-phase philosophy goes far beyond anything which could be recognized as orthodox Vedanta. The subjective attitude which dominated the first phase now yields equal importance to the objective attitude,⁹ and also to a third attitude, that of feeling. This broader point of view culminates in the doctrine of the alternative forms of the absolute, which is perhaps his most original and significant contribution to philosophy.

The epistemology of this phase is formulated in the article, "The Concept of Philosophy",¹⁰ at once the most intelligible and most easily available of Bhattacharya's works. In place of the stages of subjectivity he distinguishes four "grades of theoretic consciousness"—empirical, pure objective, spiritual, and transcendental thought. Empirical thought is concerned with science, the other three with philosophy. (1) The content of empirical thought (theoretic consciousness necessarily referring to an object perceived or imagined) is *fact*. Fact is speakable literally, not *spoken* but *spoken of* as information. "Beliefs in science alone," he says in a notable concession to positivism,¹¹ "are formulable as

⁹ This, like everything I say about K. C. Bhattacharya's philosophy, involves some simplification. For him the objective attitude is involved in the subjective attitude, which has two currents, the one looking toward the pure subject (subjective attitude proper), the other looking at the lower stage objectively when you have arrived at the higher stage subjectively (becoming the objective attitude). Realism is always transcended.

¹⁰ *Contemporary Indian Philosophy* (London, 1936; 2nd ed. 1952), pp. 105-25.

¹¹ Professor T. R. V. Murti protested against my calling this a "concession" to positivism, maintaining that it is rather an assertion of positivism.

judgments and literally thinkable." Fact is expressible as a judgment which has no reference to its being spoken, yet it is nowise independent of its being known, for it is believed not as self-evident or self-subsistent but as essentially knowable, though perhaps actually unknown. For science the object is knowable as of right, not only knowable but also usable, and it is this wrong spiritual attitude of science toward the object which provokes a philosophy which goes beyond science. (2) The content of pure objective thought (contemplative consciousness without necessary reference to perception) is *the self-subsistent object*. The self-subsistent object is speakable literally, not *spoken of* but *spoken* as meant. It is constituted by being spoken, and so always has reference to the subject, and is not, like fact, literally expressible in an independent judgment. Not being restricted by perception, however, it is not necessarily knowable, and so is self-subsistent, not dependent on any individual mind but self-evident. The philosophy of the object includes logic, the study of the form of the self-subsistent object (which is also the form of fact), and metaphysics, which is the study of the object in reference to the subject. (3) The content of spiritual thought (enjoying consciousness or introspection) is *reality*. Reality is speakable literally, spoken not as meant but as symbolized. It cannot be understood literally, but the objectively contemplated meaning symbolizes a subjectively enjoyed content, the subject *I*, spoken as though it were object but understood as the speaking subject. The subject *I* is enjoyed either psychologically as embodied, morally as related to other selves, or religiously in communion with the over-personal self. But religious experience is infinitely varied, and systematizes itself in alternative religious systems, which in turn are expressed in alternative systems of psychology, metaphysics, and logic. There is consequently indefinite scope for differences in philosophical theory. Philosophy can never progress toward a unanimously acceptable solution, but is a systematic symbolism which necessarily admits of alternatives. (4) The content of transcendental thought (in which both objective and subjective attitudes are rejected) is *truth*. Truth is speakable,¹²

¹² He has no place in his theory of knowledge for the ineffable, taking the plausible position that everything we speak is speakable.

but symbolically, not literally, for it cannot be understood as it is believed, but is expressible only by the negation of *I*. The absolute is, not as perceived fact, contemplated object, or enjoyed reality, but as self-revealing truth independent of being spoken.¹³

The absolute, for which everything else is nothing, has nothing to be distinguished from, yet is capable of internal distinctions. It may be *truth*, or it may, in opposition to truth, be absolute *freedom* beyond all being, or it may be absolute *value* as the indeterminate togetherness (though not synthetic unity) of truth and freedom. Truth, freedom, and value are alternative forms of the absolute, and the prototypes of the three subjective functions knowing, willing, and feeling. Historically the absolute is conceived as truth in Advaita Vedanta, as freedom in Buddhism, and as value in Hegelianism. The theory of knowing which culminates in absolute truth recognizes the possibility of alternative theories of willing and feeling which culminate in absolute freedom and absolute value.

The theory of willing is not elaborated in detail in his published works, but the theory of feeling is developed in the articles, "The Concept of Value" and "Artistic Enjoyment."¹⁴ We speak of the value of a known content or a willed content, but value itself is a felt content. *Rasa* (literally "flavor") is the felt essence of a thing, as contrasted with its known essence, or rather the feeling itself. Primary feeling is enjoyment of an object. Sympathetic feeling is feeling of another's feeling (not merely understanding it or having a like feeling). Contemplative feeling or artistic enjoyment is sympathy with sympathy, that is, feeling of the feeling of another person—actual, indefinite, or universalized—who feels sympathetically, so that in artistic enjoyment the feeling is freed from its reference to an individual subject and made impersonal and eternal as the beauty of an object—yet a feeling, not a property.¹⁵ On the one hand it is no judgment (and

¹³ This scheme seems less reminiscent of classical Vedanta or Kant than of Plato, the four grades suggesting his shadows, ideas, soul, and Good respectively.

¹⁴ I am indebted to Professor P. J. Chaudhury for a copy of this unpublished work.

¹⁵ This, he says, is why "Indian art is prevailingly abstractive or contemplative in character and not dynamically creative."

so not objective); on the other it is independent of valuation (and so not subjective). Absolute feeling or value is not speakable but expressible only symbolically as an exclamation.

The general theory of the absolute is developed most completely in the article, "Concept of the Absolute and its Alternative Forms." Philosophy starts in *reflective consciousness*, in which we are not merely aware of a content but are aware of it in relation to consciousness. The content of *knowing* is not constituted by the act of knowing, which does not construct but discovers the object.¹⁶ The content of *willing*, on the contrary, is constituted by the willing. The content of *feeling* is imperfectly distinguished from the feeling, so that value is alternately content and consciousness. In all three cases reflection tries to understand the relation of content to consciousness on the analogy of the relation of contents, but the analogy can be extended only part way, and must be completed by forms of negation meaningless to reflection: unrelatedness (known content understood as what need not be content of knowing), negation of the emergent (willing understood as the negation of being—even the being of the willed content), and indifference of being and non-being (value understood by the known being distinguished from it). The absolute is what is free from the dualism of content and consciousness. The known freed from its contenthood (reference to consciousness) is the self-evident *is* or *truth*. Consciousness freed from content (as solely creating its content) is *freedom* of the will. The implicational relation of content and consciousness freed from their distinction is *value*. We cannot assert either that there are three absolutes or that there is one absolute, but the absolute must be formulated in this triple way—truth, freedom, value (absolute for knowing, willing, feeling). Each is absolute, but what are three are only their verbal symbols, "they themselves being understood together but not as together." The absolute is an *alternation* of truth, freedom, and value.

The third phase of K. C. Bhattacharya's philosophy, developed during the last years of his life, has no written documents either

¹⁶ Both realism and idealism are overstatements, he says, but realism is a better approximation to the truth.

published or unpublished, but is extant only in Kalidas Bhattacharya's recollection of his conversations with his father. In these conversations he generalized the concept of alternatives into a logic of alternation. Beside the Aristotelian logic based on contradiction (this, *not* that) and the Hegelian logic based on synthesis (this *and* that), this is a third sort of logic based on disjunction (this *or* that).

The quasi-realism of "Concept of the Absolute and its Alternative Forms" is transcended in a more involved dialectic where knowing reveals reality as subject (*chit*), while willing posits reality as object (*sat*), and feeling apprehends reality as subject-object dialectically united (*ananda*). Each of these three attitudes (knowing, willing, feeling) can be deduced from each of the others by formal logic,¹⁷ the basic concept of which is negation (including double, triple, and quadruple negation). There are two elementary categories, *is* (position, which is no form, and useless for deduction) and *is not* (a living form which can draw out something from something else), and five combinations of them.¹⁸ Logic gives possibilities. We start from the actuality or existence of what is given in experience and so simply *is*. By logic we discover possibilities, but cannot choose among them, since all are established by logic and so alternate. Actuality and possibility never clash but themselves alternate.¹⁹ Conflict among actuals (for example, religions) ceases when all are recognized as not only possible but alternatively actual, that is, by lifting up the actual to the realm of the possible, getting rid of the standpoint of actuality.²⁰ Starting from the given, we proceed by reason, that is, negation, to reach other possibilities, each a negated being, and from each possibility still others are deduced. In the realm of possibility there is no position and

¹⁷ Kalidas unfortunately has forgotten how.

¹⁸ Different from and more basic than the categories of Jain logic, which however contributed to K. C. Bhattacharya's logical thought and is discussed in his early article, "The Jain Theory of Anekantavada" (theory that truth is indeterminate).

¹⁹ For example, there is no synthesis or hierarchy of religions; for each man only one is actual, but he recognizes the possibility of others.

²⁰ This superior attitude of the pure logician he called the "angelic attitude."

no positive language: data are not-A, not-B, etc. Starting with actual object, we proceed to not-object, not-not-object (a higher concept not to be confused with the original object), and so forth.²¹ But the realm of possibility is the realm of alternation. Among possibilities either may be true, but insofar as they negate each other both cannot be true. The meaning of possibility is not *this or both but either*.

It is language which makes possibilities and therefore alternation possible. The three subjective functions are an empirical fact, but there is also a fourth function, speaking, which is the unity of the others in formal logic. Besides the alternative attitudes of knowing, willing, and feeling, there is the attitude common to them all, the linguistic attitude of semantics, which studies their common structure. Although the meaning of particular words and the grammar of particular languages are empirical, that words must have both meaning and syntactical connection is known *a priori*. Just as in feeling the artistic creativity is basic yet requires also the subordinate beauty, so in language the semantic function of words is basic yet requires also the subordinate syntactical connection. Hence we can develop a system of semantics, in which words give not actualities but forms, semantic thought giving "mere forms" and syntactic thought "pure forms." This philosophy of language, however, is not an autonomous system independent of those based on experience, and it does not lead to a fourth absolute.

While K. C. Bhattacharya is perhaps the most influential Indian philosopher of recent times, this does not mean that contemporary Vedanta philosophers accept his system. So far as I know there is not a single contemporary philosopher who simply accepts Bhattacharya's doctrine. His influence has been organic, not systematic. He did not teach a theory to be accepted but a way to be followed, a new way of philosophizing, in spirit the ancient way of Vedanta but in content informed by his own novel genius. His disciples have not accepted his philosophy but have developed it, and in different directions.

²¹ I quote, as an example of style: "Negation applied to actualities makes them exhaustive and alternative—but my father did not say that: he spoke of double and triple negation."

2. *Kalidas Bhattacharya.*

The third phase of K. C. Bhattacharya's philosophy is now being developed by his son Kalidas. He considers his own philosophical thought to be a continuation of and organically one with his father's. They form a single intellectual process, but it is a process, not a fixed system. Kalidas acquired from his father the fundamental principle of alternative absolutes, but in certain important theses, notably the correlation of the absolutes with the conscious functions, he never agreed with him.

Kalidas Bhattacharya, third son of K. C. Bhattacharya,²² was born in 1912. Educated at Calcutta, he received a P. R. Scholarship, and has always been a student and teacher of philosophy.²³ Since 1951 he has been professor of philosophy at Government Sanskrit College in Calcutta. He is more interested in philosophical ideas than in the textual research with which this college is concerned, but is free to pursue his own interest, having no formal duties.²⁴ He does, however, give individual instruction to advanced students.²⁵

Kalidas Bhattacharya is a friendly, pleasant, humble man interested in philosophical ideas, and not in his own standing as a philosopher. He is a serious, competent, and scholarly philosopher, perhaps the best young philosopher in India. He treats basic problems in an original and profound way, and is developing an epistemological and metaphysical system of great

²² His elder brother Gopinath, of Presidency College, Calcutta, is also well known as a brilliant philosopher and teacher. He rejects their father's philosophy, especially the doctrines of indefiniteness and alternation, and is himself a realist, but has no philosophical system of his own.

²³ One of his former students at Calcutta University told me that his philosophy class, ending at three o'clock, usually continued to five and then sometimes went in a body to the professor's home, thirteen miles away, to continue the discussion for one or two days.

²⁴ He remarked to me that, although he had been in his present position for three years, nobody had yet told him what his duties were.

²⁵ When I met him, he had five students, some themselves professors of philosophy, to whom he was teaching Vedanta, Nyaya, Tantra, Kant, and his father's philosophy respectively. When he was teaching one, the others would usually listen in, and when I called they would stop whatever they were doing and he would talk to me.

interest. His oral style is like that of an inspired prophet, the inspiration being his recollection of his conversations with his father. He does not develop his argument consciously, but struggles, sometimes incoherently, to bring up from his sub-conscious mind the memory of those half forgotten discussions. Asking him a question evokes a vivid example of what Plato called recollection.

Unlike his father, Kalidas Bhattacharya has an oral style which is often obscure but a written style which is a model of clarity, although not always of literary elegance. He has written three books and many articles. His first and most important book, *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy* (Ph.D. thesis, 1945; published 1953), develops the logic of alternation and applies it to the conscious functions knowing, feeling, and willing. His second book, *Object, Content and Relation* (P. R. Scholarship thesis, 1951), applies the logic of alternation to the content of perception and to relations. His third book, *The World and the Concept of Necessity* (not yet completed), modifies the logic of alternation and applies it to the ideal and the actual.

The foundation of his philosophy is a theory of knowledge. The central problem of philosophy, he says, is how knowledge is possible—not merely synthetic knowledge *a priori* but any knowledge. Knowledge and object are so opposed in nature that their conjunction is contradictory, yet as a matter of fact they are not only conjoined but united in the close unity "knowledge of object." Knowledge, whether perception or memory or inference, is the subjective feeling of an object, while object is that which is known as not itself knowledge. We may accept their unity, in spite of their incompatibility, as a synthetic unity of contradictories, but this Hegelian approach is only one possible solution. We may assume the subjective enjoying attitude, in which consciousness is felt as identical with the feeling of it, or we may assume the objective contemplative attitude, in which object is felt as standing over against the feeling of it. At the perceptual level, consciousness, object, and their unity exhaust the experience, but at higher levels of knowledge there is a third element, content. Images and universals, for example, are contents but not objects. Contents are alternately objective and subjective as knowledge progresses

through the correction of error. In inferential correction the error is corrected, but in perceptual correction the false appearance is not only corrected but rejected. What suddenly disappears is illusion, while what suddenly appears in its place is the real. Not contradiction but rejection determines unreality. All appearance is real so long as contrary evidence is not forthcoming. The unreal is that which, once real, has exploded into nothingness. This is an account of the unreal at the unreflective level of consciousness. At the reflective level, the unreal is that which resists confirmation, while the real stands fully, and especially socially, confirmed. There is cognitive condemnation of content as false from a higher level (somehow analogous to social condemnation of a criminal by a judge authorized to condemn), recognition of error thus showing that there is a higher standpoint which must be admitted. In knowledge this higher standpoint is truth, and in the object it is necessity. In ordinary reflection the higher standpoint reveals things which were already present, although unrecognized, in the unreflective experience, but in transcendental reflection entities are discovered which were not present at all at the unreflective level. This is a new method of knowledge, transcending perception and inference, treating categories as entities (not as functions or laws or abstractly, as in ordinary reflection), and culminating in a demand for or belief in values which is given only by teaching in a cultural tradition. The teaching is apprehended in four stages—spoken word, empirical concept, pure concept, *logos*—and the world is apprehended rationally as a development of language.²⁶

These epistemological considerations, he maintains, lead to an Advaita Vedanta metaphysics—but it is an original system hardly recognizable as classical Advaita. It is based on the logic of alternation, which means disjunction. Disjunction occurs when alternatives exist at the level of possibility. One alternative must be asserted, that is, tied to actuality for the speaker, but if the alternation is real (A both opposed to and united with B) the commitment may be arbitrarily to either. The other alternatives

²⁶ This is true also of Western rationalism, according to Kalidas Bhattacharya's analysis of it, reason being language for Greek rationalism, although only subjective thinking for modern rationalism.

are then rejected or ignored or subordinated or included, and by the dialectic resulting from these processes the chosen alternative is developed to its logical conclusion. The most important dialectical process is rejection, which must not be confused with mere negation or contradiction, and in which the act of contradicting a content is itself negated, leading to the neo-Advaitic doctrine of the ultimate negation of the penultimate negation of the world.

The most important application of the logic of alternation is to the problem of knowledge itself. We may adopt the outward objective attitude by which the object is apprehended or the inward subjective attitude by which knowledge itself is apprehended. In the latter we find that *knowing* has three levels—perception, memory, thought. Memory is more reflective than perception, and thought more reflective than memory, this increasing rejection of the object being the essence of cognition. In knowing the subject determines or creates its object. This is subjective idealism.²⁷ The subjective is certain because the consciousness of subjectivity is identical with subjectivity itself. Going beyond positivism (which "exaggerates its business" in denying the ideal, which as the criterion of evaluation cannot be ignored), and seeking the essence of things, we find a hierarchy of essences each claiming to be autonomous, the highest being the ideal value or demand beyond, yet immanent in, the region of facts. The knowing process culminates in the reflective self-positing of pure subjectivity. Its antepenultimate stage²⁸ is pure self (*jīva*) as consciousness of *I*, and at this stage there is only one self.²⁹ The penultimate stage is God (*Ishvara*), pure self with reference to the potentiality of all actual worlds. The ultimate stage is pure consciousness (*Brahman*), with no I-hood and no question of other individuals.

²⁷ Which is true Vedanta, he claims—stated correctly in K. C. Bhattacharya's *The Subject as Freedom* but wrongly in his "Concept of the Absolute and its Alternative Forms."

²⁸ Though he rejects this phrase, finding this stage somehow coordinate with the following (though not in the sense of Brahman dividing into God and self).

²⁹ The doctrine, controversial among Vedantists, of monopsychism (*ekajīva-vāda*).

If, alternatively, we adopt the objective attitude, we reject knowing in order to apprehend the object. This is *feeling*, which also has three levels—pleasure-pain and emotion, aesthetic creation, aesthetic appreciation. The de-subjectification of emotion in aesthetic creation and that of mere pleasure-pain in appreciation point to the fact that aesthetic qualities, including beauty, are pure objects indifferent to subjectivity. This is the correspondence theory: truth, instead of being constituted by logic, as in the preceding alternative, is simply *felt* to be true, with immediate certainty. Art and aesthetic joy in it are purely objective.³⁰ The feeling process culminates in pure objectivity, and its ultimate ideal is that of surrender to the infinite object.

The disjunction of knowledge and object thus offers two alternatives, but alternative to their disjunctive unity is their dialectical unity. This presents the possibility of a third alternative attitude, the dialectical, which is expressed in conation or *willing*. This likewise has three levels—instinctive and other unreflective activities, ordinary voluntary will, moral will (i.e., willing the good). The dialectical attitude tends toward a concrete subjectivity which posits a negative object by negating the positive object, and by comprehending this negation enriches subjectivity into a dialectical synthesis. Will is a self-transcending activity which reaches its terminal point in the object which is said to be created. The objective facts, however, from their own point of view are not determined by will, but by their own objective causes; there is a pre-established harmony (i.e., alternation) between will and the facts of the world. At the highest level the action is determined by the mere *ought* or *good*, which is a matured disposition of our past actions *as good*, and this presupposes that also at the time of their occurrence these actions were reflectively apprehended as good.³¹ Reflective

³⁰ The hierarchy of the arts depends on the amount of that indifference to subjectivity which is the essence of aesthesis. The lowest art is poetry, bound up as it is with thought; higher is music, which is free from thought; still higher is painting, which is free even from the quasi-intellectual modes of music; highest is architecture, where the thought element is completely eliminated.

³¹ The ethical standard is social instinct. The ideal known by transcendental reflection exists in the actual, although in a disguised form.

actions consequently can never be interpreted in terms of unreflective ones. This originality of reflective activity (not indeterminism, something unknown to Indian philosophy) is freedom.³²

Thus the three alternative attitudes lead to three alternative absolutes. The dialectic is somewhat different in the three cases. Knowing *subordinates* feeling, feeling *rejects* knowing, and willing while subjective *incorporates* the objective.³³ These are alternative philosophies.³⁴ He says:

There is to be no preferential treatment of these three attitudes, and these themselves are related to one another in such a way that on the assumption of one the others as *independent* have to be either rejected or ignored. There is thus *absolute alternation* between the attitudes. Yet in each the unity sought for is gained.³⁵

Subjective idealism, which speaks in the language of truth (constituted by forms of thinking), objective realism, which speaks in the language of necessity (constituted by self-subsistent Platonic forms of objective thought), and dialectic, which speaks in the language of negation, are equally correct and complete systems capable of explaining all phenomena, but they reject each other, and there is no passage from one to another. *Each* is correct, but *all* are not correct; three alternatives do not mean three facts. There are three objective worlds—objects created by knowledge, objects which cause feelings, objects which are termini of will—and these cannot be identified theoretically (unless by a superhuman “angelic” insight which we do not have),

Social laws are images of ideals, and so I must observe them (according to “my station and its duties”). Here also there is alternation—between *duty* (what we ought to do) and *right* (what we ought to be or have).

³² Asked whether truth and freedom are the same or opposite, he replied that pure consciousness by itself is truth, pure consciousness as determining the world is freedom, impure truth has an influence of the object, and impure freedom is determinate action accompanied by the feeling of *I*—while pure feeling apprehends only the beauty, etc., of the object and does not disturb *me*.

³³ This distinction, different from that given in his published works, is developed in his forthcoming book.

³⁴ The three alternative philosophies, he remarked, are suggested by the three Critiques of Kant.

³⁵ *Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy*, p. 205.

although in practice we always do identify them.³⁶ Alternation is not a fact of the *empirical* world, where the empirical self has the three functions confused. But when the self *reflects*, it disintegrates into three possibilities. Knowing, feeling, and willing tolerate each other in the finite world of time, but reflectively each *demand*s the subordination, rejection, or incorporation of the others. Ultimately, as an ideal, each is absolute, not simultaneously but alternatively—pure subjectivity (absolute knowing, Truth) or pure object (absolute feeling, Beauty) or dialectical synthesis (absolute willing, Goodness).³⁷

There are many other applications of the principle of alternation. *Thought* may be understood anti-intellectually (inference only between data), intellectually (forms held *a priori* yet referring synthetically to data), or logically (logical construction or pure meaning). *Content of perception* may be understood as object, appearance, or relation. *Image* may be understood as change of perceptual object, withdrawal from percept, or subjectivity referring to percept. *Relation* may be understood as external, internal, or "happening to be coeternal." *Reality* may be understood as actual, ideal, or infinite. All these alternatives represent the objective, subjective, and dialectical attitudes respectively. In political philosophy, the alternative ethical ideals of right, duty,³⁸ and love lead respectively to democracy (including communism), fascism, and super-political religion.³⁹

The ultimate problem of philosophy, according to Bhatta-charya, is the status of alternation itself. Granting that our problems about reality have alternative solutions, must we suppose that reality itself is alternating? This question also has alternative answers. The three philosophies are alternative images

³⁶ He rejected the suggestion that a similar argument would establish three subjective worlds, since the subject of feeling is negated and that of will is identified with that of knowledge as pure consciousness.

³⁷ These represent, respectively, the traditional three "paths" of Hindu religious philosophy—knowledge, love, action (*jnana*, *bhakti*, *karma*); characteristic, respectively, of the schools of Advaita, Vaishnavism (also Nyaya-Vaisheshika), and Tantric Saivism (also Buddhism).

³⁸ Duty, he points out, is most prominent in the Hindu tradition.

³⁹ Alternation of political philosophies incapable of synthesis is what is now called "coexistence."

of reality, but the phrase *image of reality* may mean that reality is nothing but the image, that the image is a function of the reality, or that there is some dialectical unity of one with the negation of the other. In the first case there is no reality but only alternative philosophies, in the second reality itself is alternative, in the third there is one reality but alternative standpoints from which it can be viewed. The first alternative is advocated by Buddhism, the second by Jainism, the third by Vedanta. The alternation of these alternative "super-philosophies" is the last word of philosophy.

Kalidas Bhattacharya's philosophy, with all its intricacy and digression, is founded on the one doctrine of disjunction, rather than contradiction or conjunction, as the fundamental principle of logic. Disjunctive alternatives are equally valid as possibilities, and indeed equally tenable as actualities for different persons, but only one is actual for any one person. This, he points out, is the way we usually do think in ordinary unphilosophical problems. But he defends it also as correct in philosophy, which is always based on a prior commitment to some alternative.

A philosopher does not become an Idealist or an Objectivist through logical arguments. He is an Idealist or an Objectivist at the very start, according as he begins with the subjective or the objective attitude; he only interprets phenomena from the standpoint he has already assumed.⁴⁰

On the one hand, this doctrine avoids the dogmatism which maintains that, if one view is tenable, the opposite view is untenable. On the other hand, it avoids the irrational pseudo-liberalism which would hold contradictory views simultaneously either by some compromise (involving a sacrifice of essential points), by a hierarchical arrangement (involving subordination unacceptable to the subordinated view), or by alleged harmony ("different paths leading up to the same mountain top"). We start from the same unreflective experience. As we reflect philosophically, our paths do not converge but diverge, and their final goals are the alternative forms of the absolute.

(To be concluded)

Tufts University.

⁴⁰ *Object, Content and Relation*, p. 140.

NOTES AND OBSERVATIONS

ROMANTICISM AND CROCE'S CONCEPTION OF SCIENCE

PATRICK ROMANELL

IN 1907 the Royal Society of Naples announced an essay contest on the following theme, "Principal Contemporary Trends in the Theory of Knowledge, with Special Reference to the Philosophy of Science."¹ The winner of the contest was Antonio Aliotta, who has since become notable as a philosopher in his own right as well as a teacher of some of Italy's most gifted students of philosophy to date. His prize-winning essay was published as a sizable book in Palermo in 1912 under the title, *La reazione idealistica contro la scienza*. An English version, *The Idealistic Reaction Against Science*, appeared in London two years later.²

The first part of the book is an excellent historico-systematic analysis of the romantic reaction against science underlying and pervading the once popular philosophical currents within the last seventy-five years, such as, e.g., Austro-German empirio-criticism, English neo-Hegelianism, French intuitionism, and Anglo-American pragmatism. The second part studies the new theories of mathematics and physics—including non-Euclidean geometry, non-Aristotelian logic, and non-Newtonian physics—in relation to "the phenomenon of irrationalism" (p. viii) in contemporary thought. The book is definitely worth reading, and anyone acquainted with Morris R. Cohen's *Reason and Nature* (1931) will readily come to realize how Aliotta anticipates remarkably the courageous position that great American classic in contemporary philosophy takes towards "the insurgence against reason" in recent times.

In the Preface to the English edition the author states that

¹ Michele F. Sciacca, *Storia della filosofia italiana: Il Secolo XX*, II (Milano, 1947), p. 825.

² Antonio Aliotta, *The Idealistic Reaction Against Science*, tr. Agnes McCaskill (London, 1914).

neo-Hegelian idealism, "which came into vogue in Italy after the decline of positivism, now appears to be on the wane," adding flatly that irrationalism, "in spite of the efforts of a few romantic minds, has not taken root in Italy" (pp. vii, viii). Now Professor Aliotta was doubtless a good philosopher in making an appeal throughout his work to the life of reason and defending the cognitive significance of science, but unfortunately he was a poor prophet—at least as far as the subsequent course of Italian philosophical thought is concerned. For the historical fact is that the efforts of a few romantic minds *did* take root in Italy, as is all too clear (in retrospect, to be sure) from the tremendous influence of Benedetto Croce on contemporary Italian culture in general and from the even greater impact of Giovanni Gentile upon Italian education and Fascist politics in particular.

It has been customary to regard the revival of idealism at the turn of the century, particularly in Italy, as a reaction against the positivistic tendencies which prevailed in late 19th-century thought. Aside from Professor Aliotta's ill-fated prophecy with respect to the philosophical situation in Italy, a careful reading of his volume will lead one to see the fallacy which underlies this popular notion as to the origin and nature of Italian neo-idealism. The fallacy in question, which is found even in the accounts of the critics of idealism itself, is one of false premise, namely, that positivism and idealism (as a modern philosophy) are really different in fundamental attitude.

Now then, granting that the neo-idealists Croce and Gentile took upon themselves near the turn of the century the task of "melting the hard ice of positivism"² prevailing in Italian thought during their youth, the logic of the matter is quite a different story. Idealism and positivism, however they may differ in technical details and despite the numerous polemics their respective followers had with each other, have a common temper and share the same goal: the romantic's quest for *ultimate* security. Both are forms of *romanticism*, and this in spite of the repeated claims of their defenders to the contrary. Professor Aliotta sensed many years ago in his prize-winning essay the anti-intellectualist

² Benedetto Croce, *Primi saggi* (Bari, 1919), p. viii.

basis common to idealism and positivism as typical 19th-century philosophies, but the man in Italy who has performed the most effective job of exposing their romantic roots is a former student of his, Nicola Abbagnano.

On Abbagnano's thesis, it is not at all difficult to explain the reason for the rebirth of idealism in Italy and its eventual success there: neo-Hegelian idealism came to Italy at the beginning of the present century not to *disapprove* of the positivist's goal of security but to *improve* upon its realization, and the romantic foundations of that powerful movement could not be shaken effectively until a terrible crisis like the Second World War made them obvious. To get a better appreciation of Professor Abbagnano's thesis regarding the romantic character of *both* positivism and idealism, let us look more closely at the highly instructive historical relations of romanticism to the two philosophies.⁴

Historically viewed, romanticism as a whole is a 19th-century phenomenon in Western culture which represents a great rebellion against the Age of Reason. Psychologically, romanticism is an expression of man's reaction to the obvious but disconcerting limitations of his *ordinary* reason and therefore, by extension, a reaction against science, which is but a product of that same fallible power of mankind. Philosophically, romanticism gets crystallized into two major schools of thought during the last century: idealism and positivism. In the earlier half, paradoxically but significantly enough, the idealistic variety of romanticism develops in two opposite directions. Romantic idealism first *glorifies* reason but then *de-glorifies* it by reducing human intelligence to a *practical* function expressive of "the will to live." This is obvious from a comparative study of the development of post-Kantian idealism, but the most neglected point of all, which is only implicit in Abbagnano's thesis and not explicit in his historical works, is that the positivistic variety of romanticism dominating the philosophical scene in the latter part of the century *also* develops in two opposite though corresponding directions. For romantic positivism at first *glorifies* science but later on *de-*

⁴ Nicola Abbagnano, "Contemporary Science and Freedom," this *Review*, V (1952), 361-2.

glorifies it by reducing human thought to an *economic* function expressive of "the struggle for existence."

Thus the two 19th-century philosophical movements under consideration are exactly parallel in spirit, if not in letter, both in their negative as well as in their positive counterparts. That is to say, Richard Avenarius, the sceptical positivist, is to Schopenhauer what Auguste Comte, the dogmatic positivist, is to Hegel. And just as Schopenhauer attempts in idealistic terms to satisfy the romantic's quest for security by advising an *escape* from Nature, so Avenarius tries to do the same thing in positivistic terms by advocating a *return* to her. This one-to-one correspondence holds because positivism as a philosophy is, as Professor Abbagnano neatly put it, "*romanticism in science*."⁵ It is, in a word, *scientism*—whether positive or negative in species does not matter as far as their common romantic genus goes.

The foregoing analysis of philosophical romanticism, positive and negative as well as old and new, not only serves to substantiate Abbagnano's contention that the idealistic and positivistic philosophies of the past century move within a "common horizon" of security, and hence that their revival in Italy as elsewhere in our own century constitutes essentially "an historical survival"⁶ of characteristically nineteenth-century thought. It also helps us to understand what otherwise might be a mystery, namely, how a philosopher can be an idealist in some respects and at the same time be some sort of positivist in others. An examination of Croce's conception of science will lead to a neat confirmation of this rather paradoxical conclusion.

In an autobiographical passage, Croce admits frankly that in his earliest essays (dating from 1893) he had not been aware of the fundamental distinction which must be made between "two orders of concepts": (a) those of a philosophical nature and (b) those popularly known as scientific.⁷ On this distinction, which

⁵ N. Abbagnano, *Storia della filosofia*, II, 2 (Torino, 1950), 246 (italics added).

⁶ "Contemporary Science and Freedom," p. 373. Also, "La metodologia delle scienze nella filosofia contemporanea," *Saggi di critica delle scienze* (Torino, 1950), pp. 15-16.

⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. xi. Also, *Philosophy of the Practical: Economic and Ethic*, tr. Douglas Ainslie (London, 1913), p. 127.

comes to maturity in his philosophic system (after 1900), rests his whole treatise in logical theory, *Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept* (1905). According to the Crocian system, logic is identical with philosophy, and philosophy is identical with historiography. This being the case, philosophy is the only "true science."^{*} It works with "pure" concepts and uses "the speculative method," which is a systematic synthesis of what is traditionally called induction and deduction. On the other hand, what most people call "science" or "the sciences" is not really such at all in the strict logical sense to Croce. For he holds that the mathematical and natural sciences work with "impure" concepts, originating from the *practical* needs of men. Since "impure" concepts, *ex hypothesi*, are not the product of the theoretical activity of the human mind, they are not in reality concepts at all but "pseudo-concepts." Therefore, for Croce, the various sciences are "pseudo-sciences." In short, *technically* speaking, but only so, Croce is Comte turned upside down: it is the so-called positive sciences which deal with "pseudo-problems," not metaphysics!

Corresponding to the difference between mathematics and the natural sciences (physical, biological, social), there are two types of "pseudo-concepts" in the Crocian logic, "abstract" (e.g., Euclidean space) and "empirical" (e.g., mechanical causality), respectively. Now to Croce, what makes scientific concepts "impure," from a logical standpoint, is that they lack one or the other of the two properties which "pure" philosophical concepts (e.g., human will) are assumed to enjoy, namely, following Hegel, concreteness and universality. Either they are universal but not concrete, like the concepts of mathematics, or, conversely, they are concrete but not universal, like the concepts of the natural sciences.

Moreover, and this is the most crucial issue of all, in Croce's logic the mathematical and natural sciences exhaust the whole field, there being (excluding philosophy) no other sciences besides them. This may sound like an innocent statement of fact, but its consequences are tremendous for value theory. The statement

^{*} B. Croce, *Estetica*, 6th ed. (Bari, 1928), p. 35.

implies that "no normative sciences exist" (*ibid.*, p. 56)—which is exactly what Croce infers explicitly.

Given his general point of view of "absolute historicism," where everything that happens in the world must *automatically* happen for the best (in the Hegelian sense of the identity of the real and the rational), it follows necessarily that "no normative sciences exist." Yet, to deny the existence of normative sciences is to deny the difference between the real and the ideal, the evident implication of which is to affirm the value of the *status quo* and thereby make a mockery of human history. But if all this is the case, how could Croce have been the ardent critic of Fascism that he indeed was, fortunately—which implies that there was something wrong in Italy at least—and still have remained a consistent Hegelian? Thus, the great paradox of Croce's life is that he was a liberal in politics but not in philosophy.

As to the reason adduced by Croce for banishing the normative sciences themselves from the realm of inquiry, his argument is that those who believe in a special class of value judgments fail to realize that, "We do not desire things because we consider them useful or good, but we consider them useful or good because we desire them" (*ibid.*, p. 55). This is an old Spinozist argument employed by voluntarists of diverse schools of thought, but it misses the whole point concerning the psychological problem of motivation in relation to ethics. For the express aim of ethics as a *normative* science is precisely to educate us to desire things *because* we consider them useful or good, that is, after deliberation. Were things to be considered automatically useful or good on the mere ground of our desiring them, there would be no need at all for ethics to supply a rational basis for resolving our conflicting desires.

In any event, the very fact that the normative sciences have no place in Croce's logic is the first concrete piece of evidence for his romantic philosophy of science. A romantic mind always feels uncomfortable when confronted with a precarious world like ours, where ideals are just possibilities and, being such, have neither prior nor ultimate *guarantee* whatsoever of getting actualized. Besides, one of the greatest ironies in 20th-century philosophy in Italy is that a brilliant thinker like Croce—whose

system, composed as it is of "the four moments of the spirit," turns out to be an elaborate series of variations on four great themes of the good life (the aesthetic, the logical, the economic, the ethical)—should end up by denying the existence of normative sciences as such.

If one evidence of Croce's quest for security has to do with the sciences he *excludes* from his system, the other and more obvious piece of evidence may be gathered from his particular way of interpreting the nature of the sciences he *includes* in it.

The Crocian doctrine of logic maintains that the pseudo-conceptual constructs of the mathematical and natural sciences presuppose the prior conceptual activity of historico-philosophical thought. If this is so, what is the function of such "pseudo-sciences"? All that they are competent to do, according to Croce, is to "schematize" whatever knowledge has already been attained. In other words, the calculations and classifications of the various sciences have no "theoretical importance" but "merely practical importance."⁹ Consequently, the mathematical and natural sciences have no "special object" of inquiry; the special thing about them is their *practical* "mode of treatment" (*ibid.*, p. 343) of what is known through other means, artistic and historico-philosophical.

Except for philosophy (the only *true* science for Croce), there is no such thing as *pure* science. All sciences in his system are interpreted as "impure," that is, as purely practical. Accordingly, the popular distinction between pure and applied sciences is fallacious, all sciences being *applied*. Even "pure" mathematics, alas, is "impure" to Croce! What differentiates mathematics as a "formalistic" science is its recourse to deduction as against induction, the method of the natural sciences. But, like shorthand, mathematics is only good for manipulating "dead" symbols, not for understanding "living" reality. The development of non-Euclidean geometry is to Croce proof positive that all mathematical principles are purely hypothetical or "conventional," their only

⁹ B. Croce, *History: Its Theory and Practice*, tr. Douglas Ainslie (New York, 1923), p. 79.

¹⁰ B. Croce, *Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept*, tr. Douglas Ainslie (London, 1917), p. 353.

purpose being "to aid memory" (*ibid.*, p. 370). It is pretty clear from all this that his utilitarian interpretation of the new mathematics, the results of which he never really appreciated, suffers from considerable ambiguity.

Croce has less difficulty in pointing to the practical character of the other group of scientific disciplines in his system, the natural or empirical sciences. These sciences, he emphasizes, manipulate *things*, not mere symbols. However, in contrast to what most investigators believe, he holds that the natural sciences do not constitute the theoretical basis of the various technologies, but *are* the technologies themselves, their actual foundation being history and, ultimately, philosophy (*ibid.*, p. 350). To put this identification of science and technology in his own words, "The natural sciences are not directed to action, but *are*, themselves, actions: their practical character is not extrinsic, but *constitutive*" (*ibid.*, p. 332). In short, all science *qua* science is technology. But this does not mean that the scientists themselves are mere technicians. On the one hand, Croce admits, insofar as an individual scientist (say, Darwin) makes a discovery in his field of research, to that extent "he is a discoverer of truth" and a contributor to "revolutions in the natural sciences," which "represent progress in historical knowledge" (*ibid.*, p. 352). On the other hand, insofar as such historical knowledge undergoes schematization, to that extent it gains practical value as science, but loses theoretical value as history.

In this connection it should be pointed out that Croce usually gets criticized for setting up an artificial dualism between the theoretical character of philosophy and the practical character of science. However, the artificial dualism in question turns out actually to be between the *scientist* on one side and *science* on the other, or to be exact, between science *qua* history and science *qua* science. Taking his revenge on those who disparage the *history* of science, Croce contends that it is that history which constitutes science *alive*, while science taken out of its historical context is merely science *canned* (*ibid.*, p. 351). Our author is doubtless scoring a good point here.

Croce's *economic* interpretation of science derives from two main historical sources: indirectly, from the left-wing Hegelian

economist, Karl Marx, and directly, from the left-wing positivistic physicist, Ernst Mach. As to the motives behind that interpretation, one is quite sound. Croce is urging philosophers and scientists to recognize their own "limits" and stop being arrogant "bunglers."¹¹ The other motive, however, is not so sound and, in fact, contradicts the one just cited. Croce affirms the *practical* import of science at the cost of denying its *theoretical* value. Obviously, a doctrine that assigns utility-value alone to the various sciences offers, in reality, only a left-handed compliment to them. "There can be no doubt," he writes, "that empirical concepts are useful; indeed what we maintain is that just because they are useful, they are not true."¹² Now, such a statement is bad enough, but there is something worse which lurks in its manifestation of a so-called "new pragmatism."¹³ "The limited character of the natural sciences," Croce declares with pride and prejudice, "implies the unlimited nature of philosophy."¹⁴

Anticipating in part at least the thought of Hans Vaihinger by pushing the "fictionalistic" strain found in the writings especially of Avenarius and Mach, Croce exploits for his own purposes the dubious presupposition regarding the theoretical weakness of science inherent in the half-hearted romanticism of those two leaders of "empirio-pragmatism," thereby leaving himself free to become a full-fledged neo-Hegelian in philosophy. Finally, just as the less disarming but, at the same time, less reproachable Kant restricted reason in order to make room for faith, so Croce limits the sciences in order to make room for philosophy. And since philosophy is, on his own admission, "the true religion"¹⁵ as well as "the true science," it does for him exactly what faith did for Kant. The quest for security now acquires at long last cosmic assurance, and Croce's own cult of Philosophism as the

¹¹ *Philosophy of the Practical*, p. 121.

¹² *Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept*, p. 341.

¹³ *Philosophy of the Practical*, p. 304.

¹⁴ *Estetica*, p. 36.

¹⁵ B. Croce, *Logica come scienza del concetto puro*, 4th ed. (Bari, 1920), p. 286.

religion of History replaces, despite his best intentions not to succumb, Comte's cult of Scientism as "the religion of humanity." Thus the extremes of romantic idealism and romantic positivism coincide.¹⁶

University of Texas, Galveston.

¹⁶ This paper is a condensed version of a paper read at the 121st Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Section L, at Berkeley on December 29, 1954.

BOOKS RECEIVED

SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS *

V. C. CHAPPELL AND STAFF

BATTAGLIA, FELICE. *La Valeur dans l'Histoire*, tr. by M. L. Roure. Preface by Régis Jolivet. Paris: Aubier, 1955. 206 pp. 525 fr.—An evaluative study of the philosophy of history as developed by Croce and Gentile. The author agrees with Nietzsche that the idealist's view of history fails, in the last analysis, to account for the moral force of the individual; this failure stems from the more basic difficulty of not admitting a sufficiently radical distinction between actuality and potentiality. He suggests that if creative value is to be maintained in history, the syntheses which form history should be regarded as "open" rather than "closed," and irrationality should be admitted as an historical force. — A. R.

BENOIT, HUBERT. *The Supreme Doctrine: Psychological Studies in Zen Thought*, tr. by Terence Gray. Foreword by Aldous Huxley. New York: Pantheon Books, 1955. xv, 248 pp. \$4.50.—A masterful attempt to express the teachings of Zen Buddhism in terms that the Western mind can understand. The book contains a wealth of psychological insight; one feels its force even in spite of a somewhat too literal translation (from the French original). The chapter on anxiety is especially fine. Altogether a rich and important work. — D. R.

BERKELEY, GEORGE. *The Works of George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne*, ed. by A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop, Vol. VII, ed. by A. A. Luce. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1955. viii, 389 pp. 30s.—Contains a variety of short pieces, some published for the first time, whose main interest is biographical and historical. Included are Berkeley's sermons, a series of essays against free-thinking, travel journals, and two pieces on America. — E. T.

BLUCK, R. S. *Plato's Phaedo: A Translation of Plato's Phaedo with Introduction, Notes and Appendices*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955. x, 208 pp. 21s.—A welcome addition to the series of translation-commentaries initiated by the late F. M. Cornford. Mr. Bluck's English *Phaedo* reads smoothly and naturally; it is, like

* Books received will be acknowledged in this section by a brief resumé, report or criticism. Such acknowledgment does not preclude more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. The summaries and comments will be written by the Managing Editor and his staff of Assistants, with the occasional help of others. Reports have been contributed, in this issue, by Alan Ross Anderson, Alvin Feinman, Irwin C. Lieb, Louis Mackey and Roderick N. Smart.

the original, a work of literature as well as of philosophy. The running commentary is clear, well-informed and helpful, being mainly designed to get the reader through the text. More detailed pieces of analysis and interpretation are placed in an Appendix; here Mr. Bluck argues that Plato's Forms are not merely abstract logical universals, but substantial "things," which "cause" the appearances in the material world. He also defends, in opposition to the majority view, the validity of the crucial proof of the soul's indestructibility at 105E ff. — V. C. C.

BONFORTE, JOHN. *The Philosophy of Epictetus*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. xiv, 146 pp. \$3.00.—Material from Epictetus' Discourses and maxims, arranged into 116 brief, readable chapters. The translation is that of T. W. Higginson, made in 1865. — E. T.

BORNEMISZA, STEPHEN TH. *The Unified System Concept of Nature*. New York: Vantage Press, 1955. viii, 137 pp. \$3.00.—The author's unified system concept evolves as a result of a new approach to the unification of physics and biology. Phenomena can be regarded either as cyclical and recurrent or as unique and structural, but from a wider perspective, every event can be taken as a phase in a recurrent process. Such a relativity allows us to consider the universe as constituted by nothing but recurrent, self-maintaining processes, some being the objects of physics and others of biology but both united as processes in a totality. Of particular interest are the author's discussions of the dependence and independence of the organism on its surroundings and of the relation of the cyclical and the unique to time. — M. F.

R. B. BRAITHWAITE. *Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1955. 76 pp. \$1.25.—An extension of game theory to the two-person game involving collaboration. In a detailed discussion of a simple case, the author argues persuasively that his methods yield a strategy which is *sensible*, *prudent* and *fair* for both participants. One of the more interesting by-products is a method for comparing inter-personal preference scales, thus providing an answer to one of the standard objections to the Hedonistic calculus. Braithwaite's approach is novel, and should be of interest to game-theorists as well as philosophers. — A. R. A.

BRIDGMAN, P. W. *Reflections of a Physicist*, 2nd ed. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. 573 pp. \$6.00.—An enlargement of the 1950 volume under the same title. Ten new essays are divided under the original sections dealing with operational analysis, specific scientific problems, and social science. — M. F.

BRÜNING, WALTHER. *Der Mensch als handelndes Wesen; El Hombre como Ser Actante*. German and Spanish. Cordoba: Universidad de Cordoba, Instituto de Metafisica, 1955. 42 pp.—A section of the author's *Philosophical Anthropology*, dealing with the pragmatic conception of man as acting being. This view rejects the notions of a rationally ordered world and of a supra-temporal nature of man, holding that man creates through his acts both himself and the world. — E. E.

- BUCHLER, JUSTUS. *Nature and Judgment*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. 210 pp. \$3.75.—An imaginative and provocative attempt to provide a fresh analysis of man as knower, doer, and maker. At the heart of Buchler's analysis is a theory of judgment which encompasses not only assertive judgment, but also "active" and "exhibitive" judgment: The theory is explicated and elaborated by an examination of query (more comprehensive than inquiry), experience and meaning. — R. B.
- BUTLER, RICHARD, O. P. *The Mind of Santayana*. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1955. xiv, 234 pp. \$4.00.—Fr. Butler centers attention on Santayana's doctrine of essence, seen as the expression of a total outlook on life, as well as of a theory of knowledge. The basic criticism is that Santayana's scepticism and "essentialism" arise from a self-defeating doubt about the existence of knowledge. — R. H.
- CAHN, EDMOND. *The Moral Decision: Right and Wrong in the Light of American Law*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955. 342 pp. \$5.00.—Believing that the law is "a rich repository of moral knowledge" and that moral rules gain full reality only in their application to concrete cases, the author, a professor of law, examines actual court cases for the moral conflicts they reveal and the moral insights they may yield. The aim is not merely to instruct the reader but to develop his ability to make wise moral choices by presenting, with full attention to their complexities, a number of difficult cases. Professor Cahn's analyses are carried out with wisdom and sensitivity. R. G. S.
- COPLESTON, F. C. *Aquinas*. The Pelican Philosophy Series, A 349. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1955. 261 pp. \$0.85.—A presentation, lucid and concise, of Aquinas' chief philosophical views, set against the historical background out of which they developed and supplemented by an appraisal of their present-day significance. Fr. Copleston's writing is precise without being elaborately technical, simple without being superficial; he succeeds in saying something both to the general reader and to the philosophical specialist. — L. H. E.
- CROCE, BENEDETTO. *History as the Story of Liberty*, tr. by Sylvia Sprigge. Meridian Books, M 17. New York: Noonday Press, 1955. 333 pp. \$1.35.—A reprint of the English version of Croce's illuminating essays on history and historiography. The Italian edition was published in 1938. — V. C. C.
- DARWIN, CHARLES. *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*. Preface by Margaret Mead. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. xi, 372 pp. \$6.00.—A re-issue of Darwin's pioneer work on expression. In addition to the text, this edition includes a brief preface by Margaret Mead and added illustrations meant to show the results of some recent work in the field established by Darwin's inquiry. — R. B.
- EDWARDS, PAUL. *The Logic of Moral Discourse*. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955. 248 pp. \$4.00.—Maintains that the emotive theory

need not conflict with the common understanding of ethical judgments, since ethical judgments ordinarily are both descriptions of facts and expressions of attitudes. The author does admit that certain "fundamental" judgments cannot be analysed in this way, and are nothing but expressions of attitudes. The argument is often persuasive, but the limitation of ethical inquiry to semantic analysis seems arbitrary.
— R. H.

FIRTH, RAYMOND. *The Fate of the Soul: An Interpretation of Some Primitive Concepts*. The Frazer Lecture for 1955. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1955. 45 pp. \$0.50.—An examination of the social functions of eschatological beliefs in primitive societies, based mainly upon a study of the Tikopia, both pagan and Christian.
— E. T.

GEYL, PIETER. *Use and Abuse of History*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955. vi, 97 pp. \$2.50.—This work, the Yale Terry Lectures for 1954, provides a condensed survey of historiography from the earliest times to the present day. Comments on individual authors are brief but deft. The author renews his polemic against Toynbee and other system-builders who impose imaginative constructions on history. A tone of genteel common sense and judicious balance pervades the work; this makes it, if unexciting, at least quite satisfying.
— D. R.

GOULD, JOHN. *The Development of Plato's Ethics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1955. xiii, 240 pp. \$4.75.—An attempt to account for the shift in Plato's ethical views from the Socratic ideal of personal decision in the early Dialogues to the institutionalized morality of the *Laws*. The author's interpretations are fresh and illuminating, and his central thesis—that the shift in Plato's view is a function of a growing attention to the conditions, social and natural, imposed upon moral man by the actual world—is well-supported. One of the best features of Mr. Gould's work is his attempt to recover something like the original senses of crucial Platonic terms. He is able to make much better sense of the Socratic "virtue is knowledge," for example, by interpreting, with considerable justification, *ἐπιστήμη* as technique rather than science, as a species of "knowing how" rather than of "knowing that."
— V. C. C.

HARPER, RALPH. *The Sleeping Beauty*. New York: Harper & Bros., 1955. 144 pp. \$2.50.—A fluent essay in contemporary *Kulturkritik*, flexibly but not always happily strung to the interpretation of a fairy tale. The author submits, drawing extensively upon Marcel and Buber, that nostalgia, homesickness, is the characteristic moral sentiment of our time. As an index and reminder of man's want of a true present, and especially as a potential signpost to its recovery, nostalgia holds out promise. It is suggested—at odds with a Humanism such as Sartre's, and with Heideggerian "waiting"—that true presence, whether of Person or of Nature, must depend upon and serve the realization of Divine Presence.
— A. F.

HARTMAN, GEOFFREY H. *The Unmediated Vision: An Interpretation of Wordsworth, Hopkins, Rilke, and Valéry*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954. xii, 206 pp. \$5.00.—Poetry is frankly regarded by the author as a mode of knowledge; as such, it presupposes a mediating principle, by means of which the mind, in a poetic act reducing experience to meaning, is able to overcome the "tyranny" of the senses. But the dissipation of "tradition," the unavailability of mediating symbols, as once Christianity afforded, has left the modern poet experience only with which to mediate experience; perception itself must somehow be rendered creative of an order at once mimetic and synthetic. It is as venturers in such "unmediated" (i.e., self-mediated) vision that the subjects of Mr. Hartman's study are taken; he interprets their work with sensitivity and craft. — A. F.

HULME, T. E. *Further Speculations* by T. E. Hulme, ed. by Sam Hynes. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955. xxi, 220 pp. \$4.50.—A collection of previously unpublished essays—philosophical, literary and critical—presenting the influential views of T. E. Hulme and throwing new light upon the complex personality of their originator. The book also includes Hulme's war diary, his controversy with Russell on war, some poems and fragments, and a complete bibliography of his writings. — A. R.

IBSEN, HENRIK. *Peer Gynt: A Dramatic Poem in Five Acts*, tr. by Horace Maynard Finney. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. x, 127 pp. \$3.75.—Ibsen's epic drama rendered, not altogether successfully, into English verse. The idiom is sometimes unnatural and the verse tends to be rigid and sing-song. — V. C. C.

JAMES, WILLIAM. *Pragmatism, and Four Essays from the Meaning of Truth*. Meridian Books, M 16. New York: Noonday Press, 1955. 269 pp. \$1.25.—This compact edition reprints James's most important writings on pragmatism, as first selected by R. B. Perry in the edition of 1943. — V. C. C.

JASPERS, KARL. *Reason and Existenz*, tr. with an introduction by William Earle. New York: Noonday Press, 1955. 157 pp. \$3.50.—Jaspers' Groningen lectures of 1935. The first lecture presents a challenging interpretation of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche and their importance for the contemporary philosophical situation. Lectures 2, 3 and 4 develop the central notions of Jaspers' philosophy such as the Encompassing, communication, and the role of rational thought. The final lecture explores some of the implications of these views, in connection with the radical contributions of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, for contemporary philosophizing. — D. R.

JUNG, C. G. and W. PAULI. *The Interpretation of Nature and the Psyche*, tr. by R. F. C. Hull and Priscilla Silz. Bollingen Series, LI. New York: Pantheon Books, 1955. vii, 247 pp. \$3.00.—Consists of two papers, Jung's "Synchronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle," and Pauli's "The Influence of Archetypal Ideas on the Scientific Theories

of Kepler." The latter is of interest as an application of Jungian psychology. The idea of synchronicity in Jung's paper is defined as "the simultaneous occurrence of a certain psychic state with one or more external events which appear as meaningful parallels to the momentary subjective state," and as "acausal orderedness." This principle is put forth as a necessary supplement to the causality principle, to which it can in no way be reduced. The evidence for this view is drawn from fields as diverse as microphysics and astrology, and is supported by many references to the history of thought. Jung perhaps fails to be fully convincing, but he has succeeded in illuminating an important yet hitherto highly obscure field of inquiry. — D. R.

KELSEN, HANS. *Foundations of Democracy*. Ethics, Vol. LXVI, No. 1, Pt. II. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955. 101 pp.—A "scientific . . . objective study of a social phenomenon," not an argument for democracy. The author maintains that the historical opposition between autocracy and democracy reflects the opposition between philosophical absolutism and philosophical relativism. Only relativism can justify an egalitarian democracy ruled by a majority, since today's truths may be to-morrow's errors; Christian and Natural Law theories of democracy are criticised. The work, unfortunately, lacks an adequate philosophical foundation. The discussion of the function of democracy fails to be fully convincing because the underlying distinction between philosophical absolutism and relativism is oversimplified and unclear. — R. G. S.

KOREN, HENRY J., C. S. SP. *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Animate Nature*. St. Louis: B. Herder, 1955. xiii, 341 pp. \$4.75.—An elementary textbook of Thomistic psychology, presenting traditional doctrines in traditional terms, and embodying pedagogical aids—summaries, questions and suggested readings—at the end of each chapter. — E. T.

KÖRNER, STEPHAN. *Conceptual Thinking: A Logical Inquiry*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1955. viii, 301 pp. \$5.50.—An important survey of the ways concepts are used. Part I deals with the logic of ostensive concepts (involving two relations not usually recognized, viz., inclusion-or-overlap and exclusion-or-overlap). Part II deals with epistemological problems, and Part III with ethics, aesthetics and metaphysics. The discussions, though sometimes too technically presented and sometimes too brief, are frequently illuminating, especially those on entailment and on the applications of mathematics. — R. N. S.

LAMONT, W. D. *The Value Judgment*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. xv, 335 pp. \$6.00.—An independent attempt to discover the standards of judging goodness and right, based on a description of the ways in which such judgments arise in economics and law. The approach and outcome are generally Kantian, and the author concludes with an effort to reconcile the claims of causality and freedom. — R. H.

LAZEROWITZ, MORRIS. *The Structure of Metaphysics*. New York: Humanities Press, 1955. xiii, 280 pp. \$5.00.—The essays which comprise

this book (all but three have been published previously) represent a series of earnest attempts to understand the nature of metaphysical utterances, and to account for their "abiding fascination" for the human intellect. Arguing on the basis of the familiar distinction of the logical empiricists (itself not questioned), the author maintains that metaphysical statements are neither empirical nor a priori; but neither are they, thereby, merely verbal or utterly nonsensical, as the older positivism held. They are, rather, "linguistic innovations," made for the ultimate purpose of satisfying some unconscious need or desire. Metaphysical sentences actually denote "the unconscious contents of our minds," and the metaphysician's belief that he is announcing a theory about the world or reality is strictly an illusion, "produced by altering [at a pre-conscious level] the use of a word or expression." Professor Lazerowitz is somewhat limited in his understanding of metaphysics by his positivistic assumptions. Most metaphysicians would claim that they assert necessary propositions saying something about the real—including the empirical—world. Failure to recognize even the possibility of such propositions makes much of Professor Lazerowitz's account seem irrelevant to what practicing metaphysicians themselves understand of their task. — V. C. C.

LEWIS, CLARENCE IRVING. *The Ground and Nature of the Right*. Woodbridge Lectures, No. 5. New York: Columbia University Press, 1955. vi, 97 pp. \$2.50.—The author sketches, briefly and somewhat informally, the foundations of a theory of ethical right which is both "naturalistic" and "rationalistic." The rightness of an act depends upon two things; its conformity to a right rule or principle and the goodness of its consequences—the former is rationally, the latter empirically, determined. Besides this central ethical thesis, the book includes a rather routine discussion of non-ethical modes of rightness (e.g., rightness of belief) and some interesting if inconclusive suggestions about the ultimate ground of the right. — R. B.

MATHIS, LELAND. *Possible Developments in Materialism*. Riverside, Ill.: Mimeographed, 1955. 40 pp. \$1.00.—Convinced of the truth of materialism, which he associates with a "leftist" political outlook, the author argues that traditional philosophic, religious, and artistic insights ought nevertheless to be preserved, by retaining old words and emotions stripped of their supernatural and idealistic associations. — R. H.

MAURIAC, FRANÇOIS. *Words of Faith*, tr. by Edward H. Flannery. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. 118 pp. \$2.75. — A collection of six addresses on such questions as the emptiness and despair of nihilism and materialism vs. the richness and hope of Christian life, the use of evil in literature, and the task of the Catholic intellectual. — E. E.

MAYO, H. B. *Democracy and Marxism*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1955. xi, 364 pp. \$4.00.—A scholarly yet very readable analysis and criticism of Marxism according to the "Moscow orthodoxy," stressing problems of Marxist theory of knowledge, of science and of history, and virtually omitting consideration of Marxist economics.

Attempting to be partisan without being unfair, the author devotes the final chapters to an exposition of democratic theory and compares it to Marxism. The obscurities of the democratic theory make the constructive argument less authoritative than the destructive criticisms. This does not, however, remove the main value of what is an enlightening study of competing political philosophies. — R. G. S.

MELZER, JOHN HENRY. *Philosophy in the Classroom: A Report*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1954. vii, 192 pp. \$2.50.—A survey of the practices and problems of American teachers of philosophy, based upon nearly 350 answers to a comprehensive questionnaire covering courses, curriculum problems, class preparation, grading, professional ethics, and advancement. The report is liberally sprinkled with direct quotations. — V. C. C.

METZGER, ARNOLD. *Freiheit und Tod*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1955. xii, 290 pp. DM16.—The author of this interesting study seeks to understand being in its unity—das Sein des Seienden—in terms of free will, the unifying base between death (which as the limit of being is its determinant) and existence (which, as the counterpart to death, is the source of permanence at various levels). The work is rich in ideas and suggestive in its interpretations, though it suffers at times from a lack of clarity in expression. Part of Chapter Two appeared in this *Review*, IV (1950). — L. H. E.

NESBIT, FRANK FORD. *Language, Meaning and Reality: A Study of Symbolism*. New York: Exposition Press, 1955. 181 pp. \$3.00.—A popular book on semantics, illustrating and commenting on uses of symbols in the social and physical sciences. The author writes best when he deals with subtle uses of language in practical affairs and in politics, but in clarifying notions central to semantics he is too often imprecise and obscure. His selection of quotations and references suggests, furthermore, that he is unacquainted with much of the best recent work in semantics. — I. C. L.

NEUMANN, ERICH. *The Great Mother: An Analysis of the Archetype*, tr. by Ralph Manheim. Bollingen Series, XLVII. New York: Pantheon Books, 1955. xliii, 380 pp.; 185 plates. \$7.50.—A sumptuous volume, offering a thorough-going study of the Great Mother Archetype of Jungian psychology, based on pictorial material from the Eranos Archive at Ascona. The translation is excellent. — D. R.

READ, HERBERT. *Icon and Idea: The Function of Art in the Development of Human Consciousness*. The Charles Eliot Norton Lectures for 1953-1954. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955. 161 pp. \$7.50.—Presents with mature sense and sensibility the thesis that the image-creating activity of the artist is presupposed by the cognitive systems of the scientist and philosopher. The argument is given in the form of a history of the visual image in seven roughly chronological stages, from paleolithic vitalism to modern constructivism; the application to philosophy is rather suggested than carried out. This account of visual art as the primary mode of cognition should prove suggestive not only

to aestheticians, but also to those interested in the theory of emotive meaning, the history of thought, and the problem of "beginning to know." — C. B.

RICE, PHILIP BLAIR. *On the Knowledge of Good and Evil*. New York: Random House, 1955. 299 pp. \$4.50.—This instructive work tries to avoid the parochialism and over-technicality characteristic of so much recent theorizing about ethics. The author examines each of the main current accounts of moral goodness and judgment, and then constructs a view of his own in their light—a view predominantly "naturalistic" in its conception of goodness but partially "non-cognitivist" in its treatment of moral judgment. The rest of the book defends and elaborates this view. Mr. Rice writes perceptively, and his accounts of contemporary ethical theories are lucid and concise. His passion for non-technicality, however, makes the presentation of his own view less convincing than it might have been; his argument is sometimes elusive and fragmentary, and his writing, though vivid, often lacks clarity and precision. Still, this is a book of considerable significance; one hopes that it will mark the beginning of a broader, more constructive approach to the problems of ethical theory. — V. C. C.

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RICKARD, J. A. and JAMES H. MCCROCKLIN. *Our National Constitution: Origins, Development, and Meaning*. Harrisburg, Pa.: The Stackpole Company, 1955. 277 pp.—An historical account of the background and framing of the constitution, together with a clause-by-clause discussion of its provisions. — R. H.

ROBINSON, DANIEL S. *Crucial Issues in Philosophy: Studies of Current Problems and Leading Philosophers from the Standpoint of Philosophical Idealism*. Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1955. 285 pp. \$5.00.—A collection of essays, about half of them published previously. Part I is concerned mainly with theoretical issues arising from the present international political situation; the last essay in Part I is a defense of "philosophic wisdom" against therapeutic positivism. Part II consists of studies in the philosophy of such figures as Royce, Descartes, Whitman, Spengler and Kant. — C. B.

ROUCHIER, LOUIS. *Traité de la Connaissance*. Paris: Gauthier-Villars, 1955. 450 pp. 2,200fr.—An important addition to logical empiricist literature on the nature of scientific knowledge. It argues for the substitution of the conventional for the a priori, of the changeable truths of evolving rationality for the eternal verities of static reason, maintaining that this substitution enables one to avoid pseudo-problems about the nature of knowledge and science. Includes analyses of the natures of deduc-

tive systems, physical theory, language and pseudo-problems, and concludes with a comprehensive history and critique of classical (non-logical-empiricist) theories of knowledge. — M. F.

- SCHOENFELD, CHARLES. *God and Country*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. vi, 119 pp. \$3.00.—An effort to account for the discrepancy between modern man's technological skill and his understanding of moral and social values, which has made human self-destruction a very real threat. The author's conclusions are familiar and not too illuminating. — V. C. C.
- SESMAT, AUGUSTIN. *Dialectique: Hamelin et la Philosophie Chrétienne*. Travaux de l'Institut Catholique de Paris, 3. Paris: Bloud & Gay, 1955. 350 pp.—A comprehensive examination of the role of dialectic in human knowledge. The author shows, in a careful and detailed analysis, how a dialectic such as Hamelin's mistakenly attempts to construct the object of knowledge itself; it is actually a structure corresponding to reality and not reality itself which dialectic produces. Following this, Abbé Sesmat outlines a dialectical system of his own, and seeks to show how it can be used to produce a world-view compatible both with modern science and with recent developments in non-dialectical philosophy. — M. F.
- STACE, W. T. *The Philosophy of Hegel: A Systematic Exposition*. New York: Dover Publications, 1955. x, 526 pp. \$3.95 cloth, \$1.98 paper.—A reprint of a well-known introduction to Hegel's thought, first published in 1923. — R. G. S.
- TERZI, CARLO. *Schopenhauer: Il Male*. Roma: Officium Libri Catholici, 1955. 213 pp.—An assessment of the problem of evil in the philosophy of Schopenhauer, from the point of view of Christian nature-theory. Treats of metaphysical, as well as ethical, evil. — A. R.
- TODOLÍ, JOSÉ, O. P. *Filosofía de la Religión*. Madrid: Editorial Gredos, 1955. 570 pp. 100 pesetas.—The author argues the need for the philosophy of religion as a separate pursuit, since in the modern era the "religious fact" is questioned. A somewhat tendentious history of the breakaway from (Roman) Catholicism and of its philosophical expression is followed by a general Thomistic interpretation of religion and its defense against the views of, e.g., Kant and Otto. But the ambiguities of "being" and its cognates create the suspicion that the author's Thomism is closer to Otto than he thinks, and less clear. — R. N. S.
- USSHER, ARLAND. *Journey Through Dread*. New York: Devin-Adair, 1955. 160 pp. \$3.75.—A critical study of the "shudder before God" (Kierkegaard), the "shudder before death" (Heidegger), and the "shudder before the other person" (Sartre), favoring Sartre. The author's position is largely derived from the nature-mysticism of D. H. Lawrence. His own unscrutinized assumptions are so thoroughly "aesthetic" (in the Kierkegaardian sense) that the religious passion of Kierkegaard, the ontological passion of Heidegger, and the

ethical passion of Sartre appear in his book somewhat distorted.
— L. M.

WILD, JOHN. *The Challenge of Existentialism*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955. 297 pp. \$6.00.—Diagnosing the "breakdown of modern philosophy" as a result of a neglect of existence and metaphysics, leading to a radical separation of theory and practice, the author examines the attempts of existentialism to correct the shortcomings of post-Cartesian "intellectual subjectivity." The book begins with a short history of existentialism, following which are critical expositions of Jaspers, Sartre, Heidegger and Marcel. The range of topics considered—epistemology, ethics and ontology—prevents detailed discussion of any single problem, and both the exposition and the criticism remain on a very general level. The final chapters of the book are devoted to correcting what the author considers the excesses of the existentialistic reaction to intellectualism by supplementing it with realism. Here, however, he promises more than he delivers. Though sometimes too facile, the book constitutes an important attempt to come to grips with existentialism by relating it to trends in traditional philosophy. — A. R.

American Philosophy, ed. by Ralph Winn. New York: Philosophical Library, 1955. 318 pp. \$6.00.—An attempt to introduce readers "at the eleventh grade level" to some leading principles and practitioners of philosophy in America. This undertaking, admittedly difficult, meets with varying success. The book's most satisfactory part consists of essays by various contributors describing the different fields of philosophy; the rest outlines briefly the philosophical doctrines most influential in American thought, and sketches the lives of a wide assortment of American "philosophers," from Jonathan Edwards to Franklin D. Roosevelt, with a one- or two-paragraph selection from the works of each. — E. T.

Concept of Freedom, ed. by Carl W. Grindel, C.M. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1955. xii, 512 pp. \$10.00.—A collection of articles, mainly by members of the faculty of St. John's University, on the concept of freedom as now held and taught by Roman Catholic philosophers. After discussions of the epistemological, metaphysical and psychological aspects of freedom, its relevance in individual acts and in various social contexts (law, government, education, etc.) is described. The book is of considerable interest, and deserves the special prize it received from the Freedoms Foundation. — L. H. E.

Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. by Dagobert D. Runes. New Students Outline Series. Ames, Iowa: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1955. 343 pp. \$1.75.—A reprint, intended for student use. Despite the repudiation by some of the contributors of their articles after editing, the work

as a whole has some value, and some of the pieces are distinguished (e.g., those of Alonzo Church on logic). — V. C. C.

International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, Vol. I, Parts 1 and 2, ed. by Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap and Charles Morris. 2 Vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955. 760 pp. (1-339, 342-760). \$6.00 ea., \$11.00 the set.—These volumes comprise together the first 10 monographs in the series inaugurated 20 years ago by the Institute for the Unity of Science. All of the monographs—many of them now classic—have been published previously. It is unfortunate that a comprehensive index and bibliography have not been included. — R. B.

Knowledge and Expression, ed. by Charles A. Hart. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. XXIX. Washington: The Catholic University of America, 1955. 313 pp. \$3.50.—Contains five papers, four of them dealing with knowledge—Practical Knowledge, Knowledge of Nature, Poetic Knowledge, and Knowledge of Knowledge; the fifth is on the *Summa Contra Gentiles*. Also included are round table discussions, panels on Catholic education, reports and other transactions from the 1955 A. C. P. A. meeting in Philadelphia. — V. C. C.

Studies in American Philosophy. Tulane Studies in Philosophy, Vol. VI. New Orleans: Tulane University Bookstore, 1955. 92 pp. \$2.00.—Seven articles on American philosophy written by members of the Tulane University philosophy department. Except for James K. Feibleman's "Viennese Positivism in the United States," the papers are concerned with the views of individual thinkers: Dewey, James, B. F. Skinner, Royce, Morris, and Whitehead. — R. B.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The Metaphysical Society of America will hold its seventh annual meeting at Fordham University in New York City on March 23 and 24, 1956. The program includes a Symposium on "The Relation of Metaphysics to Theology," with Raphael Demos, George P. Klubertanz, S.J. and Paul Tillich as participants; a Symposium on "The Form of Meaning and Being," with Andrew P. Ushenko and I. M. Bochenski, O.P.; and papers by George B. Burch, Robert S. Brumbaugh and Beatrice and Sydney C. Rome. The Presidential Address, "Metaphysics and the Quality of Man," will be given by Newton P. Stallknecht.

The American Philosophical Society, Eastern Division, has elected the following officers for 1956: President, John H. Randall, Jr.; Vice-President, Milton C. Nahm; Secretary-Treasurer, Lucius Garvin.

The new officers of the Charles S. Peirce Society are as follows: President, Philip P. Wiener; Secretary-Treasurer, Edward H. Madden; Member of Executive Committee, Thomas A. Goudge.

The American Catholic Philosophical Association will have as the theme of its thirtieth annual meeting "The Role of Philosophy in a Catholic Liberal College." The meeting will be held at the Hotel Netherland Plaza, Cincinnati, Ohio, on April 3 and 4, 1956.

The Department of Philosophy of St. Louis University will sponsor a Colloquium on Thomism and Contemporary Philosophy on June 12-15, 1956, under the Chairmanship of Professor James Collins. Listed among the participants are Sidney Hook, Lewis E. Hahn, George P. Klubertanz, S.J., Eliseo Vivas and Vernon Bourke. Admission and other information can be obtained by writing to Reverend W. L. Wade, S.J., St. Louis University, 221 N. Grand, St. Louis 8, Mo.

The second Institute of Philosophy under the direction of the

Reverend Gustave Weigel, S.J. will be held at Mount St. Agnes College in Baltimore during the week of June 25, 1956. The speakers—among them Fr. Weigel, Dr. Gregory Zilboorg, Will Herberg and Dr. Heinrich Rommen—will take as their general theme "Religion and Philosophy." Further information can be obtained from the Registrar of Mount St. Agnes College, Mount Washington, Baltimore 9, Md.

Beginning with this issue, historical articles appearing in the *Review of Metaphysics* will be summarized in *Historical Abstracts*, a standard bibliographical publication in the field of history, edited at the University of Vienna by Eric H. Boehm. Some of the *Review's* articles will also be abstracted in the recently-launched *H. A. Bulletin*, which consists mainly of excerpts from material in various categories (including Philosophy and Interpretation of History) originally published in *Historical Abstracts*.

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
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
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